I am a label reader. If there is an excess of added sugar or too many ingredients with names that I don't recognize then I don't buy the product. Not all information, however, is useful.

So, if you want to know more, where do you start?

First, with the basic knowledge that while European countries and the European union has been guided philosohpically by the "precautionary principle," the United States has been guided in general by the principle of "substantial equivalence." In essence, these are two very different approaches to ideas and policies related to risk and food production and consumption, with the Europeans very wary of GMO food and Americans quite willing to eat GMO foods or oblivious and uninterested in the issue as a whole. I find it surprising that more Americans aren't interested at all in GMO questions and controversies, especially given that we produce and consume the vast majority of the world's GM crops.

With that in mind, it's fascinating to learn about how these diametrically opposed tacts came about. This article, although now almost 8 years old, provides an excellent analysis of the historical forces, in relation to food safety, risk, and regulation, that set Europe and the United States on distinct paths. These differences are also closely followed by the World Health Organization, which monitors food safety and policies towards GMO production and consumption around the globe.

For real time developments, a great virtual place to go is NYU Professor Marion Nestle's website www.whattoeat.com, which she spun out of her recent book. You'll see an entry from a few days ago that discusses a recent GAO report that highlights the marked lack of regulation and of regulatory coordination of GMO crops. For some time now, Nestle has been at the cutting edge of politics, nutrition, and food policy, offering astute analysis of America's peculiar, some would argue pathological, approach to eating.

Finally, for those of us who believe that GM labels are necessary for reasons of health, information, and consumer transparency, you can get involved at The Campaign, which is supported by a long list of organic producers.

For all the ballyhoo about genetically modified organisms (food, in particular) making the world a better place, there's also the fact that GMO technology is big money.

Science writer and environmentalist Chris Clarke said it best in his "non-knee-jerk primer" on GMOs:

I have some concerns about the safety of GMOs, based on our rudimentary understanding of how gene expression may be affected by change in a single gene, but not enough to make me want to ban research or completely rule out use of GMOs in daily life altogether.  But add the profit motive and the ability to patent lifeforms and you get attempts by individual corporations to corner the worldwide market in one species after another, which is bad for farmers and consumers, and you also get thuggish attempts to subvert independent research, which is bad for science.

In the first 2009 issue of the Vatican newspaper, Cardinal Renato Martino also focused on GMOs and profit and the correlation with famine and hunger worldwide:

"If one wants to pursue GMOs (genetically modified organisms) one can freely do so, but without hiding that it's a way to make more profits," he said.

Utilizing genetically modified foods calls for "prudence" because genetically modifying organisms can increase yields in some instances, he said, but people must not abuse their power to be able to manipulate nature.

And in 2001, Louise O. Fresco, Assistant-Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations wrote:

As the portfolio of GM applications increases, the international community needs to ensure that GM crops make an optimal contribution to world food security, to food safety and food quality, and to sustainability, and that they remain available to the public at large. However, despite some hopeful signs, FAO's inventory suggests that genomics and related research are not being directed to meeting these key challenges.

Indeed, the perceived profit potential of GMOs has already changed the direction of investment in research and development, in both the public and private sectors, away from systems-based approaches to pest management, and towards a greater reliance on monocultures. The possible long-term environmental costs of such strategies should not be overlooked.

As some might say, money is at the root of all evil. Or others might say, money makes the world go around. Either way, it's an important aspect of GMO development that should not be overlooked.

Researchers, including Todd V. Royer, an assistant professor in the IU School of Public and Environmental Affairs, established that pollen and other plant parts containing toxins from genetically engineered Bt corn are washing into streams near cornfields.

They also conducted laboratory trials that found consumption of Bt corn byproducts produced increased mortality and reduced growth in caddisflies, aquatic insects that are related to the pests targeted by the toxin in Bt corn.

Caddisflies, Royer said, "are a food resource for higher organisms like fish and amphibians. And, if our goal is to have healthy, functioning ecosystems, we need to protect all the parts. Water resources are something we depend on greatly."

Basically, they found the following:

1. Measured the entry of Bt plant parts--including pollen, leaves and cobs--in 12 streams in a heavily farmed Indiana region. The research team's results demonstrate that these plant parts are washing into local steams. Moreover, during storms, these plant parts are carried long distances and therefore could have ecological impacts on downstream water bodies, such as lakes and large rivers.

2. Collected field data indicating that Bt corn pollen is being eaten by caddisflies, which are close genetic relatives of the targeted Bt pests. Todd V. Royer, a member of the research team from Indiana University, says that caddisflies "provide a food resource for higher organisms like fish and amphibians."

3. Conducted laboratory tests showing that consumption of Bt corn byproducts increased the mortality and reduced the growth of caddisflies. Together with field data indicating that the caddisflies are eating Bt corn pollen, these results "suggest that the toxin in Bt corn pollen and detritus can affect species of insects other than the targeted pest," Tank said.

This study also shows that we need appropriate regulatory models to understand the effects of these foods:

Before licensing Bt corn, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency conducted trials to test its impact on water biota. But it used Daphnia, a crustacean commonly used for toxicity tests, and not insects that are more closely related to the target pests, Royer said.

This is a point that is too often neglected in public policy decisions (and has implications well beyond GM foods): how you design the regulatory criteria can make something look very good or very bad (a point I've made regarding the antibiotic cefquinome)

Given the stress our aquatic systems are already under, I don't think we need to add this to the mix.

Cited article: Rosi-Marshall et al. 2008. Toxins in transgenic crop byproducts may affect headwater stream ecosystems. PNAS 41 16204-16208. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0707177104

Let's further assume that the GM crops are nutritionally sound with no unforeseen consequences (e.g., allergic reactions) to those consuming them.

Will the consumers want these crops? Or maybe I should ask, will they want them if they know they're GMOs?

Consider transgenic Bt corn, corn genetically modified to express the Bacillus thuringiensis toxin, which is poisonous to many insects. The appeal of Bt corn is that it makes its own pesticide, poisoning the voracious insects that might try to eat it without the need to spray synthetic chemical pesticides that might harm the farm workers or even the consumers eating the corn.

Genetically engineered organisms may seem like wondrous designer creations—take a little bit of this DNA, a little pinch of that, and tweak a basic, time-tested genome to make something new and improved. The benefits are immediately visible in crop plants: juicier tomatoes, fatter ears of corn, more nutritious rice. Yet these super-foods come with a host of questions that must be addressed before they can replace traditional crops. Will biotechnology companies take over agriculture production from farmers? How do you control the rights to a specific species of wheat? How do we know that genetically engineered foods won't make us sick, fifty years down the line?

These are only the questions related to food. Genetically engineering medicines, while perhaps more acceptable to many for lack of better alternatives, presents additional ethical ambiguities. And once you get to the level of genetically engineering animals, you face the widespread fear that science will create something it can't control—a Frankenstein's monster, if you will.

So, what do we really have to be concerned about with genetically engineered organisms? Are our fears unfounded, or are they only the tip of the iceberg? To what extent do you think humanity will embrace this branch of technology in the near future? The distant future? Are all humans destined to become genetically engineered organisms themselves?

Me neither.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has compiled a page of links related to the preparation and planning for bioterrorism emergencies that are great for public health officials and other medical personnel. But what's the average citizen to do in the face of bioterror attack? The American Red Cross suggests:

1. Get a Kit - emergency supplies such as water, food, and disaster supplies
2. Make a Plan - choose an out-of-town contact, establish a meeting place
3. Be Informed - shelter in place (remain at home or work), quarantine and isolation, and mental health

More details here.

Aside from these general suggestions, there apparently isn't much we can do. From the University of Washington School of Public Health FAQ on bioterrorism concerns:

What can I do to protect my family and myself?

Unfortunately, there is presently little that individuals can do in advance to protect themselves from a bioterrorist attack. However, the Department of Health recommends general emergency preparedness, which could be helpful in the event of any public health emergency. For example, being prepared to be self sufficient for at least 72 hours, just as you would for floods, wind storms, and earthquakes. For each person in your home, have a 72-hour supply of safe drinking water and non-perishable food. Keep flashlights and a portable radio handy, as well as a supply of fresh batteries. Have an out-of-state contact (family or close friend) to notify of your situation in the event of an emergency.

And if you're thinking the least you could do is to get a gas mask, the Johns Hopkins Center for Public Health Preparedness recommends against it:

Should I purchase a gas mask?

No. A gas mask will only protect you if you are wearing it during an attack. It is unlikely that you will know when an attack is coming. Also, the mask must be the right type, must fit properly, and requires training to be used effectively.

Whatever you do, don't pick the monkey gas mask. Read the comments on this post...]]> http://scienceblogs.com/biotech/2008/12/how_to_prepare_for_a_bioterror.php http://scienceblogs.com/biotech/2008/12/how_to_prepare_for_a_bioterror.php Biodefense Wed, 17 Dec 2008 17:53:05 -0500 According to a report released two weeks ago by the U.S. Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, "unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is likely that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by end of 2013."

Focusing primarily on areas in which the United States needs to develop biodefense plans and infrastructure, the authors assert that "the risk is growing, not because we're making no progress but because the enemy is adapting and we must constantly anticipate and adapt as well across a broad front."

Certainly, this country has enemies who are attempting to develop biological weapons and would seek to use them against us. Without top security clearance, we won't know much more about their degree of development, although much skepticism exists about the mechanics of weaponizing any biological agent for effective (ie, deadly) dispersal to populations.

However, studies done by various independent research organizations suggest that the panicked love affair with biodefense that intensified over the past 8 years of the Bush administration, has left us less not more safe.

For example, Propublica, a non-profit newsroom, published an online article earlier this month, outlining the findings of the study it conducted with Reader's Digest and FLYPMEDIA. The article's author, Marcus Stern (note: no relation), writes that scientists have become increasingly concerned and some convinced that "the $20 billion biodefense research program the government has undertaken in the past seven years has actually made us less safe than before by vastly increasing the number of researchers and labs authorized to handle deadly substances across America."

This extensive report echoes the findings of the New York Times, which examined the state of biosecurity following the suicide of Dr. Bruce E. Ivins, who killed himself while under indictment for murder charges connected to the fall 2001 anthrax attacks.

While a question mark still hangs over the guilt or innocence of Ivins -- some believe he was psychologically unbalanced, others a scapegoat offered up to solve a puzzling crime -- the case revealed what many scientists and policy-makers had begun to fear, namely, that there are over one thousand researchers like Ivins working at approximately 400 biodefense labs, many newly created, around the country. All of them have access to the most lethal of biological pathogens, including anthrax, ricin, and tularemia, not to mention the capability to bioengineer new pathogens.

What makes this even more disturbing is the fact that not only are civilians at exposed risk, according to a still very relevant 2004 Institute of Medicine report, "the biodefense efforts of the Department of Defense (DoD) are poorly organized to develop and license vaccines, therapeutic drugs, and antitoxins to protect members of the armed forces against biological warfare agents."

What's the solution to this situation? Well, what many of my fellow bloggers have already mentioned, increased investment in basic public health infrastructure to comprehensively lower the risk of harm from any disaster whether "naturally" occurring or bioengineered (also see here and here), full support and expansion as needed of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (as noted by Marcy), and much tighter oversight of this country's biodefense labs as recommended during hearings held by General Accounting Office (GAO) last year.

There is some hope, once the Obama administration is in place, that we'll move into a new era of biodefense, in which public health is not given short shrift and regulations and safety protocols in labs are strictly enforced.

Until that happens, I guess the clock ticks on in the same rhythm to 2013.

Emerging during the same six month period as the SARS epidemic (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), H5N1 has inspired fear and fascination, as well as a steady stream of studies, papers, blogs, and commentaries.

A good place to start is Flu Wiki, which posts daily updates about H5N1 and is a veritable clearinghouse of information and links to almost everything flu-related on the web. A recent posts to scienceblogs describes the genesis of Flu-Wiki and demonstrates how its bloggers see the big picture, namely that flu needs to be understood in the larger public health infrastructure.

Even if avian influenza never arrives, a prospect that some scientists have come to believe, we'll be left with a wealth of information about about both this specific viral entity and much that is simply H5N1-related, including abundant research on H1N1 (which struck in 1918-1919), migratory bird paths, and how communities can prepare for a pandemic of any origin.

For the past few years the Center where I work at the University of Michigan has been involved in a big study of how 50 of the most populous cities in the United States responded during the 1918-1919 pandemic. We want to not only to better understand these city experiences in their historical context, but to determine what we can extrapolate from their public health measures -- what works and what doesn't work -- in the advent of another pandemic.

Our findings, published in JAMA, that cities that responded with public health measures (quarantine and isolation, school closure, and social distancing) in an early, sustained, and layered fashion generally fared better than those than responded late, haphazardly, and with one rather than several measures, has been incorporated into the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's community mitigation guidelines.

Our continuing research is exploring additional aspects of the 1918-1919 influenza pandemic in urban America, such as how the organization of city government and the public health board affected outcomes, and the extent to which pre-existing health problems and profiles made certain communities more susceptible to high morbidity and mortality rates.

As with our earlier research on 1918 influenza "escape" communities, we eventually will make our voluminous research materials available online.

In the meantime, there's a lot out there for those who want to see what's been produced during this period of Flu-Mania about the 1918-1919 influenza pandemic.

Here are a few recommended sites related to U.S. history of the flu.

From the CDC
From the History Channel
The U.S. National Archives
The U.S. Navy
In North Carolina
The PBS site for the documentary Influenza 1918

I'm a historian so I think it's wonderful to have this wealth of information publicly available. It's being accessed by a wide range of people, from middle school students to researchers in social epidemiology and public health.

I see why some people might think it's overkill, especially since it's so hard to measure the extent to which this information has any contemporary public health value.

So even as I'm excited about the wealth of historical materials on the web, I see a few potential problems too, namely, fetishization, decontextualization, and sensationalization of the 1918 pandemic. It's quite similar -- just retrospectively applied -- to the tendency to focus overwhelmingly on blockbuster events and the threat of scary emerging infections, rather than invest seriously in the everyday, chronic ailments that kill millions by the day, such as TB and diarrheal diseases.

The challenge of bioweapons and biodefense, it seems to me, is in aiming them. If you're trying to do some damage to your enemies with a biological agent (by killing them or making them so ill as to be incapacitated), how do you ensure that you're not also harming civilians, or your own people?

I've also noticed my own reluctance to take on these issues. And when I checked the website of the Sunshine Project, a public interest organization that has done really solid work on biological weapons issues, I found that it had suspended its operations in February 2008.

I suppose avoidance of the unthinkable isn't surprising, but it may not be the best approach. And with a new administration that seems open to international cooperation, we may now have the chance to deal with the nightmare of biological weapons, whether of the "traditional" or genetically engineered variety.