Dispatches from the Culture Wars

The legal standard for the ruling was quite clear given the Lemon test, which requires that a law have a clear and primary secular purpose and effect. A law that is passed solely for religious purposes and that has the effect of endorsing or advancing religion violates the establishment clause and there is simply no question that the 1954 law that added "under God" to the pledge of allegiance had an exclusively religious purpose and effect. Judge Goodwin's opinion in his ruling on the standing issue is eloquent and compelling:

When school teachers lead a recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance according to school district policy, they present a message by the state endorsing not just religion generally, but a monotheistic religion organized "under God." While Newdow cannot expect the entire community surrounding his daughter to participate in, let alone agree with, his choice of atheism and his daughter's exposure to his views, he can expect to be free from the government's endorsing a particular view of religion and unconstitutionally indoctrinating his impressionable young daughter on a daily basis in that official view. The pledge to a nation "under God," with its imprimatur of governmental sanction, provides the message to Newdow's young daughter not only that non-believers, or believers in non-Judeo-Christian religions, are outsiders, but more specifically that her father's beliefs are those of an outsider, and necessarily inferior to what she is exposed to in the classroom. Just as the foundational principle of the Freedom of Speech Clause in the First Amendment tolerates unpopular and even despised ideas, see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), so does the principle underlying the Establishment Clause protect unpopular and despised minorities from government sponsored religious orthodoxy tied to government services.

The court also noted that no matter which Supreme Court test one applies, the law here fails the test. There was a clearly religious purpose and effect, a clear government endorsement of religion and the coercive nature of the social pressure on a child to recite the pledge or risk being shunned and abused by one's classmates. Again, the arguments are eloquent and compelling:

In the context of the Pledge, the statement that the United States is a nation "under God" is an endorsement of religion. It is a profession of a religious belief, namely, a belief in monotheism. The recitation that ours is a nation "under God" is not a mere acknowledgment that many Americans believe in a deity. Nor is it merely descriptive of the undeniable historical significance of religion in the founding of the Republic. Rather, the phrase "one nation under God" in the context of the Pledge is normative. To recite the Pledge is not to describe the United States; instead, it is to swear allegiance to the values for which the flag stands: unity, indivisibility, liberty, justice, and -- since 1954 -- monotheism. The text of the official Pledge, codified in federal law, impermissibly takes a position with respect to the purely religious question of the existence and identity of God. A profession that we are a nation "under God" is identical, for Establishment Clause purposes, to a profession that we are a nation "under Jesus," a nation "under Vishnu," a nation"under Zeus," or a nation "under no god," because none of these professions can be neutral with respect to religion...

The Supreme Court recognized the normative and ideological nature of the Pledge in Barnette, 319 U.S. 624. There, the Court held unconstitutional a school district's wartime policy of punishing students who refused to recite the Pledge and salute the flag. Id. at 642. The Court noted that the school district was compelling the students "to declare a belief," id. at 631, and "requir[ing] the individual to communicate by word and sign his acceptance of the political ideas [the flag] . . .bespeaks," id. at 633. "[T]he compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind." Id. The Court emphasized that the political concepts articulated in the Pledge were idealistic, not descriptive: " `[L]iberty and justice for all,' if it must be accepted as descriptive of the present order rather than an ideal, might to some seem an overstatement." Id. at 634 n.14. The Court concluded that: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."

So what was the legislative response to this ruling? Nothing short of a complete freakout by representatives of both parties. What follows is from Irons' book:

Politicians of both parties were less restrained in their rhetoric. Speaking to reporters during a trip to Canada, President George W. Bush called the decision "ridiculous."...Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, a South Dakota democrat, derided the decision as "nuts," and his colleagues promptly adopted a resolution - passed unanimously with every senator listed as a sponsor - condemning the ruling. Senator Robert Byrd, a West Virginia Democrat and that body's senior member, blasted Goodwin as a "stupid judge" and an "atheist lawyer." Not to be outdone, the House of Representatives voted by a margin of 416-3 for a resolution that declared: "The Pledge of Allegiance, including the phrase, 'One Nation, under God,' reflects the historical fact that a belief in God permeated the founding and development of our nation."

Astonishing, isn't it? Even those allegedly "anti-religious liberals" could not find even a small handful of legislators to support the court's ruling. Why? Because they are forced to pander to the most ignorant and credulous elements of our society, those who respond with great emotional fury to any suggestion that they not be allowed to use the power of government to prop up their religious beliefs. And Judge Goodwin just became one of my heroes for the way he responded to all of th

On his part, Goodwin brushed off the bashing. "I never had much confidence in the attention span of elected officials for any kind of deep thinking about important issues," he said of his congressional critics. "When they pop off after what I call a bumper strip headline, they almost always give a superficial response." Goodwin was equally dismissive of Bush's denunciation: "I'm a little disappointed in our chief executive - who nobody ever accused of being a deep thinker - for popping off."

This is why I have so much more respect for, and interest in, judges rather than legislators. They can speak the truth, something legislators simply can't do if they want to remain in office. Their job requires them to apply intellectual analysis rather than electoral analysis and the difference is stark.