...the
USA has not gotten all of its highly-enriched uranium back.
As reported in a special report in the Chicago Tribune, the
USA had a program in the '50's and 60's called "Atoms
for Peace." Initially, we supplied low-grade uranium fuel to
countries that pledged to not develop nuclear weapons. But at
some point, the policy shifted, and we began shipping the high-grade
stuff. The idea was that we would get it back when it was no
longer useful as fuel. An atomic threat made in America
How the U.S. spread bomb-grade fuel worldwide — and failed to get it back
By Sam Roe
Tribune staff reporter
January 28, 2007
...Romania is but one example in a world that reverberates from the fallout of the United States' Cold War folly known as Atoms for Peace, a program that distributed highly enriched uranium around the world.
That uranium was intended solely to be used as fuel in civilian research reactors. But it is potent enough to make nuclear bombs and can be found everywhere from Romania, now a crossroads for nuclear smuggling, to an Iranian research reactor at the center of that nation's controversial nuclear program.
Three dozen other nations also obtained highly enriched uranium from the U.S....
...America initially provided this dangerous uranium fuel with the provision that foreigners return the used material, which remained weapons-grade. But in 1964, the Johnson administration started selling the fuel with no such requirement...
The rest of the article details the various efforts to get the fuel back. It's a story of waxing and waning fortunes, as the political climate shifted from one administration to another:
...When Ronald Reagan defeated Carter in 1980, the retrieval effort fell out of favor. With memories of India's test fading and terrorism still viewed as a foreign problem, the Energy Department in 1981 proposed shutting down Travelli's mission, according to government records.
Though the program survived, the message was clear: Influential forces in the department didn't have much use for it. "They just wanted it to all go away," recalled Busick, the former State Department official...
The Tribune article cited here is the first in a series. We'll have to wait to see how it has turned out. They appear to have the most up-to-date information on the subject.
Other sources are not encouraging. The Union of Concerned Scientists prepared a report in 2004, stating:
Russia has about 600 tons of potentially vulnerable nuclear material. The United States has been working since the first Clinton Administration to secure it.
With American technical know-how and taxpayer funds, we have been able to put about one-fifth of Russia’s known excess fissile material into secure storage, and 43% more has been given more modest security upgrades. That leaves at least nearly half, however, that is still potentially vulnerable to theft.
And it has taken over ten years to get to this point. At the current pace, it will take more than ten years more to finish this job. That is simply unacceptable.
Then there are the stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU) outside of Russia today. More than 130 nuclear reactors around the world have HEU fuel that could be stolen or diverted and converted into a nuclear weapon.
Many of those reactors are in academic settings, at universities, where security is little more than a locked gate and a night guard.
And of course, there was the recent report of an attempted sale of weapons-grade uranium by a Russian citizen in Georgia. Although, Russia claims the incident has been overblown, calling it a propaganda ploy, it does highlight the risk of loose nuclear material.
The US government provides us with some hopeful information, such as this from the Dept. of Energy:
...NNSA's Megaports Initiative, which began in 2003, teams up with other countries to enhance their ability to screen cargo at major international seaports. The Initiative provides radiation detection equipment and trains their personnel to specifically check for nuclear or other radioactive materials. In return, NNSA requires that data be shared on detections and seizures of nuclear or radiological material that resulted from the use of the equipment provided...
And this:
...We have substantially increased our nonproliferation spending. DOE’s request to Congress last year sought a nonproliferation budget of $1.35 billion – a nearly 75 percent increase over the last—and largest—budget request of the previous Administration.
We have accelerated our efforts to secure 600 metric tons of weapons-usable material in Russia, and to date have upgraded security on over 50 percent of the materials at nearly 70 percent of the sites where they are found. This acceleration has cut two years off the schedule we inherited...
...First, we will work in partnership to repatriate all Russian-origin fresh HEU fuel by the end of this year. We will also work with Russia to accelerate and complete the repatriation of all Russian-origin spent fuel by 2010. There is roughly two metric tons of this material located at more than 20 facilities in 17 countries.
Second, we will likewise take all steps necessary to accelerate and complete the repatriation of U.S.-origin research reactor spent fuel under our existing program from locations around the world. There are 41 countries eligible to participate in this voluntary program. Under the acceptance policy, about 22,700 fuel elements are eligible for return.
That part is at least vaguely positive. Although the quantities involved are staggering, at least there is an effort underway.
But a few weeks ago, the DOE published this:
WASHINGTON, D.C. – Linton Brooks, administrator of the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), issued the following statement today to employees:
“The Department has just announced that Secretary Bodman has asked for my resignation because a number of management issues, the most recent of which was the recent security breach at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. I expect to formally submit my resignation to the President shortly and to leave within 2-3 weeks. One reason for forming NNSA was to prevent such management problems from occurring. We have not yet done so in over five years. For much of that time I was in charge of NNSA. Therefore the Secretary believes that new leadership is needed...
Yes, new leadership is needed. Need more convincing?
'Round Midnight
BY ALEXANDER ZAITCHIK
01.25.2007 | POLITICS
...Where would we find the money to expand CTR and other nonproliferation efforts?
As easy as plucking petals off a daisy. The 110th should reduce, redirect and rescind funds going to programs that increase the risk of nuclear war, nuclear proliferation, or both. Juicy targets include missile defense (aka, The Maginot Inch), all space weapons research, and "Complex 2030," the Department of Energy's sneaky beast of a proposal to reinvent and expand the entire U.S. nuclear supply chain in the name of "consolidation."
Missile defense should be first in line for a Thorazine shot and a straightjacket. The boondoggle has the unique triple-attribute of being corrupt, dysfunctional and destabilizing. It's also a pretty penny, sucking up some $10 billion a year. (That number, incidentally, equals the total price tag Harvard's Graham Allison puts on securing the world's remaining vulnerable fissile material depots.)...
We're spending 10 billion dollars a year to defend against an attack from space, but only one-tenth of that to defend against a much more likely line of attack.
Even though we have to wait for the conclusion to the Chicago Tribune's series on "Atoms for Peace," we already know what we need to do. And we are not doing it.
