Truism 4: There is most likely no God - if all gods but one are rejected with good reason, then by induction so should the final god.
Corollary: There are no independent reasons to think there is a god
Corollary: If there is a god, no-one can know that for a fact
Discuss
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I don't think this induction works. A theist would say that what has been rejected are not other gods (which don't exist) but models or descriptions of a god. The fact that all models but one are false does not imply that there is no true model. Compare:
All previous models of the Solar System have been rejected with good reason. By induction, so should our current model.
I've had no experience with formal logic, so can someone tell me; does the corollary derive from the truism, or is the truism dependant on the corollary being true? Wikipedia didn't help much.
If the crollaries are derived from the truism, then the truism may be wrong; there could be evidence for the last god which makes it reasonable to believe in that god, while there are still good reasons to reject all the other gods.
This one: If the corollaries are derived from the truism
And yes, I don't follow this one at all. I don't think the induction works, and the corollaries don't obviously follow from the "truism".
The truism is certainly correct, but not for the reason stated.
We live in only one Universe so, while there are many hypotheses about that universe (no god, many gods, Christian god, Abrahamic god (includes Allah and Jehovah) etc.) only one of these is true. All others must be rejected.
Anyone for a game of Last God Standing?
Tom
of the Sweetwater Sea
If I wanted a god, I'd invent one.
Viewing a god through the goggles of philosophy allows for consideration of isolated statements, but in the real world, the one where stubbing your toe causes pain, many other considerations have to be taken into account, such as the human need for control of the local environment.
The weather got you down? Can't stand tsunamis? Invent a cause for them that can be influenced by your actions. Do a rain dance or sacrifice a virgin and the powers-that-be will/may heed your pleas and stop being so damned mean. If the bad weather comes back, or another far off quake re-awakens the tsunami, then someone in your midst must have pissed off the god, so better get that person under control - hell better get them all under control.
Btw, I don't see the inductive reasoning either.
I'm not so sure about the induction either. It sounds a lot like Dawkins' saying "Some of us just go one god further." It's a bit of an oversimplification.
I prefer something more like "The reason(s) one has for disbelieving in any supernatural being could just as easily be applied to any other supernatural being. It follows that if one rejects any supernatural claims and wishes to remain consistent, one should reject them all." That's similar to what you said, but rather than calling it an induction, it's just an appeal to consistency.
This is a big part of why I consider myself to be an atheist for all intents and purposes, and only an agnostic in the Kantian sense that I can never know anything about the "noumena" (which corresponds to your second corollary, I think). As far as this world is concerned, there are almost certainly no gods. Whether any gods exist in any other, undetectable "higher" worlds is unknowable by definition.
All previous models of the Solar System have been rejected with good reason. By induction, so should our current model.
I don't think this analogy works as a rebuttal to the "atheist induction". We know that stars, planets etc. exist as visible phenomena; the only question is their nature and physical arrangement. Out of all possible cosmologies, one of them must be true, and the choice is to be made by gathering further data to generate and distinguish among hypotheses.
For the analogy to work, we must consider theologies as competing attempts to explain phenomena in our universe -- but as such, they are also in competition with physicalist scientific explanations, which have a much better track record. By induction, I choose to prefer physicalist models over theological ones.
However, this still leaves some theologies which do not attempt to engage with science (I think the Ontological Argument falls into this category, though there are no doubt others). I'm not convinced that the atheist induction is robust against such theologies. ISTM that the logic is: all the previously proffered god-models (and we've seen many!) failed for one reason or another, therefore the chances that this one is any better are slim. As a practical matter I tend to accept that reasoning, but somehow it lacks the force of "the sun will rise tomorrow, because it always has in the past".
Truism 4: There is most likely no God - if all gods but one are rejected with good reason, then by induction so should the final god.
I don't follow this logic either. Kinda like saying, "If all class X theories of abiogenesis but one are rejected, then by induction so should the final theory." Unless of course, that is a point you are making about absolute atheism.
Corollary: There are no independent reasons to think there is a god
Some current arguments are a little better than others, such as the fine-tuning argument, but nothing conclusive. I would say there are no conclusive objective reasons - yet, but of course the future is always unknown and that means knowledge is always incomplete. In addition, our tiny little primate brains may not be able to cope with possibly relevant higher level thought, just like most dogs struggle with calculus.
As far as subjective reasons go, I have no reasons to think there is a god either, but of course I have no way of ruling that out in others. If I were to suddenly receive a life-changing "revelation" or "vision" (unobservable to others), or if certain coincidences and synchronicities would repeatedly happen to me in a way that I would consider far from random and physically unexplainable, then my views might change (but not before I would question my sanity).
Corollary: If there is a god, no-one can know that for a fact
I don't think I can comment on what others have the capability of knowning or not knowing. A simple and relatively meaningless answer would be that no one can know that for a fact until they do ;)
Is this not a good example of a "Wiley E. Coyote" inductive leap?
I'll have to agree with the majority here that the logic is flawed in that multiple wrong models do not necessarily invalidate the potential for a correct model. However, that is based on the idea that all models are held to the same standards of evidence, which is not necessarily the case.
I think Dawkins' "One God further" argument is more about the cultural assumption of a specific god over other gods; I.e. why certain gods are relegated to myth, while others are actively worshiped as Truth, without applying the same standards of evidence.
I'm willing to accept that there might be a "God", but personally, I have yet to see compelling reason to assume there should be a "God", let alone that any of the models are accurate representations of such an entity, or that spiritual understanding of such things holds any value over the scientific method in even attempting to understand such a thing.
On th euse of the word "corollary" - I am being very loose here (as I am with "truism") these are statements that I think follow from statements I think are obviously true. They are not derived through formal proofs (although if I set up the premises, I think most of them could arguably be).
The "one god further" argument precedes Dawkins by a long shot - I recall reading it in some Enlightenment literature (memory fails, though). But the pessimistic metainduction succeeds here where it fails in science - in the latter, successive models are increasingly empirically adequate, such that we have greater confidence that the model we now have is on the whole quite correct (OK, we might refine that model if we locate a new mass, but we aren't going to change the principles of astrophysics any time soon).
But using it in religion is quite legitimate, as there is no increase in precision of claims or adequacy to the evidence. Gods are posited willy nilly to suit nonepistemic purposes, and the best one can say is that as science shows the world to be X, claims for God that require non-X beliefs are silently or explicitly dropped. The worst one can say is that the religionists claim that science is false.
So if one has reasons for rejecting the entirety of all god claims but one tradition, one has reasons for dropping that god, too. If, on the other hand, one has no reasons for thinking any god is true, but one merely does think it (i.e., one has ungrounded faith), then the argument fails.
Truism 4: There is most likely no God, and we shouldn't discriminate, because the Gods of the Christians, Jews, Muslems, etc. are no more plausible than Zeus or Apollo. Corollary:There is indeed, no independent reason to think there is a God, because life is explicable in purely natural, chemical terms, which renders a supernatural explanation for life superfluous.Corollary: If there is a God, no-one can know that for a fact, and if they claim there is, the burden is on them to prove it.
Truism 4
At present the evidence available to us through our current capabilities show that there is no God.
successive models are increasingly empirically adequate, such that we have greater confidence that the model we now have is on the whole quite correct (OK, we might refine that model if we locate a new mass, but we aren't going to change the principles of astrophysics any time soon)
So you actually think the Standard Model is the last word in physics? It would interesting to see what scientists (or whatever passes for them) 9000 years from now think. Is there a difference between "truth" now and "truth" then?
How much does the standard model contribute to astrophysics of the solar system? Even the existence of dark energy and dark matter is unlikely to make a whole lot of difference, at least on the scale used by NASA for example.
I'm something of a fan of Ian Hacking on this: as he said of electrons "If you can spray them, they are real". We use astrophysics to send probes with amazing accuracy. That means that to a first, second third and fourth approximation, the models are real aspects of the universe.
And how much does astrophysics contribute to practical physics here on earth? But history shows that our theoretical knowledge does indeed have practical applications: radio, nuclear energy, lasers, etc. And I would say "refinement" is definitely the wrong phrase to use with scientific progress. More like an "expansion of context". That is what Relativity did to Newtonian mechanics, and QM did to billiard ball physics. And we now have QM and Relativity - how do we unite them and make sense of the reality we know so far? A larger context. If they do ever get united, you don't think any new practical insights will come from it? And some physicists don't even think QM is fundamental. If true, where will that lead us?
If they do ever get united, you don't think any new practical insights will come from it? And some physicists don't even think QM is fundamental. If true, where will that lead us?
Heck, I'm likely to believe that we'll see something beyond the frame of context for the Standard Model, but I doubt we'll see "God" in those contexts either. =/ Or at least, nothing identifiable by any particular religion as "God"
1) An Anthropomorphic Personification of something-or-other
2) Capable of intelligent intervention in the lives of man
3) Omnipotent/Supernatural in power
4) The source of morality
5) Indistingushable from any other natural phoenomenon
Erf, last should be "Distinct and Unique from" rather than "Indistinguishable". It's late. need sleep.
Truism 4: There is most likely no God - if all gods but one are rejected with good reason, then by induction so should the final god.
I think I see the logic here, but only as it applies to organized religion. If, to be a Christian, I have to reject all "other" existing "versions" or "characteristics" of God, and if as Jew, Muslim, Buddhist, etc., I have to do the same, then whatever my religion, I have rejected all other gods with good reason, but at the same time, others have rejected my God with equally good reasons. That still doesn't say anything about whether the "God" entity exists out there (I personally believe He does, but that's just me ...)
I suspect that there are a few thousands of millions of people who wouldn't agree with you. They believe that they are capable of knowing that God exists and believe that a Theistic God does exist.
You may be limiting yourself to things that are repeatable and testable in an empirical way and being a positivist as well; but most people don't live like that.
Many normal events are one offs, the meteor strike that may (I only say may as I suspect volcanic eruptions near the same time also had an effect) have obliterated the dinosaurs and left a space for other species to evolve.
Say that God does interact with the material world but does so in a way not subject to scientific investigation, we are then left with personal experience and the records of them.
Even intervetionist miracles aren't a problem; they could be very low probability events (Virgin birth perhaps) that aren't likely to occur again within the lifetime of the universe and so can't be tested.
#17 Or at least, nothing identifiable by any particular religion as "God"
I agree that it is with a probability infinitesimally close to zero that Zeus or Yahweh will ever be vindicated by science. But the main issue for me is defining exactly what is meant by "God". If some deep physical phenomena were discovered 30,000 years from now, some might choose to call it God, which would fall under your category of "indistinguishable from natural phenomena" - and that could mean many things in 30k year's time.
But to me at least, any definition of "God" would necessarily involve something largely or completely beyond my comprehension. We're not talking tooth fairies or santa here - which would have specific visual or other properties that I can identify, so those arguments don't apply. Since I can say very little about what I cannot comprehend, I must remain forever agnostic about it.
I have good reasons for saying that none of the people I've met are John Wilkins, so does this mean that I have demonstrated the non-existence of John Wilkins?
Or was Bertrand Russell's turkey called John Wilkins?
Delurking with some thoughts and questions:
Is anyone ever in a position where they can say that they've got good reasons against *every* possible conception of God bar one (presumably fairly precise description [1]), though?
Could a 'religious agnostic' who thinks that *some* God concepts are clearly rubbish but has no problems with a sufficiently broad set of others escape this -- or at least have the reasons against those others weakened? (Admittedly, such a person is unlikely to be advancing the kind of specific arguments against other traditions that this argument seems to be targeting.)
How does having reasons *for* a given conception/set of conceptions enter in to things -- can these counterbalance a reason against? Or is that just a different way of saying that one has reasons against other conceptions?
Doesn't this apply to metaphysics in general [2], and not just (a)theology?
[1] As particular attributes seem to pick out a set of God-concepts, rather than a single one.
[2] Particularly in light of the second question and (I think) Bradley's comment along the lines of 'Metaphysics consists of coming up for bad reasons for what one intuitively thinks to be true'. This could have bearing on issues like quantum indeterminism.
Aargh. In footnote [2] ignore the reference to the second question. I could have sworn it made sense when I wrote it...
David - Nope. We can measure this solar system and have no basis for rejecting the existence of it.
Alan Kellogg - What evidence? Are you suggesting we can prove a negative?
Explorer - Why just organized religion? Do you really mean "mainstream" or Really Big? Suppose my tribe worships only the Serpent God because she is so powerful she ate all the other gods, so only she still exists?
"David - Nope. We can measure this solar system and have no basis for rejecting the existence of it."
Yeah. You really have to be talking about something fairly abstract -- say, the difference in ontologies as we progress along the path of Classical physics --> quantum mechanics --> quantum field theory -- in order for the argument to be more plausible, since in the nature of what you're talking about needs to get radically different with each step [1]. (So radical, in fact, that in order to get to grips with the problems of QFT one has to ensure that it's rigorously axiomatised, which changes the nature of some of the questions involved from how you'd think of them in everyday uses of field theory...)
[1] Not to mention that one tends to jump from the old theory to the new without bothering to solve all the philosophical problems of the old theory...
The Grader's Corollary:
There is most likely no answer to this induction problem - if all the answers turned in by your classmates were rejected with good reason, then by induction your answer should be rejected as well.
Unless there is an exceptional student who can solve the problem. But you need really good reason to think they have done so.