Or just found lying around, according to an anonymous package containing the source code for their voting machines on a disk. That package was sent to Cheryl Kagan, a former Maryland legislator who has been a critic of computer voting machines. These systems are remarkably easy to manipulate and it really is important that there be a paper trail to validate the results, at the very least.
a paper trail to validate the results, at the very least.
But, as the video that you posted some time ago showed, sometimes that's not even enough.
I strongly urge anyone who lives in state where these machines are being used, and who has the option, to vote absentee. I did. It'll cost you a couple of first-class stamps, but what's that?
Electronic voting machines are black boxes and thus wholly untrustworthy. Without a ballot box full of actual physical ballots, there is no conceivable mechanism that could provide a recount that anyone can trust if a recount were needed--and they will be. I think the best use of the Deibold (and the other) machines is as artificial reefs or large paper weights unless they can be cheaply adapted for use a inexpensive PCs.