Wrap up on the Missing Explosives

I was out of the loop a bit from Friday to Sunday, but while eating lunch on Friday afternoon, I did see the press conference held at the Pentagon that claimed that they had blown up the HMX and RDX. By my count this was their 5th different excuse as to what happened and, of course, it contradicts all the previous ones. It's a claim that cannot be disproven, and therein lies the beauty of it. But given that it comes after a series of lies and false alibis, the only ones who are likely to believe it's true are those who desperately want it to be true. Sorry, but it stretches credulity to the limit to believe that they really blew it all up and had just forgotten to tell us that until after they had told us that they had forgotten that the Russians had shipped it out of there, and that it was looted before they got there, all of which was a big pile of nonsense and lies.

The reason why I've been hammering away at this story so much is because it makes so obvious what I have been saying for over a year now, that the administration has been astonishingly incompetent and negligent in their execution of this war. They had a brilliant strategy to take control of Iraq and not a clue what to do once they had it, primarily because they really did think that once we took over the sky would open up and gifts from heaven would rain down upon us all and Iraq would just magically transform itself into a peaceful, democratic society. That's a nice fantasy, but that's all it is. And most importantly, they not only ignored but systematically undermined the generals and former generals who tried to tell them otherwise, people they absolutely should have been listening to. And again, I am not the only one saying this. Those within the military have been saying it right from the start, to no avail. Take this article by Brett Wagner of the Naval War College:

In the weeks before the invasion, the U.S. military repeatedly warned the White House that its war plans did not include sufficient ground forces, air and naval operations and logistical support to guarantee a successful mission. Those warnings were discounted -- even mocked -- by administration officials who professed to know more about war fighting than the war fighters themselves.

But the war fighters were right. Military commanders weren't given enough manpower and logistical support to secure all of the known nuclear sites, let alone all of the suspected ones.

It wasn't until seven of Iraq's main nuclear facilities were extensively looted that the true magnitude of the administration's strategic blunder came into focus.

General Zinni tried to tell them this. General Shinseki tried to tell them this. General Clark tried to tell them this. General Hoar tried to tell them this. Secretary of the Army White tried to tell them this. The Army War College did a study and sent it to them trying to tell them this. After the occupation began, Jay Garner, Paul Bremer and General Sanchez tried to tell them this. Colin Powell tried to tell them this. Why didn't it get through? Because Donald Rumsfeld and his deputies convinced Bush to give them total control, including the unprecedented move of allowing the Pentagon to control a post-war occupation, and those people were too pig-headed to listen to the military folks who knew better. Even those who support the President and supported this war admit that everything I've said here is true. And Al QaQaa is just one of a myriad of examples why those decisions not only turned out to be wrong, but turned out to be deadly for our troops and for our ability to achieve any objective goals in Iraq.