Steven Pinker is wrong on religion

Sort of. I assume that part of this is delivery and the nature of a short interview format. But, I think it is important to highlight a point of mild disagreement between Steven Pinker and Rebecca Goldstein in their Salon interview:

PINKER: Exactly. I would be opposed to a requirement on astrology and astronomy, or alchemy and chemistry. Not because I don't think people should know about astrology. Astrology had an important role in the ancient world. You can't understand many things unless you know something about astrology -- the plays of Shakespeare and so on. What I'm opposed to is equating it with reason or science.

But can you really equate religion with astrology, or religion with alchemy? No serious scholar still takes astrology or alchemy seriously. But there's a lot of serious thinking about religion.

PINKER: I would put faith in that same category because faith is believing something without a good reason to believe it. I would put it in the same category as astrology and alchemy.

Pinker is alluding to the floating of a "Reason and Faith" requirement at Harvard. He makes the point that there are many things out there that a well rounded education should include and he sees no reason to privilege religion. I tend to agree with him here because I'm not sure that a religion course would add much value in the grand scheme of things; rather, the marginal return on a required course in statistics, a laboratory science or economics might be far greater (in part because people have fewer preconceptions in these areas). But I think Pinker is a little too casual in equating religion with astrology & alchemy. On one level he is correct, on another level he misses the forest from the trees.

Religion, astrology and alchemy are human universals. Astrology & alchemy are found across widely disparate cultures when those societies attain a particular level of sophistication; they seem intuitively appealing ways of organizing and explaining the world. Religion is no different, there are broad similarities in religious sensibility which likely derive from universal human cognitive intuitions. This is one reason that belief in astrology, alchemy and religion are all extant at appreciable levels across modern societies. Unlike astrology and religion views on alchemy are not often surveyed, but my own impression from talking to most people and speaking as someone with a chemical education is that alchemical intuitions remain strong. They are part of the root of the non-scientific opposition to genetically modified foods for example.

Nevertheless, it is true that astrology has generally been expelled from elite discourse while religion has not. That indicates that there is some important distinction between the two domains. I would argue that religion encompasses a far larger suite of behaviors and beliefs, and in many religions astrology is a subset of the religious system (e.g., Hinduism). So even if there are aspects of religion which retreat before modernity other dimensions remain robust or even expand in their vigor. And of course these persistent religious beliefs have material consequences in the lives of those who are not religious in a way that astrology and alchemy do not. The analogy may offer insight in an ontological sense, but it elides the practical reality of the world as it is.

Consider Monopoly money and conventional paper currency. Substantively they're the same. Both are processed cellulose inscribed with ink which represent scalar economic values. On an ontological level there essentially equivalent. But in practical terms they are very different. For $10,000,000 of paper currency a minority of humans are likely willing to kill, and a larger number willing to engage in unethical acts. In contrast Monopoly money doesn't inspire the same sort of response. Why? Simple, government fiat and popular collusion give paper currency symbolic value which can be traded for material good and services. Similarly, whether Shiva or Yahweh exists may be as sensible a question on the merits as whether there is an Invisible Pink Unicorn, but in practical terms there's a big difference because the rest of the world doesn't treat Shiva & Yahweh as equivalent to the Invisible Pink Unicorn.

In some ways I feel that the attitude of many atheists toward religion resembles that of someone who accepts the ontological argument for God's existence as irrefutable; the conflation of a philosophical point for the point of it all. Most atheists who encounter the ontological argument find it ludicrous. Similarly, the attempt that some atheists make to trivialize religion through definition, analysis and refutation seems totally missing the point for the religious. Of course a theist will find the ontological argument compelling, the logic reaffirms prior beliefs. Inversely, the theist will find reasoned analogies which show similarities between their religious beliefs to obviously irrational systems of thought absolutely unpersuasive. A rational decomposition and comparison set against the experience of the believer will always lose.

A pragmatic accounting for the fact that believers believe and that what they believe has real world implications is not an exotic idea. After all, forums such as Internet Infidels focus on Christianity, and especially particular flavors, as opposed to the entire sample space of supernatural belief. Why? The common response is simply that Christianity is what is relevant to unbelievers in the United States, where Internet Infidels tends to focus its energies. That was also Richard Dawkins' rationale for focusing on the Abrahamic faiths in The God Delusion. That is also why atheists don't spend much time disproving the Invisible Pink Unicorn; though the analogy has some force the reality is that implicitly atheists understand that theists resist the equivalence and therefore a full frontal deconstruction of the God Hypothesis on its own terms is necessary. A fruitful debate has to be across axioms of agreement. Analogizing religion to astrology is important for the atheist to make clear their own axioms to the theist, but ultimately it is only a first step in clarifying one's own position.

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Hi Razib.

You seem to be assuming that the religious are generally open to argument at all, which would be necessary for a "fruitful debate" in the sense you mean. But there is no intellectually serious case for the existence of the God of the Bible (and the onus is on the believer to provide one, not on the atheist to prove his nonexistence).

Those who believe in that god do so not by some subtle intellectual mistake, but just by wishful thinking. I think the valid point of recent atheist tracts is not to address intellectually unserious arguments, but to present a precise, uncompromising portrait of what religion is and implies, psychologically and politically. They aim not to reason with those who reject reason as our means of knowing, but to provide some moral ammunition to atheists who normally don't want to rock the boat.

By Eric Dennis (not verified) on 16 Oct 2007 #permalink

You seem to be assuming that the religious are generally open to argument at all, which would be necessary for a "fruitful debate" in the sense you mean.

no, not really.

Those who believe in that god do so not by some subtle intellectual mistake, but just by wishful thinking.

no. i don't think that religion involves much explicit cognition as you would think....

Razib,

Could you expand on what folk alchemical intuitions you are referring to and how that relates to GMO? With GMO, my impression was that the topic engages our "purity" mental machinery, which is also usually part of the overall religious system.

For example, most (non-scientists, but otherwise well-educated) people I know are chemo-phobic. They say they wish there were fewer "chemicals", and they try to avoid ingesting "chemicals". Silly, yes, but widespread. Seems extremely widespread among upper-middle class women, but this might just be my sample bias (ie my dating pool).

Every middle class family in America seems to use Brita water filters -- which seems a testament to irrational fear.

[if you're going to say something, say it. don't just leave a cryptic comment -r]

By Tegumai Bopsul… (not verified) on 16 Oct 2007 #permalink

With GMO, my impression was that the topic engages our "purity" mental machinery, which is also usually part of the overall religious system.

yeah. that's what i mean. there is an idea that substances have ineffable essences. gold is essentially gold. now, since it is an element that is true to some extent, but the mentality extends to something like animal flesh. to be short, there's no reflexive reductionism.

Eric,

Why is the onus on the believer to prove that God exists? After all you can never really prove a theory in science you can only falsify it. Therefore the onus is on the non-believers to prove that God doesn't exist. Which really hasn't happened yet. Good Luck if you want to try and go there, but you can't pass the buck. If it makes you feel better I would hate to have to prove scientifically that God exists. That hasn't happened yet ether. I suggest that issues of belief are simply outside of science.

By Jim Weaver (not verified) on 16 Oct 2007 #permalink

After all you can never really prove a theory in science you can only falsify it.

except math and its derivations. in any case, induction doesn't prove, but one can play around with probabilities with the pieces of data we have....

I disagreed with the GMO alchemy comparison too. I think it is opposed by luddites who dont understand either the technology or basic statistics.
The times I have discussed GMO with those opposed to it I have got the impression that they seriously worried about the 'Frankenstein' factor - that there was a serious chance that the recombinant genes would spread and directly harm humans. To say to them that there was almost zero chance of this happening was simply a conformation of their fears - "almost zero chance" meant some small chance and this was enough to convince them that it was a serious danger - enough for them to be in favor of banning ALL work on recombinant DNA, just to eliminate this small chance.
One of these individuals, a software engineer, when it was suggested to him that the situation might be somewhat analagous to a computer virus taking over the world - 'so perhaps we should ban computers?' - was not in favor since 'the chances of that happening are almost zero' - or words to that effect.

One of these individuals, a software engineer, when it was suggested to him that the situation might be somewhat analagous to a computer virus taking over the world - 'so perhaps we should ban computers?' - was not in favor since 'the chances of that happening are almost zero' - or words to that effect.

that's why i stipulated non-scientific opposition. educated people opposed to GMO will, i think, give different rationales for opposition from the less educated. i think that the underlying intuition is the same, but the educated have at their disposal more explicit models for rejection. i.e., the "yuck factor" is not even neo-ludditism, that would entail that one held to a set of positive beliefs in a formal or systematic sense. i don't think that's generally true, most of the populace (even in the USA) prefers non-GMOed foods for reasons that aren't explicit but have to do with innate psychological predispositions.

It's pretty clear we evolved mechanisms to fear contamination, for highly plausible reasons like don't drink where you crap. This purity/contamination instinct then gets drafted onto larger mental contructs - religion, environmentalism, tribalism, etc.

One of my favorite psychology videos was demonstrating the onset of the contamination behavior - somewhere around 4-5 year olds, I think. They'd take kids and have them drink water from a glass. Then they'd put a cockroach in it and ask them to drink again. All made disgust faces and said no.

Then they scooped the roach out and asked them to drink the water now. Kids just before a certain age would drink it fine, no problem. Kids past the cutoff point all refused and made disgust faces, and said there was invisible bad stuff in the water now.

My point is that most arguments against something like GMO are just rationalizations to justify the instinctual disgust many feel -- they see contamination and find it horrific.

It's also interesting how politicians tap into these base urges/instincts. On the right, xenophobia, and on the left, chemophobia. Fear of contamination is universal and a strong motivator.

Why is the onus on the believer to prove that God exists? After all you can never really prove a theory in science you can only falsify it.

Wrong. You can't falsify it either. You can only show the degree to which the available evidence is compatible with the scientific hypothesis.

There are a large number of philosophic memes that have been widely spread despite their being utterly wrong. It discourages me to see them being spread here.

By Caledonian (not verified) on 16 Oct 2007 #permalink

fwiw, Caledonian is right -- falsification isn't privileged.

Jim, The onus is on he who is asserting something. Like if I assert the existence of unicorns or the flying spaghetti monster, obviously it's not your responsibility to disprove it. Without any evidence, the claim must be dismissed as arbitrary. A Christian who acknowledges that Jesus has the same epistemic status as the flying spaghetti monster is a toothless Christian.

Caledonian, I also think falsificationism is naive. But you're going in the wrong direction. We have a number of examples of scientific theories which have been proven, fully, absolutely and irrevocably, e.g. natural selection or Newtonian gravity. A problem only arises if you regard the theory as an attempt to specify every aspect of the objects under study, with infinite exactness. If instead, you regard the theory as a means of economizing causal explanation, you realize that valid superceding theories (e.g. relativity) can only delimit the original's domain of validity and further elucidate what it had taken as postulate before (e.g. inverse square law).

By Eric Dennis (not verified) on 17 Oct 2007 #permalink

We have a number of examples of scientific theories which have been proven, fully, absolutely and irrevocably, e.g. natural selection or Newtonian gravity.

Wrong. All we have is lots and lots of data that go against certain hypotheses. If new data came out showing that the Earth really was flat, and it was sufficiently strong, we'd have to accept it.

(Natural selection? What the-)

By Caledonian (not verified) on 17 Oct 2007 #permalink

newton's theory is a very good approximate in any case. it doesn't hold beyond particular boundary conditions.

Razib, Yes that was my point. Relativity circumscribes Newtonian gravity, telling us where it applies and where it doesn't, and it tells us where certain postulates (e.g. inverse square law) come from. But it does not invalidate the unifying causal account of the theory. An approximate law is not the same as an invalid law. Newtonian gravity is not the same as Lamarckism.

By Eric Dennis (not verified) on 17 Oct 2007 #permalink

And we abadoned Lamarckism because it wasn't compatible with the data we had.

If new data were to arise showing that our past data was misleading, we'd embrace Lamarckism again. If new data were to arise showing that Lamarckism applies in certain situations, we'd embrace it in those situations. If new new data were found discrediting the new data, we'd discard it again.

Everything is questionable in science, which means nothing is certain. Any position, any hypothesis can rise and fall on the data, and we're getting new data all the time. Your ultimate point is simply incorrect.

By Caledonian (not verified) on 17 Oct 2007 #permalink

Caledonian, So certainty is *never* possible because new data may always arise to contradict you? Are you certain of *that*? What if new data comes up that overturns *that* principle? What data do you have that proves that principle in the first place? Your naive empiricism is just as self-inconsistent as falsificationism.

By Eric Dennis (not verified) on 18 Oct 2007 #permalink

"Of course a theist will find the ontological argument compelling"

Considering that a contemporary of Anselm's, Gaunilo, a monk, criticized Anselm's argument, there is no "of course" about it.

Considering that a contemporary of Anselm's, Gaunilo, a monk, criticized Anselm's argument, there is no "of course" about it.

the typical stupid theist finds it compelling just like the typical stupid atheist does not.

What I think you are pointing out here was one of the big obsessions of thinkers (Mandeville, Adam Smith, Swift, Addison & Steele, Pope, Hume) in the early days of modernity.

Questions about credit, value and truth and how they were evaluated socially--how social consensus could be created that a certain man's word was as good as money or that a certain stock was valuable (South Sea stock, for instance), and how that consensus could be lost.

Some writers took a pretty simple-minded approach to these questions--opposing the appearance of value (paper) to the reality of value (gold, say, or virtue).

Others, though, began to see how much everyday life was wrapped up in and structured by consensual, but generally unacknowledged fictions.

Probably the fundamental error we see in many anti-theists is that they seem to believe that our lives are fundamentally driven by the play of factual propositions, when in fact they are driven by variously acknowledged fictions.

In some cases these fictions are probably easily exchangeable with something closer to fact (astrology/astronomy). However it would seem to me that in many cases fact just won't do the work that the fiction is doing (currency).

Gold isn't something that has 'actual' value - it cannot be eaten, it's not suitable for toolmaking, and has very few functions other than decoration.

What makes it different than paper currency is that it's difficult to increase the amount of gold flowing through an economy, and it's much more widely seen as desirable for itself. You can take paper currency, turn it into slurry, and it loses virtually all of its value - wood slurry is cheap and plentiful. That's not so true of gold.

By Caledonian (not verified) on 21 Oct 2007 #permalink

Gold isn't something that has 'actual' value - it cannot be eaten, it's not suitable for toolmaking, and has very few functions other than decoration.

What makes it different than paper currency is that it's difficult to increase the amount of gold flowing through an economy, and it's much more widely seen as desirable for itself. You can take paper currency, turn it into slurry, and it loses virtually all of its value - wood slurry is cheap and plentiful. That's not so true of gold.

Right. And there is a pretty extensive pre-modern literature pointing out that gold is merely sybolic wealth as opposed to real estate. But, after the emergence of paper currency, gold has come to be seen as "real wealth" as opposed to the "false wealth" of stocks and other paper holdings.