In the conversations with Ilona, one point has come up repeatedly and I wanted to address it in more detail. This is the question of the role of naturalism in science. Ilona, and Rusty as well, fail to understand the distinction between methodological naturalism(MN) and philosophical naturalism(PN). This is not surprising, because the literature of IDCs and mainstream creationists ignores the distinction completely. Phillip Johnson, in particular, is maddening in his tendency to equate the two. But there is a very big difference between the two. Science employs MN despite the fact that a large portion of the scientific community does believe in the supernatural in the form of a personal Deity. So why would a scientist who believes in the supernatural pretend as though it doesn't exist for purposes of scientific investigation? Because he has to. To do otherwise would be to eliminate the ability of scientists to distinguish valid explanations from invalid ones, as Arthur Strahler explained in his book Science and Earth History:
Supernatural forces, if they exist, cannot be observed, measured, or recorded by the procedures of science - that's simply what the word "supernatural" means. There can be no limit to the kinds and shapes of supernatural forces and forms the human mind is capable of conjuring up from "nowhere." Scientists therefore have no alternative but to ignore "claims" of the existence of supernatural forces and causes. This exclusion is a basic position that must be stoutly adhered to by scientists or their entire system of processing information will collapse. To put it another way, if science must include a supernatural realm, it will be forced into a game where there are no rules. Without rules, no scientific observation, explanation, or prediction can enjoy a high probability of being a correct picture of the real world.
There are supernatural alternatives to every scientific theory, and there are simply no limits on how fanciful they might be. It's possible that the planets are not kept in their orbits by gravitational pull at all, but by angels moving them around in a preset motion that just happens to mimic the calculations and predictions of physicists. You can't disprove it so it might be true, right? Ah, but that's exactly the point. What could possibly disprove that explanation? No matter what we observed, it could always be attributed to the movement of angels acting in accordance with the will of God. And this is exactly why such supernatural explanations are not allowed in science, because they are not falsifiable. And if they are not falsifiable, then there is no way to determine whether they are true or not.
Another reason why scientists must assume a natural explanation is that that assumption has always been found to be true in every case where it replaced a supernatural explanation. Before science, mankind assumed supernatural explanations for virtually everything - bad weather, good weather, good crops, bad crops, floods, earthquakes, sickness, won or lost battles. Now we know that all of those things, and much more, have natural causes. The natural models allow us to predict when a storm is going to hit, when an earthquake is likely to occur. If creationist logic was applied in any of those situations, they would point to the fact that they aren't 100% perfect models and say, "Ah ha. Meteorologists and seismologists only believe this imperfect model because of their commitment to atheistic materialism. They rule out the role of God in bringing disasters and earthquakes, which the bible speaks of numerous times, a priori because they want to deny their reliance on God so they can go on sinning. You can't replicate earthquakes or floods in the lab, which just goes to prove that only God is powerful enough to create earthquakes and floods."
The same is true in medicine, of course. Until the last few hundred years, virtually everyone just assumed that sickness and disease was sent by God as punishment or by Satan to destroy God's creation. Had we stuck with the supernatural explanation, we would never have advanced beyond blood letting or exorcisms to get the evil spirits out. But we didn't stop with the supernatural explanations, we kept searching for natural ones and that search paid off in a million ways in our life everyday, most obviously in the fact that we have more days to live. Is medical science perfect? Of course not. There are thousands of unanswered questions where research continues. But would creationists argue that we should scrap the germ theory of disease because it has unanswered questions? Would they make the same argument they do with regard to evolution, that doctors are just blinded by their commitment to atheistic naturalism and they can't see the obvious flaws in their theory? Of course not.
There are at least as many verses in the bible to the effect that God sends sickness, disease, plagues, storms and earthquakes as there are verses that imply fiat creation, but you rarely hear fundamentalists quoting those verses against the "atheistic assumptions" of meteorology, seismology or medical science and their "imperfect models" that aren't infallible in so many obvious areas. Other than the occasional Pat Robertson rant about how we're getting more earthquakes or hurricanes now because we've "turned away from God", we don't typically see this kind of argument made. But it's the same type of reasoning that creationists use when attacking evolution - that it's not perfect, there are gaps in the knowledge, that scientists are "ruling out God" a priori because of their commitment to atheistic materialism, etc.
The fact is that science operates on the assumption that there is a natural explanation for a given set of phenomena because A) they must do so in order to have a way to test the explanation; and B) because historically, in every single instance where there was a supernatural explanation that was assumed to be true, we have eventually found a perfectly good natural explanation. That does not mean that there is no God or there is no supernatural, it just means that we have to do scientific research with the assumption that there is a natural explanation and that the supernatural is not going to mess up the results of our work.
Hello, Ed:
I think about the MN versus PN distinction quite a bit more often than I should, and I'd like to ask your opinion on a specific question.
I'd define a supernatural entity is a being such that (a) it is not bound by natural law, and (b) it may nevertheless act as a causal agent in the natural world.
If it is the case that science assumes the regularity of natural law (per Michael Ruse), wouldn't it be fair to say that that assumption is false if supernatural entities exist?
I know that I could be accused of mixing contexts (that of science, and that of "everything else"), but I agree with Richard Dawkins that all existence claims are necessarily scienctific claims. It seems to me that if a supernatural entity could effectively violate natural law, it would follow that science as Ruse (and I) understand it is impossible.
In short, I'm looking for a counterargument. Thanks.
EON
I would say no, it's not the case merely IF such an entity exists. It's also possible that there could be such an entity who chooses not to upset the regularity of natural law. But remember that the assumption of such regularity is nothing more than a methodological necessity. It's possible that it's not true. The problem is that if it's not true, and there are supernatural entities that intervene in natural phenomena, science has no means of either detecting that activity, nor determining how to distinguish between one claim of supernatural intervention or another. So science has to proceed on that basis simply because, as Strahler points out, it doesn't have the tools to consider such questions. And so far, that assumption has served science very well. We have yet to find a situation where there's not a reasonable natural explanation that can be described and modeled.
Within the context of the present set of discussions (you versus Rusty and Ilona), the best definition of science is A) "the pursuit of naturalistic explanations for observable events." It simply does not concern itself with B) naturalistic explanations for non-observable events (my being bad makes the baby Jesus cry) or C) supernatural explanations for observable events (an intelligent designer causes evolution). It also has no opinion on whether B or C are relevant or true. A is science; B and C are theology (of the lowest sort). Rusty and Ilona deny the modern division of the disciplines and want to claim the credibility of science for their theology. Karen Armstrong covered this years ago in her book "The Battle for God." It's ridiculous that you or I have to continue having this dialog with fundimentalists who can't or won't acdcept the difference between the disciplines.
ID advocates try to get around this in two ways. First, by claiming that the "intelligent designer" need not be supernatural, such as an alien who planted life on earth. They don't believe that, of course, and they would attack such an idea, if advocated, with great aplomb. But they say hypothetically it could be. Second, they claim to have developed a way to test this hypothesis, an actual test for design (as opposed to apparent design). The broad frawework of that is Dembski's "explanatory filter", which is really just "I don't see how that could have happened naturally, so it must have happened supernaturally" in the language of statistical probability. Then there is Behe's irreducible complexity, which is the same argument in the language of biochemistry. Dembski's filter has not produced a single hypothesis that is testable in the real world and Behe's examples of irreducible complexity have proven to be quite reducible. Such is the reality when all you really have is a highly technical argument from incredulity. There simply is no science there.
I think what I was getting at is this: it's not just that "science has no means of either detecting [supernatural] activity, nor determining how to distinguish between one claim of supernatural intervention or another." If some entity exists that *could* act outside the "rules" of physics -- at any place and time it chose -- predictive accuracy, testability in the first instance, coherence ... all of that would be impossible in such a world. That would be so even if there was an appearance of regularity, because we could never know that our observations weren't illusory. The regularity assumption *must* be true for science to have any actual content.
This thing about drawing a line between science/methodological naturalism and some other field of inquiry encompassing theological existence questions seem to me to be entirely arbitrary. Of course science must employ MN, by its own terms. But I have never seen a justification offered for why other existence claims shouldn't be subjected to the same methodology. You would, I think, say that's so because science simply doesn't have the tools to look for supernatural things. I'd respond that, if it is indeed possible to "do" science, we don't have to look for those things, because they necessarily don't exist (a priori).
This isn't something I'd say at a school board meeting, but I happen to agree with Phil Johnson that the MN/PN distinction is artificial. The difference between us is that I wouldn't advocate for the proposition that science should be looking for supernatural agencies. As much as I am repulsed to say it, I think he's dead-on is his argument that a strong commitment to MN excludes the possibility of considering evidence for the supernatural, which in turn leads to an a priori rejection of supernaturalism in general.
Again, the difference between us is that he thinks that's somehow optional. I think it's an epistemological necessity.
Thanks for listening.
EON
You made one comment that I forgot to address:
"The problem is that if it's [the regularity assumption] not true, and there are supernatural entities that intervene in natural phenomena, science has no means of either detecting that activity, nor determining how to distinguish between one claim of supernatural intervention or another."
I'd say that that's exactly right, as far as it goes. I just don't think your taking your position to its logical conclusion. The consequences of irregularity are applicable to naturalistic inquires as well.
I think what I was getting at is this: it's not just that "science has no means of either detecting [supernatural] activity, nor determining how to distinguish between one claim of supernatural intervention or another." If some entity exists that *could* act outside the "rules" of physics -- at any place and time it chose -- predictive accuracy, testability in the first instance, coherence ... all of that would be impossible in such a world.
I disagree. Let's try to get specific. Let's assume that there is a God and he is perfectly capable of intervening in the natural order if he chooses, since he created it in the first place. And let's say he intervened only one time, to plant the first self-replicating life forms on Earth about 3.9 billion years ago (I'm not saying I accept this, but let's assume it for the sake of my illustration) and then never ever intervened again, content to sit and watch what happened. Now what specifically in science would be "impossible" given that scenario? Would it mean that deductive reasoning no longer works? Would it mean that we couldn't do the same sorts of research we do know on plate tectonics, big bang cosmology, or the role of microbes in disease? I don't see why. Those theories, and the research they spawn, remain identical to the way they are now - successfully explaining the data and providing fruitful opportunities for new research. The most it could do is provide the hypothetical possibility that that supernatural agent could mess things up again, but that hypothetical possibility is there now as far as science is concerned, yet science proceeds just fine.
ED:
Would your answer be substantially the same without adding to the hypothetical I proposed? That is, assume the existence of a supernatural, godlike entity, but not the complete historical account of its actions ... would the possibility of supernatural interference obviate reliable observation and prediction?
EON
Yes. I was responding to your argument that the mere existence of something that could interfere with the natural order makes science impossible to do. I just don't accept that premise.
Just to clarify:
I asked two questions in my last post ... which one did you answer "yes" to?
Sorry, yes to the question of whether my answer would be substantially the same. And I think it's primarily because I don't see where the argument leads. Is the argument "If a supernatural god that could intervene in the natural order exists it will mean we can't do science at all, therefore that supernatural god doesn't exist"? That seems like an argument for why you hope it doesn't exist, not an argument for why it doesn't. And the opposite argument - "If a supernatural god that could intervene in the natural order exists it will mean we can't do science at all, therefore we can't do science at all" - seems to me to beg the question. I think at best one could argue that it might obviate reliable observation and prediction. But as long as science continues to be successful at explaining things and solving problems, I don't view this concern as terribly important.
"Is the argument 'If a supernatural god that could intervene in the natural order exists it will mean we can't do science at all, therefore that supernatural god doesn't exist'?"
No. To make that argument, I'd have to defend the regularity assumption on a priori grounds (since it can't be defended a posteriori). I don't know that that's possible.
"And the opposite argument - 'If a supernatural god that could intervene in the natural order exists it will mean we can't do science at all, therefore we can't do science at all' - seems to me to beg the question."
I didn't - and wouldn't - claim the "therefore" part of your restatement. I'd limit myself to the if/then statement.
The dual implications are what, for the moment, concern me. I wanted to make sure I was on solid ground with those before I continued on with my little rumination. I have no idea what I'll ultimately conclude. I nailed my theses to your door because you've obviously given some thought to the MN vs. PN distinction, and because I knew you'd make a strong counterargument.
Please understand, I'm not trying to win any kind of debate with you ... I just wanted to know what you thought.
I appreciate your clarifications of your thoughts on this.
It seems from this post that you have a particular theological view that you favor. Many of us do. That amount of assumption might be troublesome in some of the discussion, though.
I guess I don't quite see some of your arguments...such as the idea that knowledge is atheistic. I don't see it that way, but it appears to be couched that way (as my perceived viewpoint).
The idea that there is natural explanation and that this should be investigated is the only thing that makes sense in mans quest for knowledge. I can accept that in the explorations of science.
It is where that becomes extrapolated that I see problems. Can we reasonably do this?
This seems to be a big problem for lots of people, because many times there are people who dismiss the supernatural based on the idea that it is not subject to the rules of naturalism, methodological or otherwise.
Maybe as I get to know you better through your blog I will understand what you are saying better. I keep feeling I misunderstand your point.