Laurie Goodstein has a profile of Judge Jones, who presided over the Dover trial, in today's New York Times. It's a flattering portrait of the judge as an independent thinker, as every profile of him seems to be (he appears to be widely respected across political boundaries). In the article, there are some hints at what the ruling might be:
Legal experts said the big question was whether Judge Jones would rule narrowly or more broadly on the merits of teaching intelligent design as science. Proponents of the theory argue that living organisms are so complex that the best explanation is that a higher intelligence designed them.
One of his clerks hinted last week that the decision was long.
One could interpret this as good news for our side. A narrow ruling would be shorter than a broad ruling, and we are hoping for a broad ruling. That's not the only interpretation, of course, and it doesn't necessarily mean that, but it's reasonable to view this as a positive sign for our side.
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Wouldn't a narrow ruling focus more on the facts and details of events in Dover, while a broad ruling could focus on the broad issues and treat the myriad local details as peripheral? Then you'd have a short, broad ruling justifying a claim that IDC is creationism, cite precedent, or a long, narrow ruling on the politics of Dover, PA, and the evidence and facts supporting an assessment of the intentions of the Board.
I'm not a lawyer, so I'm honestly just curious.
Josh wrote:
Possible, I suppose, but I think the broader ruling would take a lot more room to express. The scientific issues would take a lot longer to explain than a purely purpose prong ruling, I would think.
While I doubt this case will be appealed, if it were, and the judge were to rule that ID is not science but is a form of creationism or a religious concept, would any possible appeal be able to challenge this finding of fact from the trial, or would it have to be a ruling purely challenging the Edwards precedent that creationism can't be taught?
But this is probably pointless philosophising on my part, as this case is extremely unlikely to be appealed.
hyperion asked:
That's a good question. First, I should note that the school board is very unlikely to appeal the case should they lose because the new board has said that they will abide by Judge Jones' ruling. But if the school board wins the case, it will be appealed by our side.
Second, my understanding is that the appeals court generally only examines the constitutional issues and not the factual issues of a case on appeal. But I'm not positive how that would be applied in this case and I hope that Dan Ray or maybe Sandefur will add their expertise here. If the district court rules that there is sufficent evidence to tie ID to the "creation science" that was outlawed in Edwards, is that considered a finding of fact that the appeals court would be bound to accept? Or would they be able to appeal on some grounds that would challenge that conclusion as well as the application of precedent?
Are we looking at the same judge?
Here's the courtroom artist's sketch that PT linked to a few days ago: http://photos1.blogger.com/blogger/3350/1897/1600/ID%2CHarrisburg%2CPA09-27-05.jpg
There's also a photo of him in the article above. What the heck? Okay, maybe they look a little more similar than when I first thought about this, but still, this is a brand new mental picture for me.
"Second, my understanding is that the appeals court generally only examines the constitutional issues and not the factual issues of a case on appeal"
That's what I was thinking too. What brought it to my attention was the Cobb County Case's appeal, where one of the appellate judges was challenging the respondent's listing of findings of fact from the district court trial.
From what I understand, a finding of fact cannot be appealed, but questions of whether or not certain evidence should have been admitted, some of the hearsay objections, for instance, or whether the Lemon test is appropriate could be. The facts as decided at district level ought to be immutable, the only appeal question would have to be the application of those facts, and I don't see an appeals court unilaterally choosing to overrule both Lemon and Edwards without a really good reason.
But yes, as it stands, I'd say the odds of an appeal are fairly nil. Given his feelings towards perjury, Judge Jones doesn't strike me as being very receptive to the usual ID arguments as, let's face it, most ID arguments involve perjury or at best creative use of language at some point.
Commenting on the fly here, but briefly: as a general proposition, appellate courts review issues of law, not findings of fact. There are notable exceptions as, for example, when an appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment. But this judgment will be rendered after a trial on the merits. Most often after a bench trial, the judge will issue an opinion that consists of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The legal conclusions, as well as other legal issues that arose during the case (e.g., discovery issues; rulings on evidentiary matters; refusal to grant a motion to dismiss), can be alleged as error on appeal.
You've probably already figured out that the line between a finding of fact and a conclusion of law is not always bright. Further, to the extent that a conclusion of law is premised on a finding of fact, attacking the conclusion of law can be a de facto attack on the finding of fact. "Teaching ID in public schools is a religious establishment" is both a factual and a legal conclusion. If an appeals court concludes, for example, that the facts do not amount to a violation of purposive neutrality, the court might be saying: (1) the facts as found do not, as a matter of law, rise to the level of a purposive neutrality violation; or (2) as a matter of fact, there is no purposive neutrality violation here. The difference is subtle, and perhaps in most cases completely academic, because the result in either case is the same: no purposive neutrality violation. The former is an appropriate appellate conclusion ("appropriate" in the sense of being within appellate rules and norms); the latter is not, at least (as a general rule) after a trial on the merits.
For what it's worth (which isn't much, since I'm just speculating) I'm looking for a Freiler-type opinion. No purposive neutrality violation, but the effect of the Dover policy is to advance religion so it violates Lemon. Or perhaps a substantially similar outcome under an endorsement-type analysis. On the other hand, if the district court takes seriously what the Court said about purposive neutrality in McCreary, then the case shouldn't get past purposive neutrality.
Thanks Dan, you confirmed what I suspected was the case, that while the appeals court is generally supposed to consider only legal conclusions and not factual ones, there is no bright line between the two. An artfully worded appeals court ruling can delve into findings of fact as well.
Commenting on the fly here, but briefly: as a general proposition, appellate courts review issues of law, not findings of fact.
Pretty much correct, but it is not unheard of for appellate courts to review findings of fact, as determined by a trial court, if it determines that the findings of fact are clearly erroneous.
The appeals court overturning a jury verdict based on findings of fact is far less likely, in large part because, unless the court requests the jury to respond to interrogatories during their deliberation, it is difficult for them or the trial court to determine what their findings of fact were.