A research agenda without foresight or prudence

If you increase spending for research on the world's most dangerous microbes you might want to also increase your surveillance and safety oversight. Since 2001 NIH expenditirues for biodefense research have increase over 40 times. And oversight?

American laboratories handling the world's deadliest germs and toxins have experienced more than 100 accidents and missing shipments since 2003, and the number is increasing steadily as more labs across the country are approved to do the work. No one died, and regulators said the public was never at risk during these incidents. But the documented cases reflect poorly on procedures and oversight at high-security labs, some of which work with organisms and poisons so dangerous that illnesses they cause have no cure. In some cases, labs have failed to report accidents as required by law.

The mishaps include workers bitten or scratched by infected animals, skin cuts, needle sticks and more, according to a review by The Associated Press of confidential reports submitted to federal regulators. They describe accidents involving anthrax, bird flu virus, monkeypox and plague-causing bacteria at 44 labs in 24 states. More than two-dozen incidents were still under investigation.

The number of accidents has risen steadily. Through August, the most recent period covered in the reports obtained by the AP, labs reported 36 accidents and lost shipments during 2007 - nearly double the number reported during all of 2004. (AP)

We've been talking about this a lot here and now the conversation is becoming more general. People are noticing. The biodefense enterprise is not making us safer. Regulators claim that so far no deaths have occurred, but many of the incidents -- this year happening at the rate of four a month -- were previously unreported. The fact is there is no reliable surveillance for laboratory acquired infections and we have no real assurance workers have not become seriously ill or died, directly or indirectly as a result of their work on bioddefense projects, few of which have a public health mission. This is not a theoretical question. It has happened from laboratories like this. Indeed the last person known to have died from smallpox on the planet -- ironically the date was September 11, 1978 -- was a medical photographer one floor up from a research laboratory at the University of Birmingham where smallpox virus was in use. In the last two months foot-and-mouth virus leaked out of a supposedly high containment lab in the UK and infected cattle on a nearby farm. Accurate information about the labs and what they are doing is hampered by Bush administration secrecy, allegedly for security reasons.

Here are some new incidents uncovered by the AP:

Among the previously undisclosed accidents:

• In Rockville, Md., ferret No. 992, inoculated with bird flu virus, bit a technician at Bioqual Inc. on the right thumb in July. The worker was placed on home quarantine for five days and directed to wear a mask to protect others.
• An Oklahoma State University lab in Stillwater in December could not account for a dead mouse inoculated with bacteria that causes joint pain, weakness, lymph node swelling and pneumonia. The rodent - one of 30 to be incinerated - was never found, but the lab said an employee "must have forgotten to remove the dead mouse from the cage" before the cage was sterilized.
• In Albuquerque, N.M., an employee at the Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute was bitten on the left hand by an infected monkey in September 2006. The animal was ill from an infection of bacteria that causes plague. "When the gloves were removed, the skin appeared to be broken in 2 or 3 places," the report said. The worker was referred to a doctor, but nothing more was disclosed.
• In Fort Collins, Colo., a worker at a federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention facility found, in January 2004, three broken vials of Russian spring-summer encephalitis virus. Wearing only a laboratory coat and gloves, he used tweezers to remove broken glass and moved the materials to a special container. The virus, a potential bio-warfare agent, could cause brain inflammation and is supposed to be handled in a lab requiring pressure suits that resemble space suits. The report did not say whether the worker became ill.

Other reports describe leaks of contaminated waste, dropped containers with cultures of bacteria and viruses, and defective seals on airtight containers. Some recount missing or lost shipments, including plague bacteria that was supposed to be delivered to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology in 2003. The wayward shipment was discovered eventually in Belgium and incinerated safely.

[snip]

• In Decatur, Ga., a worker at the Georgia Public Health Laboratory handled a Brucella culture in April 2004 without high-level precautions. She became feverish months later and tested positive for exposure at a hospital emergency room in July. She eventually returned to work. The lab's confidential report defended her: "The technologist is a good laboratorian and has good technique."
• In April this year at the Loveless facility in Albuquerque, an African green monkey infected intentionally with plague-causing bacteria reached with its free hand and scratched at a Velcro restraining strap, cutting into the gloved hand of a lab worker. The injured worker at the Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute received medical treatment, including an antibiotic.
• The National Animal Disease Center in Ames, Iowa, reported leaks of contaminated waste three times in November and December 2006. While one worker was preparing a pipe for repairs, he cut his middle finger, possibly exposing him to Brucella, according to the confidential reports.
• A researcher at the CDC's lab in Fort Collins, Colo., dropped two containers on the floor last November, including one with plague bacteria.
• A worker at Walter Reed Army Institute of Research-Naval Medical Research Center in Silver Spring, Md., sliced through two pair of gloves while handling a rat carcass infected with plague bacteria. The May 2005 report said she was sent to an emergency room, which released her and asked her to return for a follow-up visit.

The Bush administration response is not to slow down but to open the spigot more. Piping money to scientists to work on dangerous bugs has a purpose if it is done in a measured way, with foresight and prudence. But foresight and prudence are not words anyone would ever apply to the Bush administration.

Ever.