For a long time I (and many others) were of the opinion that the reported deaths from H5N1 and the extraordinaraily high Case Fatality Ratio (CFR; proportion of all infections that end fatally) was an over estimate due to underascertainment of infections that were mild, inapparent or just undiagnosed because they weren't severe enough to come to the attention of the medical care system. The reason for thinking this was that this is the pattern for most other infectious diseasesk, even serious ones like TB and cholera. Most of the infections are asymptomatic or at least undiagnosed. It is estimated that half of all seasonal flu infections are also asymptomatic. So this was expected to be true of H5N1 as well. But for some time there has been no or little evidence of the hypothesized "missing" cases. Every time we look hard for them we don't find them. The latest search was reported in the form of an abstract and oral presentation at the big flu meeting in Toronto. I'd like to say they have now been found. But I can't:
A study of 901 people who lived near confirmed victims of the H5N1 avian flu strain showed no serological evidence that they had been infected and fought off the disease, Rapeepan Dejpichai, M.D., of the Thai Ministry of Health told attendees at the Options for Influenza Control meeting.Even those who were in close contact with both infected birds and infected people showed no sign of ever having been infected, Dr. Dejpichai and colleagues found.
[snip]
The participants were mostly male, with a median age of 40; 85.5% were selected by convenience sampling, the rest by random sampling.
Study participants were asked about respiratory illnesses and risk factors, such as exposure to infected birds or the human patients.
The researchers also took blood samples, which were tested for antibodies to the H5N1 virus, using the so-called microneutralization assay and confirmed by ELISA. An antibody titer of greater than 1:40 was considered positive.
The researchers found:
- There were no significant differences between the random and convenience samples.
- 68.1% reported contact with backyard poultry.
- 33.3% reported contact with sick or dead chickens without use of any protective equipment.
- 7.1% reported contact with the infected humans.
- All participants tested negative for H5N1 neutralizing antibodies.
During the time that the human victims were developing the disease, 118 study participants recalled having their own acute respiratory symptoms, Dr. Dejpichai said. Of those, 33% had had contact with sick birds but all had antibody titers less than 1:40 and were considered seronegative for H5N1 infection. (MedPageToday)
What do we learn from this, acknowledging the results are preliminary and have yet to undergo the usual peer review process that is part of normal scientific publication. Let's divide it into The Good News, The Bad News, and Questions and Uncertainties.
The Good News. The virus circulating in Thailand in 2004 - 2005 (so-called clade 1) was transmitted only rarely and with difficulty from infected poultry (assuming that was their source, which is likely but not 100%). Failure to find evidence of infection elsewhere means that surveillance can focus by using seriously ill cases in hospitals as sentinel events, as the session moderator, CDC's Joseph Bresee, observed.
The Bad News. The current Case Fatality Ratio of over 60% may not be the huge overestimate we expected it to be. This disease is Ebola-like in its lethality. The hoped for phantom cases are looking more and more like they don't exist.
Uncertainties and questions. The surveyed population is relatively large (over 900) but it was a "convenience sample," meaning it was people that were available to the investigators and willing to participate, not a random sample of the population at risk. Thus the results are not a true estimate of the base population. On the other hand, it is hard to see why this would produce a negative selection bias, although this is possible. If the results are from biased sampling, it must be either a very strong bias or a fairly small seroprevalence. An extremely strong selection seems unlikely. A very small seroprevalence has much the same implication as the results.
Another question relates to the test (microneutralization) and the threshold for positivity. Microneutralization is essentially a demonstration that the subject's serum is able to prevent influenza infection in a cell culture. We think this is a good measure of both whether someone has been infected and whether they are protected against the test virus. It is possible that it is not sufficiently sensitive and that people can be infected but not have a positive microneutralization test. The other question is exactly how "positive" the test has to be. The threshold in this paper was a conventional one of a titer of 1:40. A recent paper looking at seroprevalence against avian virus subtypes in veterinarians used a lower threshold of 1:20. When we posted on it recently there was a discussion in the comments about the appropriateness and validity of this lower titer, but the fact that there was a difference between veterinarians and a control population that was very unlikely a chance finding suggests there might be other criteria for positivity. We have not seen the data from the Thai paper so we don't know if lower titers were detected but considered "negative."
On balance, is the news good or bad? My take is pessimistic. This disease may never become easily transmissible from person to person or animals to people. We are still pretty much in the dark as to what it would take for this to happen. But if it does, this is a really, really nasty bug and even a ten fold reduction in virulence would be result in a major public health disaster.
If a ten fold reduction in virulence is still bad news, then on balance I'd say this is bad news, too.
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I remeber you calling for more seroprevalance studies last year, and noting that the sketchy data at that time was not indicating that there was a clear pattern of asymptomatic infection. And since the train wreck in Indonesia has shown a CFR of something like 85% overall with clade 2.1, despite this fact still the worst case scenario talked about is (almost always) 2-3% CFR as in 1918. Many in flublogia are suggesting that this is insanity, that we need to recognise that the planning MUST at least take into account a Category 5 pandemic at a CFR one helluva lot higher than 2%. Just the mortuary considerations alone would be orders of magnitude different. Here in Oz the health officials say the planning is based upon a CFR of about 0.2%, which is nuts.
So yes, high CFR combined with high infectivity, probable aeosolisation, and a public that is completely asleep in terms of preparation reads to me like a train wreck on the way if H5N1 goes H2H. Does anybody have some good news for a change, please? If not, then let's get cracking on getting the public prepared to ride out a 3 month wave....or else.
Revere. An excellent analysis. Thanks.
There is a mild case in Indonesia at the moment and there has been mild cases in Egypt but I take this as a new plateau in adaption and also very bad news.
What I was wondering is that as this virus evolves further and further from the index case, is it possible that PCR tests etc. have become inaccurate and unable to pick up all of the unique genetic changes...therefore causing false negative's...a person is infected but tests negative.
Secondly, I wonder if some mild cases could be false positives due to the developing widespread genetic diversity due to geographical isolation.
Then there is a study from Kendall P Myers et al to be released in the July Issue of Clinical Infectious Disease...
...from an overview..."The researchers studied blood samples from 42 veterinarians and 66 healthy nonveterinarians and found that the vets were significantly more likely to have antibodies to avian flu subtypes H5, H6, and H7, indicating previous infection with the viruses. The scientists did not ascertain whether the vets had had any clinical illness caused by their infections."
It seems that H5N1 may be unique even among H5 viruses...as others seem to cross the species barrier to produce asymptomatic infections quite easily.
Forgot to mention that the researchers are from the University of Iowa.
Tom: Posted on Myers article here and it is linked in the post above. PCR needs a properly matched primer and if there is sufficient genetic drift the older primers may or may not be sufficiently accurate to give a sensitive test, resulting in false negatives. I'm not sure I now what you mean about the false positives. That non H5 will give a positive PCR?
Revere. Thanks. I guess my point was that it seems to me that there is a possibility of false negatives and false positives with any test...including interpretation and other human error.
There was a recent report of a abbherent mild case in a three year old in Indonesia. It seems that on one hand it could be as a result of adaption or be a false negative...and it seems to me as the virus evolves in relative isolation, for example in both Indonesia and Africa at the same time, the odds for both false positives and false negatives increase due to genetic variability and laboratory expertise or lack of it...more hands...more mistakes.
These problems have been more in play in the past six months...and should be considered each time we read a report going forward.
What do you think?
Shoot...I should have said that the mild case in Indonesia could be an adaption or a false positive.
Revere, clarify the negative on the neutralizing bodies for me. Does that mean that the body never tried to fight, it was overwhelmed and it never got a chance to respond or that it was just a zero response?
I also agree that this is a lot more prevalent than anyone knows.Once it turns cloudy on this one its going to be too late to run ahead of the storm.
Randy: Neutralizing antibdies are just one kind of antibody and antibodies are just one kind of immune response. So it is possible that there is still either protection or evidence of infection or both with some other measure.
Dr. Henry Niman @ PFI wrote:
"The presentation at the Options VI meeting was nonsense. The cut-off of 40 used in the study was equivalent to 80 in CDC tests. The positive control had a titer of 1280, which dropped to 80 in a year. The testing in Thailand involved regions that had no reported human cases in over a year."
http://www.singtomeohmuse.com/viewtopic.php?t=1249&start=0&sid=736031f4…
Revere, please forgive my ignorance, as you've done so kindly in the past. Isn't a very high and fast mortality rate a good thing, in the bigger picture?
It's my understanding that the reason ebola didn't spread and was contained as quickly as it was, is because it was so virulent that the virus didn't have time to spread (that is, it was killing its hosts before they could go out and spread it around)?
Seems to me that a 60% mortality rate will keep the virus relatively isolated. Am I wrong about this?
merciless: Would that it were so. Ebola is in fact not very contagious. There are many counter examples, among them smallpox and pneumonic plague, not to mention AIDS before anti-retroviral therapy. I have discussed the idea that virulence "must" moderate as transmission increases here. Hope this helps.
Thanks for the link. Now I understand much better, though the urge to either (1) stop reading about this subject altogether and just take a hot bath for a decade, or (2) build a bunker and become a survivalist, is fighting with my rationality. Jeebus this stuff is scary.
Again, many thanks.