process safety management

Labor-Enviro-Community coalition wins stronger California oil refinery regulations and showcases a winning strategy for worker and community health

garrettbrown — Fri, 03 Mar 2017 16:52:14 +0000

Labor-Enviro-Community coalition wins stronger California oil refinery regulations and showcases a winning strategy for worker and community health

by Garrett Brown

On February 10^th, California’s Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) proposed revised and stronger regulations for oil refineries in the state after a 4½-year joint campaign by labor unions, environmental and community organizations to protect both refinery workers and nearby communities. The regulatory proposal now goes to the state’s Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board for consideration and final approval.

This successful “blue-green” coalition held off industry pressure and reversed earlier back-door revisions to the proposal by DIR to benefit the oil corporations, which are major campaign contributors to Governor Jerry Brown. The winning strategy of uniting workers, environmentalists and community members is a powerful example of how health and safety regulations can be improved despite an industry’s wealth, power and political influence.

The key components to securing the proposed regs have been constant coalition-building with all affected parties, carefully following the standard-setting process, meticulously reviewing each new draft of proposed regs, mobilizing for public meetings, and an active campaign to get media coverage of the worker and community health issues.

The story starts with the August 2012 fire at Chevron’s Richmond, California, refinery which enveloped 19 workers in a flammable vapor cloud which they escaped literally only seconds before it ignited and caused major damage to the refinery. The resulting fire caused 15,000 Richmond residents to go to local hospitals with respiratory complaints and other ailments.

Refinery incidents causing adverse health effects have occurred regularly in the United States, including California, Texas and Washington state, with the U.S. Chemical Safety Board reporting that there were 125 major process safety management (PSM) incidents in 2012 alone, and that 23 million people live within one mile of refineries, chemical plants and other hazardous facilities.

The adverse environmental and health impacts of refineries have been the subject of major investigative articles and the California state government estimates that incidents since 1995 have cost the state economy $13 billion in direct and indirect losses.

The oil industry is a very wealthy economic sector and uses its resources to buy political influence in California (here and here) and elsewhere. Big Oil is also a case study of how an industry can “capture” the regulatory agencies which are supposed to oversee its operations (e.g., see here and here.)

One might think that “green” California, with a Democratic Party Governor who has described the fossil fuel industry as selling a “highly destructive” product, would be different. But actually Governor Brown has a deeply schizophrenic attitude toward Big Oil – denouncing it on one hand, and protecting it and taking millions in campaign contributions on the other hand:

In 2011, Brown fired two regulators for the state Department of Conservation and the Division of Oil, Gas & Geothermal Resources for not issuing fracking permits fast enough (here and here);
In 2012, Brown suspended the California Coastal Act, which covers costal environments in the event of oil spills, to reduce costs for a pipeline company that polluted beaches in a spill near Santa Barbara;
In 2013, Brown received millions of dollars in oil industry donations to support passage of his favored ballot propositions (here and here); and
In 2015, the Brown-appointed head of the state Department of Conservation abruptly resigned following an outcry that oil companies had been allowed to inject toxic wastewater into the Central Valley drinking water aquifers (here and here) and the practice is still occurring in 2017.

Recognizing Big Oil’s power and political support, occupational health and safety professionals sought to counter-balance these forces by joining others in a broad coalition in 2012 called the “Refinery Action Collaborative.” The Collaborative included unions, environmental groups, Richmond community organizations, and the Labor Occupational Health Program (LOHP) at UC Berkeley. The organization was renamed the “Collaborative on Refinery Safety and Community Health” in 2013, and included the United Steel Workers (USW), Blue Green Alliance (BGA), LOHP, Communities for a Better Environment (working in the Latino and Black communities), and the Asian Pacific Environmental Network (working in the significant Lao community in Richmond).

The Collaborative has held regular meetings with member organizations and the Richmond community over the last four-plus years to solicit ideas and track progress of the safety effort. The Collaborative met with Governor Brown’s Interagency Working Group on Refinery Safety, which was charged with analyzing the 2012 Chevron fire and developing policy proposals to prevent a recurrence. The Collaborative met with the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB), which issued three separate reports on the Chevron fire. Labor members of the Collaborative also participated in a “Labor Management Advisory Committee” that DIR established as part of the PSM standard-setting process.

After this series of meetings and consultations, DIR released a draft PSM standard in September 2015, and in March 2016 the RAND Corporation released a report indicating that the proposed regulation to be “economically justified.” The research think-tank estimated the proposed regulation would cost the industry $58 million to implement, or only $0.004 per gallon of gasoline produced in California.

Then the funny business began. DIR went silent for nine months. It became apparent that the agency was conducting closed-door talks with the oil industry’s Western States Petroleum Association (WSPA).

In July 2016, DIR quietly released a new draft of the proposed PSM standard that contained significant changes. No explanation of the changes was provided and neither did DIR provide a complete list of them. A Collaborative member organization ran the old and new versions through a computer program to compare the text. Brightly colored “track changes” lit up the screen of the July 2016 version.

The Collaborative’s members then sprang into action. Led by the Blue-Green Alliance (itself a coalition of 10 major unions and environmental groups), the California Federation of Labor, and the USW, the Collaborative sent a letter and charts to DIR detailing the changes in the July 2016 text, and outlining 40 recommendations for reinstating the September 2015 language and strengthening it on several issues.

Prior to a September 15, 2016, meeting of the California Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board to hear testimony on the proposed PSM reg, BGA-member Sierra Club spearheaded an outreach effort that resulted in 2,000 emails being sent to the Standards Board. The Collaborative also mobilized its membership to attend and speak at the Standards Board meeting.

Big Oil also mobilized. Stung by the RAND report on economic feasibility, the WSPA released its own study of the RAND study. Unsurprisingly, it concluded that the think tank wildly underestimated the industry’s compliance costs. WSPA published their report immediately before the Standards Board’s meeting in September 2016.

Maintaining its momentum, the Collaborative conducted a series of direct interactions with DIR leaders. In October 2016, they held a conference call with DIR Director Christine Baker and her senior staff to go over the PSM draft texts. In November, the coalition sent DIR a detailed letter with 13 examples of how the changes would allow for refinery practices that led to the 2012 Chevron fire and a 2015 explosion and fire at ExxonMobil in Torrance, California. (In February 2017, the Torrance refinery had yet another fire.)

The Collaborative also launched a media offensive. It was designed to explain the worker and community health issues, maintain pressure on DIR, and counteract the lobbying by WSPA and the American Petroleum Institute (API). An op-ed article appeared in the San Francisco Chronicle, and sympathetic articles ran here on The Pump Handle, media outlets of journalist Bill Moyers, local newspapers in Richmond, CA, and even in the trade publication Cal/OSHA Reporter.

The coalition of groups continued to grow during this period involving more labor and environmental justice organizations. The State Building and Construction Trades Council – which had often been at loggerheads with the USW over jurisdictional issues related to refinery workers and building trades members doing repairs on site for contractors – joined the effort and brought its considerable political influence to bear.

In the wake of these actions, DIR agreed to make 20 changes to the regulatory text before formally submitting it to the Standards Board.

The Collaborative, with a growing masthead of organizational logos, sent a final letter to DIR on December 20, 2016, supporting the text that was last discussed with DIR. The Collaborative made clear, however, that DIR would again face active opposition if the agency repeated its move to weaken the text before it was formally submitted. The final proposal submitted on February 10^th now rests with the Standards Board for consideration and final approval.

According to Michael Wilson, national director for occupational and environmental health for the BGA the final proposal is a “clear, enforceable document with a strong worker participation element.” Wilson has been involved in leading the labor-environmental-community coalition since the 2012 Chevron fire.

The proposal provides workers with “stop work authority” and the right to refuse “unsafe work.” It also requires the use of “inherent safe technology” by the refineries to eliminate safety and health hazards in both normal and non-routine operations.

Wilson reports that 65% of the changes proposed by the Collaborative to strengthen the PSM standard were ultimately included in the draft submitted by DIR, while 75% of the changes proposed by the WSPA were left out. The WSPA wanted to eliminate timelines for hazard correction, eliminate the hierarchy of controls, replace “shall” with “should” in the regulatory text, and gut worker participation.

The PSM standard is not yet approved – it can be modified and must be voted on by the Standards Board – so there is the possibility of monkey business at the Board level. In addition, the WSPA or the American Petroleum Institute could file a lawsuit to challenge the Board-approved regulation, and state regulations of this type could also be potentially threatened by Republicans in Congress. Use of the Congressional Review Act against recent updates of the U.S. EPA’s Risk Management Program would permanently eliminate those requirements on a federal level, and undercut similar state-level ARP and PSM rules.

There is still more work to do in California to address refinery safety. Regulations under consideration by California’s Environmental Protection Agency for its Accident Release Prevention (ARP) program are weaker than the proposed PSM standard. Weak revisions of the ARP could be used to undermine Cal/OSHA’s enforcement of the PSM regulation.

On the other hand, California’s rule could be a model for other government agencies. BGA’s Wilson notes that could be the case in Washington State, which is considering revisions to its PSM standard, and even for refinery operations in the developing world, such as in Mexico.

The saga of the efforts in California to strengthen refinery safety to protect refinery workers, surrounding communities and the environment is an example of the power of coalitions between allies, of “doing your homework” in analyzing regulatory proposals, and of publicity, political hardball, and building community support. It stands out as a success against a very powerful industry with sympathetic politicians and their appointed agency heads ever eager to please. It is an example that could be followed to protect against health and safety hazards elsewhere in the United States.

Garrett Brown is a certified industrial hygienist who worked for Cal/OSHA for 20 years as a field Compliance Safety and Health Officer and then served as Special Assistant to the Chief of the Division before retiring in 2014. He has also been the volunteer Coordinator of the Maquiladora Health & Safety Support Network since 1993 and has coordinated projects in Bangladesh, Central America, China, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Mexico and Vietnam.

garrettbrown Fri, 03/03/2017 - 11:52

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In wake of Chevron Richmond fire, California aims to improve refinery safety

egrossman — Wed, 12 Oct 2016 16:15:18 +0000

In wake of Chevron Richmond fire, California aims to improve refinery safety

Four years ago, in August 2012, a corroded pipe at the Chevron refinery in Richmond, California ruptured, resulting in a catastrophic fire and a toxic vapor plume that engulfed, not only the refinery, but also spread over the northeastern San Francisco Bay area. Nineteen Chevron employees were caught up in the vapor cloud and one was trapped by a fireball. Remarkably, all survived. In the next several days, some 15,000 people in communities surrounding the refinery sought medical attention for symptoms related to smoke exposure. According to the U.S. Chemical Safety Board, among the reported health effects were chest pain, shortness of breath, headaches, and sore throat; about 20 people were admitted to hospitals for treatment. Now, the state of California is finalizing regulations designed to help prevent such incidents.

The details sound complicated and technical, especially to those not familiar with the industrial safety procedures known as Process Safety Management (PSM), that aims to prevent major incidents in hazardous industries, including refineries and chemical manufacturing. But explains BlueGreen Alliance national director of occupational and environmental health, Michael Wilson, “The fact is that this is the first major serious rewrite of PSM since the original PSM rules were drafted after Bhopal.” That was the catastrophic event in 1984 at a Union Carbide plant in India that released methyl isocyanate and killed thousands. If the new regulations do what occupational health and safety advocates say is needed, they have the potential “to completely change the [industrial safety] conversation nationally,” says Wilson.

The fundamentals of what California is proposing could have helped prevent the Richmond Chevron refinery disaster. And, says Wilson, if fully implemented, they could also have helped prevent many other such incidents, including the 2010 explosion at Tesoro’s Anacortes refinery and the 2015 explosion at ExxonMobil’s refinery in Torrance, California.

Inherent safety first

At the heart of the California Department of Industrial Relations Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board’s new proposed regulations is a preventative approach that begins upstream in the industrial process. That means relying on what occupational safety experts call the hierarchy of controls. This calls first for eliminating hazards and substituting safer materials and processes, before depending on isolating workers from hazards or relying on personal protective equipment to keep workers safe.

The regulations would require refinery managers to implement what are called “first or second-order inherent safety measures.” This means they would be required to use safer chemicals or reduce the hazards of refinery processes wherever possible, by doing things like reducing the temperatures, pressures or volumes of chemicals used. The regulations would also require refinery workers – chosen by their peers – to participate in decisions about safety procedures. The current federal PSM standard has recommended guidelines for employee participation but the California proposal goes further by requiring employee involvement in many aspects of safety planning and training. This participation, Wilson explained, is key to addressing many situations that can lead to disastrous incidents. For example, worker involvement is critically important in assessing vital factors such as how long people have been on work shifts and in ensuring that all workers are familiar with new equipment and procedures. The proposed regulations also include requiring refineries to analyze the hazards in their processes, develop plans to prevent health and safety problems, and train workers on these procedures.

Health and safety advocates see these fundamentals as key to addressing what’s lead to so many serious industrial incidents involving hazardous materials and manufacturing processes. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, about 150 catastrophic accidents happen at U.S. industrial and chemical facilities each year. That’s almost one every two days.

Labor advocates and industry weigh in

California’s Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board held a hearing on the proposed regulations on September 15^th when a public comment period on the proposal also ended. Both occupational health and safety advocates – despite their support for the new regulations’ principles – and the refinery industry currently see problems in the details of what’s being proposed.

In their comments, the Western States Petroleum Association called the proposed regulations “overbroad” and say they “overstep” the state’s authority and “would neither improve safety performance nor provide material benefits.” On the other hand, occupational health, safety and labor advocates – including the California Labor Federation, United Steelworkers, and BlueGreen Alliance – expressed concern that the proposed regulations lack specific deadlines and requirements that they consider essential if refineries are to make the needed substantive changes.

The California Department of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA) is now reviewing the public comments on the proposed regulations, explained DIR spokesperson Julia Bernstein. If the agency decides only minor changes are needed in response to public comments, the revised proposal will be released for a 15-day public comment period. If major revisions are made, there will be a 45-day public comment period. In either case, the final regulation must be adopted by July 15, 2017, one year after DIR first submitted the proposal to the Standards Board .

egrossman Wed, 10/12/2016 - 12:15

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Explosion, chemical hazards persist at Pilgrim's Pride poultry plants

cmonforton — Tue, 30 Jul 2013 16:14:48 +0000

Explosion, chemical hazards persist at Pilgrim's Pride poultry plants

Pilgrim's Pride can't seem to get its act together safely handling highly toxic and explosive gases. The firm---the second largest poultry producer in the world with annual net sales of $8.1 Billion---received citations again from federal OSHA concerning its failed safety management of anhydrous ammonia.

OSHA announced this month $170,000 in proposed penalties for 9 serious, 1 willful and 1 repeat violation at the company's De Queen, Arkansas plant. All of the alleged violations involve requirements under OSHA's process safety management standard for control of highly hazardous chemicals. Pilgrim's Pride has received similar citations from OSHA for its facilities in Lufkin, TX; Live Oak, FL; and Russellville, AL (here, here, here.)

This most recent set of citations reads like a disaster involving anhydrous ammonia was just waiting to happen. The employer failed to ensure that detailed written procedures were established and implemented for

conducting thickness measurements of piping and vessels;
inspecting insulated piping and vessels;
inspecting of relief valves and relief vent systems; and
managing process changes related to removing equipment from the ammonia refrigeration service;

Pilgrim's Pride management also failed to:

inspect and conduct tests on process equipment to ensure its on-going mechanical integrity;
ensure that the emergency shutdown system was installed in the North and South engine rooms in accordance with generally accepted good engineering practices;
ensure that the ammonia detector used to shut down the boilers in the event of a release was repaired and returned to service in a timely manner; and
ensure that the emergency mechanical ventilation system in the South engine room is either activated by an ammonia detector or run continuously.

These are some of the same problems found by OSHA inspectors on previous inspections at other Pilgrim's Pride facilities. In December 2012, when the agency issued citations to the firm about the Lufkin, TX plant, OSHA's area director said

"Exposure to highly hazardous chemicals can be fatal. OSHA will not tolerate a company's failure to provide a safe and healthful working environment."

One way OSHA demonstrates that lack of tolerance for safety failures, which can have catastrophic effects, is proposing a steep penalty. The trouble is, OSHA's maximum penalty amounts haven't been updated by Congress for 20 years. The maximum penalty for a serious violation is just $7,000, even for a corporation the size of Pilgrim's Pride. I hardly think a proposed penalty of $170,000 even gets a post-it- note on the CEO's message board. Pilgrim's Pride reported a gross profit for the first quarter of 2013 of $118.4 million.

OSHA has also been showing a lack of tolerance for recalcitrant companies with its Severe Violator Enforcement Program (SVEP). Launched in June 2010, it establishes criteria for placing an employer on the agency's SVEP list. The criteria involves certain types, numbers of, and severity of violations. Those employers on the list are subject to a follow-up inspection at the site where violations were cited, as well as at other workplaces controlled by the same company.

Do these recent willful and repeat violations by Pilgrim's Pride move the multi-national onto OSHA's SVEP list? Nope.

OSHA's criteria sets a very high bar for making it onto the bad actor list. Only about 300 employers nationwide are currently on it. The criteria for violations related to process safety management (PSM) are an even higher hurdle. In a single inspection, an employer must receive at least three PSM violations that are classified as high-gravity "repeat," "willful," or "failure-to-abate". Pilgrim's Pride's plant in De Queen, AR only received two----one willful, one repeat---violations during this most recent inspection. No matter that the billion-dollar company has received a number of repeat violations at some of its other facilities.

OSHA needs to lower the bar on what it considers a recalcitrant employer. Pilgrim's Pride would likely pay more attention to safety if it knew the next time it received a single repeat violation at any plant it will get the label: severe violator.

cmonforton Tue, 07/30/2013 - 12:14

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chemicals policy

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process safety management

Five years and $10 billion later, but process safety problem halts production at brand new U.S. oil refinery

cmonforton — Wed, 11 Jul 2012 14:00:24 +0000

Five years and $10 billion later, but process safety problem halts production at brand new U.S. oil refinery

When the deal was made five years ago, officials were proud to announce it was the first refinery expansion project in the U.S. in 30 years. Motiva Enterprises' CEO Bill Welte called it a "momentous occasion" for his firm and its owners Royal Dutch Shell and Saudi Aramco. The final product would be the largest refinery in U.S. It was projected to produce more than 12 million gallons of gasoline per day from crude oil shipped initially by tankers from Saudi Arabia to the Port Arthur, TX site.

Fast forward to the grand opening ceremony on May 31, 2012 where five executives including Shell's CEO Peter Vosser and CEO of Saudi Aramco Khalid Al-Falih turned a wheel valve to symbolize the refinery going on-line. Shell's news release noted

"a prestigious group of guests gathered to celebrate this milestone event, which was followed by an open house and site tours."

The expansion ultimately cost about $10 billion.

While the oil giants were still sweeping up the confetti, a caustic contaminant seeped into the new 30-story high crude distillation unit, described by Scientific American's Erwin Seba as "the heart of the refinery process." In "Within hours, caustic vapors wreaked quiet ruin on biggest U.S. refinery," Seba explains:

"While harmless when mixed with crude, the undiluted caustic vaporized into an invisible but devastating agent of corrosion as the chamber heated up to 700 degrees Fahrenheit (370 Celsius); the chemical gas raced through key units, fouled huge heaters and corroded thousands of feet of stainless steel pipe."

Workers at the plant were tipped off that something had run seriously amok

"when two fires broke out and a heater ruptured."

Unlike the public fanfare less than two weeks earlier at the grand opening ceremony, Seba writes:

"Motiva has said little about the incident. ...11 days after it occurred, the company confirmed for the first time that the unit might remain shut for 'several months.' Sources say officials are telling workers that the unit could be idle for as long as a year."

Details are dribbling out about the chain of events that preceded the meltdown, and Seba offers some in his piece. They include criss-crosssed wires on a temperature gauge and cracks in pipelines. Seba's article also remind us of the complexities that correspond with start-ups and shut-downs of volatile petrochemical processes. This latter point, in particular, should be well recognized by any refinery. These operations have a history of catastrophic incidents and anyone involved in the industry or observers of it know the importance of process safety management.

I'm really having a hard time wrapping my mind around what happened at this Motiva plant. A few things puzzle me. First, it seems that an effective process safety management system would have prevented this corrosive ruin from occurring. The petrochemical industry has developed its own consensus standards to prevent unintended releases of toxics and/or fires, explosions or other incidents that may affects workers, the community, the environment or property. Process safety management is a systems approach to identifying, eliminating and controlling hazards. As the American Petroleum Institute says, when talking about process system:

"While petroleum operations involve risks, they can be effectively managed and/or eliminated when appropriate measures are taken. Operating safely is the most basic feature of business efficiency and has proven to improve productivity."

Motiva Enterprises knows this. They even have a page on their website about their safety management system. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has a regulation on the books (since 1992) specifically addressing hazards associated with highly-hazardous chemical processes. OSHA's PSM standard requires employers to conduct a process hazard analysis, defined as:

"a careful review of what could go wrong and what safeguards must be implemented to prevent releases of hazardous chemicals." The PSM rule also requires prestartup safety reviews, evaluation of mechanical integrity of critical equipment, and written procedures for managing change.

This "managing change" phrase refers to the exact kinds of start-ups and shut-downs that were anticipated with the grand opening of the Motiva plant.

I'm also puzzled by the plant's massive meltdown because this Port Arthur refinery has been recognized for its safety record by the American Fuel & Petroleum Manufacturers, (formerly the National Petroleum Refiners Association.) The worksite has also been a member of OSHA's Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) since 2006. OSHA officials call VPP worksites:

"models for effective employee protection," saying "the most obvious evidence of the program’s success is the impressive reduction in occupational injury and illness rates, as well as reduced workers’ compensation costs and decreased employee turnover."

A key feature of these VPP sites is their:

"exemplary achievement in the prevention and control of occupational safety and health hazards and the development, implementation and continuous improvement of their safety and health management system."

An exemplary (i.e., effective) safety management system for chemical processes should have been able to prevent this cataclysmic event. Some knowledgeable insiders, including experts within the federal government, think this Motiva event may be the worst process safety incident in the U.S. since the 2005 BP Texas City explosion that killed 15 workers. Thankfully, no one was killed or injured in this most recent event at the Motiva Port Arthur refinery. Two workers have died on-the-job at the expansion-construction site, one in 2010 and one in 2011, but according to OSHA these incidents were not considered part of the VPP Motiva site.

A spokesperson for the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) told me they are not investigating this most recent major incident. Maybe that's because the CSB investigators would likely find the same organizational and systems-management problems they've identified and described in previous disaster investigations. A Labor Department spokesperson told me that OSHA has also not opened an inspection at the Motiva Port Arthur refinery. OSHA typically will not conduct a post-incident inspection unless a worker is killed or three or more individuals are hospitalized. Given however the Motiva site's designation as a VPP site, I have to ask why OSHA is not doing so. Investigations by GAO in 2009 and in 2004, and the Center for Public Integrity (here, here, here) strongly suggest that OSHA needs to look more closely at serious incidents at VPP sites to determine whether the metrics the agency uses really mean the worksites have exemplary safety programs. The primary metric used currently by OSHA is an injury and illness rate that is at or below the nation average for their respective industry.

I've written previously (here, here) that by relying heavily on "OSHA recordable" injury and illness cases as the measure of safety performance, we're missing the factors that probably better assess the risk of a catastrophic incident. In a workplace like a refinery, with a toxic soup of highly hazardous compounds and hundreds of miles of pipes carrying them, it's as important to consider problems found during routine maintenance, unscheduled repairs and unintentional fires, releases, and ruptures, as cases that cause twisted ankles and sprained lower backs. The Baker Panel commission investigating the 2005 BP Texas City disaster made a similar conclusion about the limitations of using injury rates as a measure of safety performance:

“BP’s reliance on injury rates significantly hindered its perception of process risk. …BP’s corporate safety management system for its US refineries does not effectively measure and monitor process safety performance.”

The catastrophic event last month at the OSHA VPP Motiva Port Arthur facility should be used by the agency to develop more informative metrics of safety and test them. Failing to do so, OSHA and all of the VPP community will have lost a golden opportunity.

cmonforton Wed, 07/11/2012 - 10:00

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process safety management

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I suspect the basic take-away here is that processes that aren't yet producing anything haven't themselves been tested yet.

No...as part of PSM you are expected to evaluate this specific type of oops event and address countermeasures Before any work....the PSM standard and subsidary documents have extensive guides on how to do this. Also, as the process is probably not "brand new" there is what is known as history from other facilites.
It is doubtful we will get full information to understand and learn from this event for many political and economic reasons but, the more public questioning that occurs will facilitate fact finding.

50 serious safety violations and $917,000 penalty don't jive with corporate PR about integrity, safety, responsibility

cmonforton — Thu, 29 Sep 2011 12:21:33 +0000

50 serious safety violations and $917,000 penalty don't jive with corporate PR about integrity, safety, responsibility

One Middleton, Massachusetts resident thought it was an earthquake. Others said it sounded like a sonic boom. When Mr. Charlie Veradt heard the explosion, he said "I knew right off the bat that it was down the street," referring to the Bostik Inc. chemical plant owned by the global giant, petrochemical firm TOTAL. Just before 8:00 pm on Sunday, March 13, part of the plant exploded.

"'...We were sitting having dinner and then all of the sudden we thought the house was caving in,' said Joyce Cucchiara, who lives near the explosion. 'It was just unbelievable.'"

The explosion sent four workers from the plant to the hospital. Because of serious damage to the plant, it was two weeks before all of the workers were called back to work.

Bostik's corporate website and that of its parent company TOTAL suggest this is a model company, one you'd want operating in your community. TOTAL says:

"We consider it our responsibility to protect our employees, and employees of companies working with us, as well as communities near our sites and our customers, from the potential effects of our operations or products. For this reason, health and safety are our top priorities at all times."

Bostik insists that its business operates

"...in full compliance with regulations, legislation, and our Values and Operating Principles and the TOTAL Code of Conduct..."

These proclamations may look good on paper, but they don't jive with the dozens of safety violations identified by federal OSHA inspectors and the proposed $917,000 fine.

The Bostik plant uses a variety of chemicals to create reactions and form the adhesives they sell for commercial and residential applications. These reactions can be created safely, but only with a well-designed and diligently maintained system that is closely monitored along each step in the process. Deviations to the process have to be anticipated, analyzed for consequences, and planned for accordingly. According to the fire marshall, on March 13 a Class 1 (highly) flammable solvent was being added to a 4,000-gallon reaction vessel that contained polyester resin solution when the major explosion occurred.

OSHA's citations against Bostik describe 50 specific violations, including 9 classified as willful. Many of them indicate the firm's utter failure to comply with safety standards, especially those particularly designed for operations that use highly-hazardous chemicals. These standards have been on the books for decades. They are fundamental safeguards. It's hard to fathom how a company in the chemical processing business could get it so wrong.

The litany of infractions----many of which could have contributed to a catastrophic event----suggest process safety management was not a priority at this plant. That point is further reinforced by OSHA's finding that Bostik managers were aware of serious safety problems and hazards at the plant but failed to correct them. The last time the Bostik plant in Middleton was inspected by federal OSHA was 2001. That won't surprise those of you who already know that there are 9 million workplaces in the U.S. and only a few thousand State and Federal safety inspectors. Our system relies on employers to voluntarily comply with the law, and only on rare occasions will OSHA inspectors visit a workplace----such as after a catastrophic event or the site appears on a targeting list for high-hazard worksites----to determine if the employer is in compliance with all relevant health and safety standards.

Given Bostik's grievous disregard for workplace safety regulations and knowing that it has seven other plants in the U.S., I hope that federal OSHA and the States that run their own OSHA programs are assessing the safety programs at these other sites. They are located in Temecula, CA; Calhoun, GA; Conyers, GA; Louisville, KY; Paulsboro, NJ; Warminster, PA; and Greenville, SC.

OSHA wasn't the only safety agency that found problems in the Middleton plant. The Massachusetts' State fire marshall found several violations including

storing more chemicals than licensed;

having an unpermitted, dust-producing "grinding operation"; and

failing to get a permit for the storage of flammable liquids.

The fire marshall also noted that the State has more modern building code standards, with requirements for explosion venting, properly designed ventilation of flammable vapors, and manual emergency alarms. These safety features were not required at the Bostik chemical plant or other existing facilities that did not make changes to how their building was used.

The websites of Bostik and its $125 Billion-valued parent company are loaded with catchy PR phrases:

"Thinking, feeling and acting in the best interest of our stakeholders"

"People are our most important resource"

"Our values are reflected in the quality and integrity of our relationships

"Foster an overall culture of integrity, responsibility, caring and collaboration"

A firm that takes these words to heart would upgrade all of its plants beyond the bare minimum building codes, and implement a safety management system that identifies hazards promptly and corrects them.

cmonforton Thu, 09/29/2011 - 08:21

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