Posted by I like rock music, but my father-in-law doesn’t. My son Jim likes horror movies, but his mom doesn’t. While some of our preferences can be explained easily—for example, we usually don’t like things that cause us pain—others are more difficult to understand. When there’s not an obvious reason for a preference, mere exposure to an item can lead to preference. Studies have found this “mere exposure effect” for words, photos, objects—nearly anything, really.
What’s less certain is what causes the mere exposure effect: two competing explanations have been proposed. The first is the uncertainty reduction hypothesis—the idea that we simply prefer things which are more familiar. The second explanation, the misattribution hypothesis, is more complex. It begins with the same concept, that we’re sometimes more familiar with one item than another, but suggests that whether we actually develop a preference depends on whether or not we remember why we’re familiar with it. If an item was only presented subliminally, meaning we’re not aware of the instance when it was presented, then we’re more likely to misattribute that recollection to actual preference, compared to items presented liminally (overtly). So preference occurs more readily when it’s subtly suggested to us, compared to when we’re hit over the head with it.
Some research supports both hypotheses, however: both overt and subliminal presentations of items can lead to preference. But what if some items are presented overtly and some are presented subliminally? Which will we prefer then? Man-Ying Wang and Hsio-Chuan Chang of Soochow University believe they have devised an experiment to determine which of the two views better explains how we form preferences (“The Mere Exposure Effect and Recognition Memory,” Cognition and Emotion, 2004). To develop their experiment, Wang and Chang needed to make one more distinction: between knowing and remembering. When we “know” something, we’re completely aware of its existence, but we don’t recall the specific instance when we learned of it. When we “remember,” we’re recalling a particular occasion. If remembering leads to preference, then that supports the uncertainty reduction hypothesis. If knowing does, that supports the misattribution hypothesis.
In their experiment, Wang and Chang played music excerpts of classical music for listeners. Next they played the same excerpts in a random order, along with some new excerpts that the listeners hadn’t yet heard. Listeners rated the items for how much they liked them on a scale of 1 to 5 and indicate whether or not they were new. Here is a summary of the results.
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Actually Old
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Actually New
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Judged Old
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3.33
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3.07
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Judged New
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2.79
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2.75
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When listeners thought the excerpt was old, they liked it better—whether or not the excerpt actually was old. So listeners prefer the items they remember, rather than those they know—when they believe they recall hearing a specific excerpt, they like it better. Wang and Chang argue that this result supports the uncertainty reduction hypothesis. They suggest that we prefer things we’ve seen or heard before because these things are less likely to be dangerous: after all, if it didn’t kill us the first time we saw it, it’s probably safe. So it might be that the reason I like rock music while my father in law doesn’t is because I had heard it as a child, while he didn’t. Since I had more exposure to rock, I like it and he doesn’t. Now apparently we just need to find out who showed all those horror movies to Jim when he was younger!
June 28, 2005
June 28, 2005
June 28, 2005
July 5, 2005
July 5, 2005