I thought Beyond Belief II was an excellent, stimulating, provocative meeting, but I'm somewhat discouraged about writing it up in detail because everything was taped and will be available on the web very soon … so I don't want to be entirely superfluous. I've already described the first day, though, so I'll continue with the second and third days, trying to cue you in to what I thought was most interesting and what to look for in the videos.
Overall, let's get some of the negatives of the meeting out of the way. There were a few things that could be improved for Beyond Belief 3:
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Time management. The schedule was very general, with blocks of time marked off but no specific individuals or times listed—apparently, people were supposed to give 15 minute talks, but no one paid any attention to that except to wave cheerfully as the scheduled end of their talk flew by. It's awfully hard to tell someone who is saying something stimulating to stop, but it really compromised the ability to ask questions and narrow discussions down to specific topics.
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Format. Everything was centered around the one lecturer at the lectern, with questions afterwards. In one session, we got four people sitting at a table at the front of the room, but even there we didn't get enough interaction between those people — they just answered questions individually. More discussion! More argument!
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Focus. I don't know how to improve this problem, if it is one at all: these were incredibly diverse topics. They were all interesting, but assembling them into a coherent whole is nearly impossible. I was entertained and enlightened, but I don't know that I came out of the meeting with a sharper view of the future of the enlightenment.
Do not get the wrong impression, though: those little general complaints did not interfere with the fact that this was a most exhilarating meeting, and that I'd do it all over again (and maybe get more of an opportunity to participate myself). Now for a few things to look for when the videos become available:
Peter Atkins talked about science as culture, advocating both the power of reductionism and a kind of scientific imperialism that I rather liked but that others may find aggravating. He gave his vision of the history of knowledge: the pre-enlightenment was dominated by theology and philosophy, the first enlightenment toppled theology and was ruled by philosophy and science, and the next enlightenment (and here's the part that will make some cringe) will dispose of the obstructionist rubbish of philosophy and allow science full dominion.
Harry Kroto offered us strategies to save us from a new dark age — he was promoting global educational outreach, an initiative to disseminate science, engineering and technology instruction to schools around the world. It's a wonderfully positive approach. The questions afterwards got a little heated, though, because both Atkins and Kroto said disparaging things about the Templeton Foundation — Jonathan Haidt accused them of "moralistic tribalism" and defended the Templeton because they had funded some of his research on moral psychology, and Michael Shermer sounded absolutely furious that people weren't appreciating the wonderful things the Templeton was doing. I think they're both full of crap: the Templeton funds stealth religion, and the good work they support is a façade to conceal their aims…an effective shield, if Haidt's and Shermer's responses are any measure.
Scott Atran gave one of the more interesting talks of the meeting, I thought. It started off as an utterly awful mess: he was stating apologetics for religion, and stumbling incoherently through a series of powerpoint slides dense with text and often having nothing to do with his point. I was about ready to yell at him to shut off the damn distracting flurry of words on the screen and say something, and then he settled down into the meat of his talk, and it was fascinating. Unfortunately, he led in with a misrepresentation — 'great scientists propose that the magic dust of atheism will produce peace' — which is complete nonsense, and then gave a clear statement that I agree with, that there is absolutely no evidence for religion as an adaptation or for group selection. And then he was off with a detailed analysis of terrorist events and Al Qaeda.
Basically, he argued that Al Qaeda is a spent force with little power, and that recent terrorist attacks, in particular the Madrid bombing, are not driven by religion, but by moral outrage, and that the perpetrators of these attacks are not religious fanatics, but are instead disaffected losers. The strongest social correlation to forming a terrorist cell was not affiliation with some radical mosque, but rather that groups of young men bond on soccer fields. He made a very strong case, and I believe he is right. However, I disagree with him when he uses his data to give religion a free pass. These young men are lost, with little hope, and they are rightly outraged when they see Al Jazeera constantly dunning them with messages of murder and destruction by Western troops in places like Iraq, but then they do something that is only explained by religion: they cloister themselves together, recite the Koran repetitively, and eventually, in some cases, their outrage coalesces into a decision to go out and blow themselves up and kill civilians. I can understand how a violation of their sense of fairness and justice drives their initial impulses to band together, but it is their religion that then shapes those feelings into self- and cultural-destruction.
Lee Silver gave a talk about some of the complexities of getting rid of religion: people don't just flop into a rationalist/naturalist position by default, but often fall prey to New Age/"Spiritual" beliefs.
Greg Epstein promoted humanism in a kind of sermon, and he ended it by singing us a song. He speaks well, but I am not enthusiastic; he's basically advocating a new view of the enlightenment that adopts almost all of the apparatus of a religion except god-belief. Maybe that would work for a future post-theist generation, but for me, in a place where religion still has a strong hold and to which I react against, it's a bit creepy. I don't want to see the enlightenment coopted by a new religion, I want to see a cleaner break, with new institutions that owe little allegiance to the old.
Ronald de Sousa gave a rousing paean to the promotion of the romance of science, calling religion an obligatory delusion, distinguishing it from art, which is the enjoyment of known illusions.
Pat Churchland talked about neuroethics, in a talk that combined neuroscience and philosophy (it was a nice unstated rebuttal to Atkins' claim that philosophy will wither away — rather, I think it will transform itself in novel ways). One particularly interesting part was the discussion of unconscious mimicry, where people assume the mannerisms of those they're talking to…she argued that this is an evolutionarily advantageous feature because it is a marker of the possession of a normal social brain in those who do it.
We got a book reading from Rebecca Goldstein (I'd give you a link to the book, but it doesn't seem to be on Amazon yet), and John Allen Paulos rambled a bit with some fun anecdotes, and he has a book coming out soon, too: Irreligion: A Mathematician Explains Why the Arguments for God Just Don't Add Up(amzn/b&n/abe/pwll). It sounds good, and I'll be getting a copy as soon as I can.
V.S. Ramachandran gave one of the best talks of the meeting, but maybe I'm biased — it was straight neuroscience, with no concern about the ramifications of the biology into religion. Look it up when it's available: it was all about synesthesia and what it tells us about the organization of the brain and how it plays into artistic talent and metaphor. I was inspired enough to tell my students in neurobiology that they have to go dig up papers on the topic and present them in class, so you may be hearing more about it in the student posts coming up.
Adam Kolber (he has a blog!) talked about neuroethics and the law…my first thought was that there couldn't possibly be anything interesting in that subject, but he twisted my brain around a few times. I'll say no more, maybe he'll put a summary on the Neuroethics & Law Blog.
Jonathan Gottschall depressed us all with the state of literature and the humanities. He rather thoroughly trashed the whole field, not in its importance, but in the corrupt state of its methodology, and advocated a more objective and science-based approach. I thought he made some strong arguments; maybe someone more versed in literature studies will want to burn him in effigy.
I should not try to encapsulate David Brin's talk in a paragraph. It was performance art. But OK, I will disagree with his claim that the resolution of the Fermi Paradox is that something must be culling the numbers — I say the numbers weren't there in the first place, and that maybe we shouldn't be assuming that our brains are at all common in the universe. I was also thinking back to Pat Churchland's talk, and our use of unconscious mimicry: most of the first contact science-fiction stories I've read assume that our first steps to communication with an alien intelligence will be along the lines of that mimicry…but if our responses have been selected by evolution as indicators of a well-socialized human brain, there is no reason to suppose that the alien will share our social cues.
Robert Winter ended the second day with a spectacular talk about music, Beethoven, and the nature of genius. We got to hear the early drafts of the themes in the 9th symphony (which sounded awful…the question was whether their awfulness was a consequence of their difference from the familiar Ode to Joy or whether they truly were simply bad). At any rate, it made very clear that that work of genius was not the product of some kind of abrupt ecstatic illumination, but long periods of very hard work.
Thus ended the second day, at about 7pm, about 2 hours over schedule. Then we were off to a fine dinner at the Scripps aquarium.
The final day began with Sam Harris. He still expresses misgivings about the word "atheism", but that wasn't the major point of his talk, which emphasized the positive values of reason and rationality. I think that's exactly right; the label is a minor issue, one that shouldn't distract us. Unfortunately, he also ended his talk with a brutal attack on Scott Atran's interpretation of his data, which was just plain mean. I disagree with Atran's final interpretation, too, but I also respect the work put into it, and that it is an important observation that the roots of the conflict lie in wider cultural and economic disparities, rather than just that their religion makes them do bad things. Atran took it well, but his reply was terse and pretty much closed off further discussion. That's too bad; I think Atran's work is a solid foundation in empirical analysis that we can't afford to neglect.
Dan Smail gave the last full talk of the session, discussing the importance of history: to get the enlightenment right, we need to get the history right. This would have been a better talk near the beginning of the meeting, if only because my brain was fried by this point and I didn't give it the attention it deserved. It's one I'll have to look up and review in a fresher state of mind.
There was one last very short talk, more of a comment on previous talks, by Jeff Hawkins, the guy behind Palm. He objected to the term "atheist" most strongly, arguing that it was equivalent to painting a target on yourself. Eh. I disliked the whole premise; it's the kind of self-loathing nonsense that encourages a failure of will.
The final part of the day was spent in more formal one-on-one interviews, at length, between Roger Bingham and others. I only caught part of one, though, his interview with Dan Dennett, before I had to head out the door and go give a talk of my own at the Scripps Institute of Oceanography. If you want to know more about Dennett, it sounded good.
And that was it. It was a grueling, thought-provoking, wide-ranging meeting, and I thoroughly enjoyed every minute of it, even in those long minutes that were keeping me away from lunch and dinner. Next year, though, they've got to reduce the time spent on one-to-many lectures and put more time into the one-to-one and panel debates — we need more arguments!
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No we don't! You're wrong!
Oh, wait, you mean at the conference. . . Never mind, carry on.
And I gotta say, supporting the Templeton Foundation because they once gave Haidt or Meera Nanda a grant is rather like forgiving the Bush Administration because the NSF exists.
Ooh, is there somewhere I can find that online? I assume he didn't include the theme from the last movement of the Op. 132 string quartet (originally planned for the symphony), which is decidedly not awful.
everything was taped and will be available on the web very soon
Anyone know when? I'm DYING to see it. I loved the first one.
I think Atran and Harris have a bit of an ongoing battle.
Atran spoke up at Harris's talk last year and basically said that they had no idea what they were talking about when it came to the motivations of suicide bombers. And I'm sure he knows alot about what he's talking about, but he was quick to claim that religion was not at all a driving factor... which doesn't make much sense either.
He was terse then too.
Thanks PZ!
I talked to a guy on the video crew, and he said the turnaround was going to be pretty fast, a few days. They had multiple cameras and were mixing and editing as they were taping -- the stuff was being shown on displays outside the main conference room.
The guy who did the Beethoven talk was Robert Winter — I don't know what all he might have online.
About Atran v. Harris: I agree that Atran was way too quick to dismiss the role of religion in shaping people's responses, but I still think he's exactly right on the ultimate motivations of the bombers. Add economic prosperity and equality to the Islamic world, and I bet the terrorism would evaporate...but then we'd still have a backwards looking religion, gender inequities, and simple crazy beliefs to deal with.
I hope Stuart Kauffman stays away from ecumenical favoritism. We need Kauffman's abiogenesis work.
PZ,
Mohammad Atta was by all reports motivated more by anger at Western policy and by his own virulent anti-semitism, than by poverty (his family was not poor) or inequality in the Islamic world. As a religious fundamentalist I doubt the inequality of women there, for example, would bother him much. The 'inequality' that mainly seemed to drive him bugshit crazy was American support of Israel. Religious fundamentalism gave him a supporting framework to act out his rage.
Indeed, given that a fair number of the most notorious Islamic terrorists have been well-educated, from middle-class or even fabulously wealthy backgrounds (that pesky bin Laden guy, for example...), from whence comes the prediction that more economic prosperity and equality in the Islamic world, laudable goals as they may be, will wither religion-fueled terrorism on the vine?
Whatever the applicability of the 'global economic inequality' explanation for radical Islamist violence, it certainly cannot be the primary factor behind Islamist genocide in Darfur, Islamist terrorism in southern Thailand (much of it directed against moderate Thai Muslims in addition to Buddhists), church burnings and bombings of Shiite mosques in Pakistan, and Islamist mob attacks against non-Muslims in Indonesia. Among Osama bin Laden's stated grievances is the 1999 liberation of East Timor from Indonesian control. The anti-imperialist resistance / subaltern protest model of Islamist political violence is inconsistent with, at the very least, these expressions of radical Islamism.
We don't generically attribute the political violence of militant Christians (Christian Identity attacks on gay bars), Buddhists (Aum's sarin gas attack), Sikhs (radical Sikhs bombing a Canadian airliner), and Jews (Baruch Goldstein's mosque attack) to economic inequality and resistance to oppression. So why do so in the case of militant Islam?
Add economic prosperity and equality to the Islamic world, and I bet the terrorism would evaporate...but then we'd still have a backwards looking religion, gender inequities, and simple crazy beliefs to deal with.
I think that is beside Sam's point.
As he would (has) asked, "Where are the Tibetan suicide bombers?"
Uh.... Tibet? :)
Add economic prosperity and equality to the Islamic world, and I bet the terrorism would evaporate
I wonder at the recent bombings in the UK where the people who attempted to carry out the attacks were educated, well-off, medical doctors. I think it's probably true that economic prosperity and equality would help alleviate the problem in some or many instances, but there seems to be something going on that money and education may not solve. I don't know if religion in general and Islam in particular is the link, but it seems like a legitimate proposal.
Anyone else on the M.D./UK/bombings?
Superb summary. Thanks! (I followed the previous Beyond Belief conference with great interest).
Finally! What we have now is a kind of mutant half-secularism. We rejected our Christian tradition but kept the Greek mysticism. It's time we recognized that the whole notion that thinking in certain ways conjures up truths about the world is every bit as anti-scientific as Christian revelation. And half measures like philosophical naturalism or philosophical empiricism (where you use naturalistic or empirical solutions to problems you pulled out of your ass) won't do; you have to reject the whole sorry thing.
Never mind the video; I'm waiting for an entire culture of these sorts of clear-eyed, high-minded discussions.
Just want to echo the thanks for the summary.
It's sometimes errant to paint radical islamists with a broad brush, since there are still so many disparate factions. My interpretation of the general state is you have an intellectual (?) elite who are reaching out to the disenfranchised young muslim man who sees all the wealth and power above him in the name of islam and is wondering where is share is and using them as their pawns in the struggle to gain yet more power. It's a machine that's feeding itself. Just my two cents.
Lee Silver's point really need to be considered by the free thinker/rationalist community here. New Age beliefs are the next step after organized religion's hold weakens. We see it in Europe and we see it in cities and places in America where religion isn't a major force. I see erroneous new age beliefs as almost as bad as Christian fundamentalism. Certainly in time, New Age beliefs will try to build power structures just as monotheistic religions do today.
We are warned. :(
TAKE OFF EVERY 'ZIG'!!
YOU KNOW WHAT YOU DOING.
MOVE 'ZIG'.
FOR GREAT JUSTICE.
Here comes the answer:
Other ideologies work just as well for the latter part. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam used to blow themselves up all the time, and the Stalinist PKK has done likewise (with a high number of women turning themselves into weapons).
@ poke: I suspect that Harry Kroto doesn't know that much about philosophy, although I'll suspend judgment until I hear what he actually said rather than relying on PZ's sketch. But based on your comments, my suspicion is confirmed in your case - you don't know jack about philosophy.
I do agree that "the whole notion that thinking in certain ways conjures up truths about the world is every bit as anti-scientific as Christian revelation," but that position (Rationalism) has been but one thread in the long and tangled history of philosophy. Rationalism, especially the rigid Cartesian rationalism indicated by your phrasing, has virtually no adherents in contemporary philosophy, and always had sharp detractors even when it was more popular. Cartesian rationalism has about as much influence in contemporary philosophy as Cartesian dualism - that is, it is discussed only for what its gross and subtle errors teach teach us. (You also mention Greek mysticism, but Platonic Idealism is even more long-since-discarded than Cartesian Rationalism. Of course, we still have people who take Kant altogether too seriously nosing about - but mostly they talk to each other and don't bother those of us who pay more attention to the world than to our ideas about the world.)
The only "thinking in certain ways" that that is universal in philosophy is reasoning itself: Philosophy is the discipline of argumentation and justification, turned on any and every subject - which is why all branches of science had their roots in philosophy. Scientific methods are just very formalized ways of making arguments about subjects amenable to empirical investigation. As Bertrand Russell famously argued, a science is simply a mature research area in philosophy - where "maturity" simply means that a sufficient number of important broad-scale questions have been answered. The resolution of those big questions sets the stage for all the little questions to be asked and answered, which answers generate still more new questions, and so on.
Russell's position on this does imply that the subjects of active philosophical inquiry diminish as science expands, but many philosophers (despite the implied threat to their own interests) embrace that ongoing process - such as Patricia Churchland. It is an interesting question whether there will be or must eventually be a point at which every area which could possibly be subject to empirical investigation has been investigated and everything that is left in philosophy is pure drivel (like the overwhelming majority of what falls under the heading of metaphysics), but two things are obvious: (1) If that point exists, we are far from it now. (2) Whether or not that point exists is a matter not yet subject to empirical investigation and evaluation - that is, it's a philosophical question. ;-)
"[T]he next enlightenment [...] will dispose of the obstructionist rubbish of philosophy and allow science full dominion."
There would be no science without philosophy, then or now.
Anyone who says such things is simply ignorant; as much as someone who says you can dispense of evolution and still understand biology. Aristotle must be spinning in his grave.
One will fall, hard and fast, when the rope from which one hangs is cut; "sawing off the branch one sits on," so to speak.
"Beware of the man who won't be bothered with details." - William Feather (1908 - 1976)
Philosophy makes the difference between the action of "warding off angry spirits" and sending a man to the moon evident. Separating science from philosophy - and vice versa - is a divorce that would leave both parties bankrupt in all aspects.
Lest I remind everyone, we recognize that science and philosophy started when Thales said "All Is Water."
Like being ripped from Plato's Cave, that monistic, naturalistic phrase pulled humans from superstition, ignorance, and random, mystical forces into the world of reality, knowledge, and discovery. This cannot be understated; I have no hesitation about being grandiose here, folks.
"Here, for the first time thought became secular, and sought rational and consistent answers to the problems of world and man." - Will Durant, on Thales.
"The belief in supernatural forces remains to this day a yoke on the neck of humanity, but at least Thales made it possible, for those of us who wish it, to be free of that yoke." - Victor Stenger, "Physics and Psychics" (p. 83.)
The world still strongly reverberates from our ancient, Grecian fathers; to commit patricide would equal suicide.
These science/philosophy segregationists wouldn't be able to spend ten goddamn minutes with Socrates. I'm not saying that all philosophy is worth saving (hell no), but don't throw the baby out with the bathwater - you'll find that you're chained to the bucket also.
Listening to science/philosophy segregationists talk about the dispensibility of philosophy is much like hearing fideists talk about reason; in the very act of arguing that the "other side" can be disposed, they use reasons, give reasons, demonstrate causes, make normative claims, and created systematic argument - as self-refuting as someone arguing that they did not exist.
"It is not enough for a wise man to study nature and truth; he should dare state truth for the benefit of the few who are willing and able to think. As for the rest, who are voluntarily slaves of prejudice, they can no more attain truth, than frogs can fly." - Julien Offray de La Mettrie, "Man A Machine" (1748)
"The idea that philosophy could be kept apart from the sciences would have been dismissed out of hand by most of the great philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries. But many contemporary philosophers believe they can practice their craft without knowing what is going on in the natural and social sciences. If facts are needed, they rely on their "intuition", or they simply invent them. The results of philosophy done in this way are typically sterile and often silly. There are no proprietary philosophical questions that are worth answering, nor is there any productive philosophical method that does not engage the sciences. But there are lots of deeply important (and fascinating and frustrating) questions about minds, morals, language, culture and more. To make progress on them we need to use anything that science can tell us, and any method that works." - Stephen Sitch
"Philosophy may be ignored but not escaped; and those who most ignore least escape." - David Hawkins
There's still room for the a priori, folks; anyone who doesn't see that is blind.
"Really this is the defining characteristic of science from the point at which science became science, we use the term now 'science' but originally science was called 'natural philosophy.' That's actually the original term, and what we meant by 'natural philosophy' was just this kind of approach; and what was 'natural philosophy' reacting against? It was reacting against a previous view that did allow explanations in terms of transcendent, supernatural forces. It was called the 'occult philosophy' and really science was a reaction against - 'natural philosophy' was a reaction against the 'occult philosophy' and occultism generally." - Robert Pennock, "A Convocation on Intelligent Design Creationism" November 14th, 2006.
- M
G,
I wasn't referring to Rationalism. I was referring more broadly to what you call "reasoning itself." Science is not mature philosophy, as Russell would have it, it has nothing to do with philosophy. (Fortunately for all of us.) You can make such an argument on the trivial basis that philosophers talk about things and scientists also talk about things and they are therefore the same subject. But then you're compelled to also include religion (and folk beliefs, magick, mysticism, esoteric beliefs, etc).
Some early scientists were interested in Greek thought but they were also interested in Christian thought. So what? Most of them were interested in esoteric beliefs - numerology, sacred geometry, alchemy - and those beliefs were far more instrumental to scientific development than philosophy ever was. Scientists of the era saw themselves as making a break with the Aristotelian tradition, from which they took nothing, certainly not methodology.
The relationship of astronomy to philosophy is weak - Ptolemy held Aristotelian beliefs, the relationship to physics more so - the word has Greek origins, the relationship of chemistry barely existent, and biology - well, Aristotle wrote a book about animals! (Again, the Bible mentions the stars and beasts and the various ways things work, but science isn't mature religion.) After all these fields developed, without the help of philosophy (and some cases impeded by philosophy), they then proceeded to completely ignore philosophy for the rest of their history. So much for philosophy paving the way.
I called philosophy "Greek mysticism" as a rhetorical flourish. Certainly the idea that observing certain practices of thought can lead to revelatory truth is similar to other mystical traditions. However, unlike that other product of Greek mysticism - mathematics - philosophical reasoning never found itself a practical purpose.
Philosophical reasoning does not play any part whatsoever in scientific practice. It is, of course, in the interest of philosophers to convince you that it does and philosophical accounts of science would have us believe experimentation is just there to confirm or deny (or falsify) our prior philosophizing. This is just a sloppy hybrid of science and philosophy. Scientific practice is absolutely nothing like this. Regardless, once you have experimentation, you don't need philosophical reasoning or any methodology of thought; most scientific reasoning is very casual stuff.
All this aside, I think the best question to ask someone who takes your position would be, What questions (big or small) is philosophy dealing with that science can't that aren't also purely the product of philosophizing? For example, philosophers discuss the ultimate justification of knowledge, but they do so in the name of taming philosophical skepticism. Philosophy, in this case, creates the problem and proposes the solutions. A nice business to be in, no doubt, but if you reject philosophy you reject both. There's no longer a problem in need of the philosophers' solutions.
There's good scientific reasons to reject philosophy. The brain, material thing that it is and product of evolution that it is, isn't likely capable of the sorts of tasks philosophers put it to. And, yes, some philosophers have realized this but only to the degree that they think it'll find them solutions to age old philosophical problems. It's a rare few that are willing to admit it makes the whole thing so much superfluous wankery. There are philosophers of science who recognize the importance of producing sociologically and historically accurate accounts of scientific practice, but they still see the problems they face in purely philosophical terms. The "problem of induction," for example, isn't a problem for science; it's a purely philosophical construct; yet it still adulterates the work of supposedly historically-sensitive philosophers so thoroughly as to render them worthless (cf. Kuhn, Popper, Feyerabend, etc).
I've heard attributed to Voltaire the statement "A man without religion is like a fish without a bicycle."
Feel free to use it the next time someone tells you there's a Jesus-shaped hole in your heart.
Re: Harris and Atran, why should we believe there is a unifying motive for suicide bombers? A person brought up in middle-class Saudi Arabia who decides to fly planes into buildings may have different motives than a disaffected youth in Britain who decides to blow up a bus.
It could be that suicide bombers from each country may have a different overriding factor. Perhaps a Saudi al-qaeda type is driven by moral outrage at American forces in his holy land and (real or perceived) abuses by 'Westerners' towards people more similar to him.
And perhaps the July 7 bombers felt like outcasts in their society and felt racial pressure there, and a quick way out that allows lashing out at people is blowing themselves up. Radical Islam provides an easy way for them to go about it. Of course, they could also just be sick in the head (rather than any disaffection felt by them).
In any case, I don't think Harris is right by applying religion to every case. When the schtick involves interpreting everything through one lens, it quickly leads to error. Look forward to watching both of their talks when they're available.
Btw, how useful is the video? Ie, slides worth reading, pictures worth viewing? I'd be interested in a podcast to listen to on my commute.
Thanks PZ - I loved Beyond Belief last year, and was desperately searching around for info on this year's session - couldn't find any information anywhere about it - some talk of Salk being closed due to the fires ...
Ramachandran was excellent last year: he's such a clear, brilliant science communicator and scientist. Really enjoyed Ann Druyan, Carolyn Porco and Neil DeGrasse Tyson - all absolute highlights last year - sad to see there weren't so many astronomers/cosmologists this year? Some of them have really thought about our place in the universe, origins and how all of those things enter into the way humans conduct themselves ...
BB did a fantastic job last year with the audio/visuals and making the video available for download.
David Brin was there! How interesting - I'm a regular reader on his blog. He gives vague hints that he may entertain some sort of deism though, without ever definitely tying himself down.
Philosophical reasoning does not play any part whatsoever in scientific practice.
I think you may be mistaking the craft of philosphy with the, for lack of a better term artistic application of it. The reasoning process, based on developed logical principles is definitely a useful part of the scientific process. Every time an argument is discarded on the grounds of logical fallacy (and in extremis, some of them can be quite hard to detect) you have exercised philosophical reasoning. Every time an experiment is designed that successfully cuts to the heart of the matter being investigated, those same principles are coming into play. You might maintain that such propositional calculus is just maths in disguise, but the investigation of the same in the argumentative sense falls largely under philosophy's purview.
Whether there is merit in applying those tools to questions of ethics, morality, or metaphysical matters is another question entirely. The lack of agreement among philosophers and the perennial obfuscation of what might seem to be simple matters would tend to agree with you. I seem to recall Rorty arguing quite spiritedly that philosophy was useless without an element of practicality. Personally, it's been too long since I dabbled in the subject to even want to try and parse some of the more long-winded proponents of the art.
Sam,
I would deny this. The reasoning of a scientist is the same as that of an engineer or a craftsman or anyone engaged in a practical task. It's simply the application of the full capability of his or her brain. It might include imaginative thought, unconscious motivation and just plain dumb luck. What makes it science is the subject matter: experimentation (including mathematical formalisms). Logic and philosophical reason have some basis in fact, of course, so we can observe simple correlations: scientists obey the law of excluded middle (inasmuch as the world does), scientists deduce consequences (but this is something the brain does normally). But I would deny that it means anything to reason properly or logically. Doing so has only gotten us obscurantist nonsense.
Harris is absolutely right in applying religion to all these cases. What drives their outrage or disaffection may differ, but what's common to all the suicide bombers is that the same unreasonable religious system amplifies their disaffections, offers up scape goats, belittles the value of human life, and justifies suicidal acts of violence. Whether the bomber's a Saudi or a Brit, there's generally some mosque or religious school that took his disaffection and taught him to twist it into an insane murderous impulse. Also, the Brit isn't much less likely to be attending a Saudi-funded, Wahabbist mosque than a Saudi.
PJ,
thanks for the synopsis. Looking forward to the vids.
poke,
Dang, I like every frigging word you've written here (with appropriate due to PJ for his "the obstructionist rubbish of philosophy")
The philosopologists think they can obscure the huge distinction between what philosophy was in the distant past and what modern philosophy is. Originally, philosophy--just a damn word after all--meant "stuff that's hard to figure out" (and people should be reminded of this whenever they hear "Phd"). Questions like "what is good?" and "what is air?" all fell under the same banner.
Well, hello! a ton of stuff has been figured out, and the contribution from those who specialize in philosophy has been miniscule for about, what, 200 years? Now, we can't accurately guess whether the amount of stuff left to figure out is 1/4 ton or ten tons. But we can predict fairly well what role the philosophy profs will play in said figuring. That's right! books and journal papers on the relationship between Aristotle and Hume on Beauty, or what Wittgenstein borrowed from Hegel on Being... thanks, guys!
Here's a concrete proposal that confident clear-thinking citizens can work towards: Specialization in philosophy shall require a prior degree in a subject that is evidence-based. Thus, eliminate, not all undergrad philosophy courses, but the bachelour degree with a major in philosophy.
I suppose this evil plan will have to wait until theology is, um, re-situated.
Ya know, the pure mathematicians say: "we're brilliant, what we do is (probably) useless, and uh, can we pick your pocket?" And my answer to them is: "yeah, shucks, I've got some spare change".
But the philosophers say, "we're brilliant, what we do is important, so can we pick your pocket?" And my answer to them is: "stay the hell away from my pocket, but here, let me show you the way to my zipper".
"I've heard attributed to Voltaire the statement 'A man without religion is like a fish without a bicycle. "
Unlikely to have been Voltaire, as he died in 1778 and the first bicycle was not built until the second half of the 19th century. I had a quick search for it, but it seems the origin is obscure.
Good news - the rather empty beyondbelief2006.org/bb2/ now redirects to http://thesciencenetwork.org/BeyondBelief2/ which includes info on speakers, recommended reading, etc. Hopefully video impending soon!
"Whether the bomber's a Saudi or a Brit, there's generally some mosque or religious school that took his disaffection and taught him to twist it into an insane murderous impulse."
There will always be somebody to do that. Get rid of the religious schools and extremists, and the disaffected youth will turn to blowing up science labs to save the bunnies.
While ridding ourselves of religious extremists is obviously good, we should address the disaffection in order to reduce the chance that this person would turn toward any figure to give him a target.
I wonder if Pat Churchland has noticed that unconscious mimicry also might apply in writing ... I find myself doing it when focusing intently on one author and given her seamless collaboration with Paul and Terry Sejnowski I wonder ...
As for the usefulness of philosophy, I still can't find a dividing line between metaphysics (in the technical sense) and physics, psychology and epistemology, and many other examples. Of course, there's anti- and non- scientific metaphysics and epistemology, but those are what we ought to commit to the rubbishbin, not the entire discipline.
I really enjoyed Beyond Belief I.
I am not a scientist, but I have, nevertheless, some unsolicited advice for scientists.
Your strengths lie in science. No question there. But not in politics or public appeal. If you want to achieve your goals in, for example, education initiatives and research freedom, the answer lies in the political arena.
You must then:
1. organize yourselves
2. hire experts in the field (politics, law, finance, organization)
3. recruit members and build alliances (not make enemies)
4. raise money to buy congresspersons, senators, and presidents
5. get laws passed
Being that many scientists are generally employed to advance the interests of governments and corporations, you may find yourselves in a position similar to that of the labour movement. (conflicting interests)
ps: I think you could benefit by appreciating that there might be a credibility gap with your relationship with the public in general. We like your work, (most of the time) but that doesn't equate to liking scientists (as a group). ie. What does "reason" mean?
To a scientist: using evidence and analysis to find truth
To a regular Joe: using communication and compromise to find solutions
This is why you need outside help.
Personally, I will always vote for compromise and diversity rather than ideology (truth). Variety enhances selection.
I may be wrong, but this is the best advice I can provide to you.
"then they do something that is only explained by religion...blow themselves up and kill civilians"
Except for the, as far as it matters, atheists that have blown themselves up and killed civilians. Numerous suicide terrorism campaigns have been waged predominately by secularists. This idea that suicide terrorism can only be explained by religion is contradicted by the empirical data.
You can go back to 19th century anarchists or you can look at the socialist and communist suicide bombers for 1980s Hezbollah - the majority - or a decade later many LTTE Black Tigers.
One could come up with rationalizations for the necessary preconditions to becoming a suicidal terrorist:
1) Believes civilians are a legitimate target for violence.
2) Believes operational capabilities demand suicidal tactics.
in uncountable ways. It's a simple matter of identifying with one community and dehumanizing another from the weak end of a conflict. The poor man's airforce and all that. I don't see how religion carries any special cachet in that regard.
The simplest explanation for the predominance of religious backgrounds in the most recent campaign in Iraq is as a byproduct of the Iraqi population being predominately religious. Atran is focused on particular campaigns where religion is the basis for communal identities, so the details of the religious belief are relevant. Harris, just judging from his performance from last year, has had nothing at all useful to add to the discussion.
Too bad Dawkins is not contributing this year; but I'm looking forward to seeing Dennett arguing with other thinkers. And Atran has some clearing up to do after the dust cloud he left last year.
I thought the whole issue of ethics/morality was one that left some loose ends last year; I hope there is some follow up about that topic this edition.
Any idea when the videos will be posted online?
The videos are still not up yet; substituting parts of URLs from thesciencenetwork with bits and pieces from last year's URLs (e.g. adding slash-"watch") only revealed the old (but much enjoyed, repeatedly!) clips.
Bummer.
Ah, the raw video is up, at last. Just watched the first two days over the weekend with Winter's Beethoven bit at the end.
Well, actually the end of day 2 was something like: "Let's go eat some fish!"
Must sleep now, can't wait to watch PZ's talk.
tenkyu
TAKE OFF EVERY 'ZIG'!!
YOU KNOW WHAT YOU DOING.
MOVE 'ZIG'.
FOR GREAT JUSTICE.
Here comes the answer:
Other ideologies work just as well for the latter part. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam used to blow themselves up all the time, and the Stalinist PKK has done likewise (with a high number of women turning themselves into weapons).
tenkyu