A federal judge has ruled that a case brought by the ACLU against a Muslim charter school in Minnesota can go forward. The school had sought to have the case dismissed on standing grounds, citing the Hein decision. This case is unusual because it is the ACLU itself that is the plaintiff, not representing another client. It is filed against the Tarek ibn Ziyad Academy and its sponsor, Islamic Relief USA.
The ACLU is claiming taxpayer standing, something that the federal courts have made more and more difficult to establish as legal grounds for bringing a suit. In general, a taxpayer does not have standing to sue the government for spending their tax dollars in an unconstitutional manner, but there is an exception to that rule:
Generally, the interest of a taxpayer seeking to ensure that Treasury funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution does not give rise to the type of redressable injury required for Article III standing. There is a narrow exception, however, to this general prohibition against taxpayer standing. The exception provides that a taxpayer will have standing to invoke federal judicial power when that taxpayer "alleges that congressional action under the taking and spending clause is in derogation of the Establishment Clause." To establish taxpayer standing under Flast, a taxpayer must establish a "logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated." In particular, Flast set forth a two-part test. First, "the taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status and the type of legislative enactment attacked." Second, "the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged."
The distinction turns on whether the action being challenged is taken by the executive branch (the governor or the agencies under his control) or the legislature. If it's the legislature, then there is taxpayer standing to sue; if the executive, there is not. But in reality such decisions are often mixed, and that is true here where the state legislature authorizes the spending and an executive agency determines how it is to be spent.
The defendants argued that the Hein decision precludes standing because the spending of taxpayer money was controlled by the executive branch once the money was appropriated. In Hein, the Freedom from Religion Foundation challenged spending by the White House on a series of conferences involving the President's Faith-Based and Community Initiatives program. The Supreme Court ruled that FFRF did not have taxpayer standing in that case.
But the judge in this case ruled that Hein did not apply here because in that case, Congress had not explicitly authorized the spending at all. The Faith-Based and Community Initiatives program was created by executive order, not by legislation, and it used funds appropriated to the executive branch for general operations. Thus, the court said, the use of funds in Hein were not "expressly authorized or mandated by any
specific congressional enactment."
By contrast, this case involves money explicitly appropriated for charter schools and the power given to the executive agency to approve the creation of specific charter schools was power created by legislative action. "The fact that the Commissioner has the responsibility to choose or authorize charter schools (which then in turn receive funding)," the judge said, "does not mean that Plaintiff here is challenging an executive
action."
The court then went on to underscore the importance of taxpayer standing because in many cases, that is the only way that allegedly unconstitutional conduct can be challenged. That is particularly true in this case, where the chances of finding a student at the school to challenge the school's actions are almost non-existent.
The Court's decision today underscores the importance of taxpayer standing, particularly when there is no other party to sue...Here, TIZA students or their parents could challenge the operation and funding of TIZA as being a violation of the Establishment Clause...(but)...It seems unlikely that a parent or student of TIZA, who presumably attends the school because of its particularized program, would challenge the program of choice.
I'll be curious to see if the school appeals this procedural ruling or allows the case to go forward. If it is appealed, I hope it is upheld.

Ed Brayton is a journalist, commentator and speaker. He is the co-founder and president of 

Comments
Interesting, but it isn't clear from your post what the ACLU is now going to be able to sue the school and its sponsor for. That is, how does the school, according to the ACLU, violate the Establishment Clause? Presumably it's more than just calling itself Muslim and maybe scheduling school-year breaks around Ramadan instead of Christmas and Easter.
Posted by: davidj | July 24, 2009 10:50 AM
Behold, the clever use of misdirection by the ACLU: this token suit against a Muslim school distracts the public from their real agenda of OUTLAWING CHRISTIANITY!!1111!!1!! TO THE BARRICADES!!!![/wingnut]
Posted by: Eamon Knight | July 24, 2009 10:57 AM
You joke, Eamon, but an ACLU win here might set a precedent that could be used against similar Christian charter schools. It would not surprise me in the least if one or more of the Religious Right legal groups chimed in with support for the school on this one.
Posted by: BobApril | July 24, 2009 12:19 PM
I think the ACLU is making a mistake on this one. It's of course to be noted that there is a difference between a school conducting religious services and merely giving religious students space to pray. The former being unconstitutional while the latter being perfectly fine (even though one may view the relegious conservatives as deluded fools; which is merely to grant that such may be the case, not to indicate my true views)
That said, IMHO, TIZA seems to be doing the latter, not the former. From reading the sun tribune article, I can see how a person not familiar with muslim customs would misinterpret the activities as conducted by the school instead of as merely accomodated for by the school.
As far as I can tell, the case against them rests on a few things
1. The dress code
2. The menu
3. The prayer sessions
4. Scheduling buses to leave after the prayer session
5. Some stuff written on a black-board which seemed to indicate that extra curricular Quran classes were really part of the regular curriculum.
Of all the things, only the last one could properly be a technical violation of
churchmosque state separation. But it can plausibly be argued that the religous instruction was reallly extracurricular, and that what occurred was just sloppy conflation of extra curricular events which a sizeable proportion participated in with curricular activites which everybody participated in.The rest can be readily explained away. (but I dont want to do so here because it would make the reply really long.
Posted by: Murali | July 24, 2009 12:53 PM
This has more to do with Hein than the case in question, but how exactly does funding privately run religious organizations constitute paying for the general operations of the Executive Branch?
For that matter, why don't citizens have the right to sue the Executive for using its general operating budget to fund pet programs that clearly have nothing to do with the general operations of the Executive?
Posted by: Julian | July 25, 2009 9:22 AM