Church and State Problem in Kansas

Most people are probably familiar with the recent Kansas case involving Matthew Limon. Limon was convicted of having sex with an underage boy (he was 18, the other was 14) and sentenced to over 17 years in prison. If his partner had been female, for the same action he would have received a maximum sentence of 15 months. The ACLU filed suit, arguing that the vast disparity in punishments for the same crime was a violation of equal protection. The Kansas Supreme Court recently ruled unanimously in Limon's favor and ordered him released after nearly 6 years in prison. But raj gave me a link to this new development in the story:

During a sentencing hear Thursday afternoon - at which Limon was in orange prison clothes and shackled - the state indicated it may take the case to the US Supreme Court or file new charges.

Under Kansas law the attorney general has 30 days to decide whether to pursue the case against Limon.

When Limon's attorney was unable to immediately assure Miami County District Judge Richard Smith that he could arrange for Limon to be monitored by a qualified agency the judge ordered Limon to remain behind bars until the state made its decision. (story)

Late Thursday night attorney Byron Cerrillo had completed the arrangements and Smith ordered Limon's release but under strict regulations.

He is to stay with an aunt and uncle and must work on their farm. He must attend church on Sundays.

If the state decides not to appeal or if no new charges are filed Limon could be freed from supervision, but if it decides to carry on the case Limon could be forced to return to jail or to post a bond.

I see another ACLU lawsuit coming here. The state cannot compel religious attendance without a flagrant violation of the free exercise clause, even as a condition of probation or parole. Kansas seems intent on adding outrage to an already outrageous situation.

Update: Turns out this one is false. Josh Rosenau pointed out a conflicting story in the Kansas City Star, and then I was contacted by Chris Hampton from the ACLU to confirm that in fact the website I cited got this one wrong. The truth is that the ACLU asked the judge to allow Limon to attend church while under the supervision of his aunt and uncle, but the judge turned him down. There may still be a free exercise issue there, but it's a different one and not quite as clear as it would otherwise be. I presume that the judge turned down this request because one of the conditions of the supervision is that he avoids contact with children and going to church would bring him in conflict with children. Any thoughts from my legal readers about the church/state implications of this? I'm inclined to think that this order would pass muster, but in a fairly close call.

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If I was Limon, I would start my own church.

What if he was Jewish? Or Muslim?

File new charges? Hasn't the Statute of Limitations past?

I have to agree with Josh on this one. Something doesn't jibe right.

Limon's attorneys asked Miami County District Judge Richard Smith to release Limon under strict conditions, requiring him to stay with his aunt and uncle, not have contact with children, and attend sex-offender treatment and counseling.

They also asked that Limon be allowed to go to church on Sundays.

"Matthew has God in his life," said Cerrillo, of the Johnson County public defender's office. "He would sit with (his aunt and uncle) and go home."

There is so much that is just plain wrong with this whole case, not the least of which is Matthew's six years in state prison for a sexual act that would seem to be something that occurs quite often in state prisons. Thus it would seem that if the state truly had the best interest of all of its citizens in mind, one would think that in Kansas especially, going to church would be something that was beneficial to all.

Ironically, as much as the initial report of forced church attendence made some degree of sense to me from the Kansas' fundamentalist dogmatism perspective, the order to not attend makes so almost no sense given that same view. Although, given that both New Jersey and Georgia banned those in their states who had been convicted of, and registered as sex offenders from participating in Halloween activities, i would think that Ed's point: I'm inclined to think that this order would pass muster, but in a fairly close call" holds valid.

From further discussions with someone at the ACLU, I have gathered that the order not to attend church is not a big deal to them. The supervision period will likely only last 3 weeks, or until the end of the 30 day period during which the state can refile charges or appeal to the SCOTUS. If they fail to do so, the supervision period will end and Limon will actually be free. If they do refile, he will likely be forced to post bond and there will likely be some restrictions on his movement. At this point, the judge has ordered him not to leave the farm pending the final outcome, and that includes going to church. The ACLU attorneys don't seem to be concerned about it at this point, since the order is a general one. If the judge had said that Limon could go some places but not to church, that would raise a serious free exercise problem. But given the circumstances, it probably doesn't.

I would interpret this somewhat differently. It isn't exactly clear what "free exercise" means, but it does not necessarily mean the right to attend public church services. If the local pastor is amenable, he could conduct private church services for Limon where he is residing. Or, maybe Limon could read his Bible and access information regarding information over the Internet.

I don't know the terms under which Limon was paroled to his relatives, but it appears that he was paroled to them under terms that would have minimized the likelihood that he would come into close contact with children. Allowing him to attend public church services would probably have violated those terms. Until the Kansas authorities determine which way they want to go--and they have only 30 days to make the determination--the court's parole terms appear to be a minimal imposition on Limon's "free exercise" rights. That seems to be a minimal intrusion on what might be considered his "free exercise" rights, and that is probably why the ACLU did not object to the court's parole determination.

NB: Actually, since the request was made by the aunt and uncle, and presumably not by Limon himself, one might seriously wonder whether it was his "free exercise" rights that might have been in issue, or their free exercise rights that might have been in issue. Totally unclear.

BTW, 365gay.com is useful, but I have often found it to be a bit in error. I could say the same about the NYTimes web site, as well as other web sites associated with print media. Indeed, if you were to follow the progression of the AP web articles (which are available through the NYTimes web site), you will find that the AP reporter initially files a report regarding a "breaking story." The report is oftentimes updated over the next few hours, until they finally come up with something that apparently has something close to reality. And the final report oftentimes has little resemblence to the original report. I have noticed that with numerous AP reports. 365gay.com is a useful starting point, but it should not be the ending point.

raj wrote:

Actually, since the request was made by the aunt and uncle, and presumably not by Limon himself, one might seriously wonder whether it was his "free exercise" rights that might have been in issue, or their free exercise rights that might have been in issue. Totally unclear.

According to the person from the ACLU that I've spoken to on this, who is deeply involved in this case, it is Limon himself who requested it and it's important to him. But everything else you said is spot on, the ACLU is not going to challenge the ruling because it's a short term and fairly minor inconvenience and it wasn't aimed at violating his free exercise rights, it had a legitimate goal. All in all, I think it's a reasonable ruling under the circumstances.

Thanks for the clarification, Ed.