Apparently so. And that should give everyone pause, since SSN has become the de facto national identification system. From PNAS:
We demonstrate that it is possible to predict, entirely from public data, narrow ranges of values wherein individual SSNs are likely to fall. Unless mitigating strategies are implemented, the predictability of SSNs exposes them to risks of identify theft on mass scales.
Any third party with internet access and some statistical knowledge can exploit such predictability in 2 steps: first, by analyzing publicly available records in the SSA Death Master File (DMF) to detect statistical patterns in the SSN assignment for individuals whose deaths have been reported to the SSA; thereafter, by interpolating an alive person’s state and date of birth with the patterns detected across deceased individuals’ SSNs, to predict a range of values likely to include his or her SSN. Birth data, in turn, can be inferred from several offline and online sources, including data brokers, voter registration lists, online white pages, or the profiles that millions of individuals publish on social networking sites (10). Using this method, we identified with a single attempt the first 5 digits for 44% of DMF records of deceased individuals born in the U.S. from 1989 to 2003 and the complete SSNs with <1,000 attempts (making SSNs akin to 3-digit financial PINs) for 8.5% of those records. Extrapolating to the U.S. living population, this would imply the potential identification of millions of SSNs for individuals whose birth data were available. Such findings highlight the hidden privacy costs of widespread information dissemination and the complex interactions among multiple data sources in modern information economies, underscoring the role of public records as breeder documents of more sensitive data.
What’s worse is that many information gathering entities don’t require perfect matches to account for typing mistakes:
In practical applications, SSNs are often used as authenticators in inquiries processed by credit reporting agencies (CRAs). Because consumer credit reports contain errors and inconsistencies, CRAs are known to accept as valid even inquiries where just 7 of 9 SSN digits are actually correct. This implies that, for some practical purposes, the prediction accuracies we reported may be conservative by 2 orders of magnitude: With just 10 or fewer attempts per target, the inquiries associated with 9.2% of all SSNs issued after 1988 could be accepted as valid by CRAs and 29.1% of those issued in the 25 states with fewer births.
This is disturbing.