What's New in Life Science Research

According to a report released two weeks ago by the U.S. Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, "unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is likely that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by end of 2013."

Focusing primarily on areas in which the United States needs to develop biodefense plans and infrastructure, the authors assert that "the risk is growing, not because we're making no progress but because the enemy is adapting and we must constantly anticipate and adapt as well across a broad front."

Certainly, this country has enemies who are attempting to develop biological weapons and would seek to use them against us. Without top security clearance, we won't know much more about their degree of development, although much skepticism exists about the mechanics of weaponizing any biological agent for effective (ie, deadly) dispersal to populations.

However, studies done by various independent research organizations suggest that the panicked love affair with biodefense that intensified over the past 8 years of the Bush administration, has left us less not more safe.

For example, Propublica, a non-profit newsroom, published an online article earlier this month, outlining the findings of the study it conducted with Reader's Digest and FLYPMEDIA. The article's author, Marcus Stern (note: no relation), writes that scientists have become increasingly concerned and some convinced that "the $20 billion biodefense research program the government has undertaken in the past seven years has actually made us less safe than before by vastly increasing the number of researchers and labs authorized to handle deadly substances across America."

This extensive report echoes the findings of the New York Times, which examined the state of biosecurity following the suicide of Dr. Bruce E. Ivins, who killed himself while under indictment for murder charges connected to the fall 2001 anthrax attacks.

While a question mark still hangs over the guilt or innocence of Ivins -- some believe he was psychologically unbalanced, others a scapegoat offered up to solve a puzzling crime -- the case revealed what many scientists and policy-makers had begun to fear, namely, that there are over one thousand researchers like Ivins working at approximately 400 biodefense labs, many newly created, around the country. All of them have access to the most lethal of biological pathogens, including anthrax, ricin, and tularemia, not to mention the capability to bioengineer new pathogens.

What makes this even more disturbing is the fact that not only are civilians at exposed risk, according to a still very relevant 2004 Institute of Medicine report, "the biodefense efforts of the Department of Defense (DoD) are poorly organized to develop and license vaccines, therapeutic drugs, and antitoxins to protect members of the armed forces against biological warfare agents."

What's the solution to this situation? Well, what many of my fellow bloggers have already mentioned, increased investment in basic public health infrastructure to comprehensively lower the risk of harm from any disaster whether "naturally" occurring or bioengineered (also see here and here), full support and expansion as needed of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (as noted by Marcy), and much tighter oversight of this country's biodefense labs as recommended during hearings held by General Accounting Office (GAO) last year.

There is some hope, once the Obama administration is in place, that we'll move into a new era of biodefense, in which public health is not given short shrift and regulations and safety protocols in labs are strictly enforced.

Until that happens, I guess the clock ticks on in the same rhythm to 2013.