This is a follow up to the post yesterday, Religion is good for your health? Conservative Christianity bad?. I finished reading the paper. It's not a bad one really, but its plausibility will be strongly conditioned by theoretical priors. It is a work in the tradition of Emile Durkheim, and attempts to resurrect a functionalist conception of religious denominations, David Sloan Wilson is smiling somewhere.... The authors posit that the other-worldly orientation of Fundamentalist and Pentecostal denominations results in a host of social dynamics which increase mortality rates. In contrast, they contend that the this-worldly orientation of Mainline and Catholic denominations results in a more communitarian public spirit which generates positive externalities within a society. They don't use the the term externality. In the paper they seem intent on carving out a non-economical space for their analysis, but that's basically what they're talking about. Mainline Protestantism and Catholicism focus on public social justice in a manner which injects capital into the community as a whole irrespective of sect. Fundamentalist and Pentecostal churches on the other hand are focused on their own narrow church-life and rather disengaged from collective public action which might produce communal capital (this shows up in the nature of mission-work, while Mainline and Catholic activities being more strongly geared toward education and health as opposed to just converting). An individual illustration of this might be James G. Watt, Reagan's Secretary of the Interior, and a Pentecostal, who reputedly had little interest in being a steward of the land due to his belief that the End Times were approaching and environmentalism was ultimately in vain.
At the end of this post I've placed the tables from the paper. The authors performed a regression analysis and found that Fundamentalism and Pentecostalism predicted higher mortality, while Catholicism, Mainline Protestantism and Evangelicalism predicted lower mortality, in that rank order. Additionally, they found elevated mortality from social pathology among Roman Catholics, and they adduced from this that this is likely due to the high rates of alcohol consumption among this group. Finally, they found that Evangelicals tended to have lower mortality rates than expected, and they inferred from this that this reflects the fact that this group is more engaged with society than are Fundamentalists and Pentecostals, who are operationally much more sectarian. Jerry Falwell was a Fundamentalist, Pat Robertson is a Pentecostal and Billy Graham is an Evangelical.
First, let me hit the theoretical objection: cognitive psychology of religion strongly suggests that the relationship between believers and their theologies are very weak. This is documented in books such as In Gods We Trust and Theological Incorrectness: Why Religious People Believe What They Shouldn't. The authors of the paper focus on "cultural content" in a manner which puts the spotlight on conscious, explicit and reflective cognition, but the consensus among psychologists today is that much of our inner lives are subconscious, implicit and reflexive. Macroscale inferences must be weighted in light of these microscale results. James G. Watt justified his hostility toward environmentalism through religious rationales, but it seems likely to me that he used religious language because it was the language he was familiar with. If he was a militant libertarian he would have used libertarian logic; if he was a Marxist he might have used Marxist logic. Methodologically I think we should consider the possibility that people use ideas, ideas do not shape people. On the margins I do think that ideas may shape people, but we really don't know enough about it to generalize appropriately. Max Weber's disastrous predictions about "Confucian" societies and their fundamental inability to ever become economically productive based on their ideological content is due warning.
Then there is the problem of definition and the neat & tidy theologies that the authors presume have a concrete reality. Fundamentalism is to a large extent a phenomenon which emerged around 1900, as is Pentecostalism. The suite of beliefs and dispositions of these religious movements predates either, but their current social configuration is a relatively recent phenomenon. But if you read Albion's Seed you note that the social pathologies of the American South and the communitarianism of New England have roots as far back as the 17th century! Additionally, mortality rates were higher in the South in large part due to ecological factors. But during this period it would be fair to say that it was the North, especially New England, was the center of Evangelicalism and Fundamentalism. The American South did not become the hotbed of religious activity it is today until the The Second Great Awakening in the early 19th century, when the dominance of the Episcopal Church gave way to the revivalism of the Baptists and Methodists. Churches that are today Mainline, such as the Congregationalists (United Church of Christ), Methodists and Presbyterians were once the Evangelical counterpoint to the Anglican establishment. And yet the social dynamics which are extant in the Upland South, which was Presbyterian Calvinist, and New England, Congregationalist Calvinists, have always been very different no matter the theological outlook ascendant.
There is one finding which the authors seem to have a hard time making sense of: Evangelicals outside the South tend to have lower mortality, but those within the South resemble Fundamentalists and Pentecostals. They explain this by asserting that there is little difference between Southern Evangelicals, Fundamentalists and Pentecostals, and more overlap in outlooks. I can accept this, but I do think it calls into question their ability to objectively generate a taxonomy which can't be fudged post facto. Consider the idea that alcoholism and Catholicism are associated; in the United States most white Catholics are not of Southern European ancestry, they're mostly German and Irish. There is a body of research which suggests that Northern Europeans are more susceptible to alcohol related social pathologies in due to a combination of genetic and cultural factors. If Catholics were Italian or Spanish then one would not see these pathologies to the same extent despite high rates of consumption. Alcoholism in Protestant Northern Europe is more of a problem than in Catholic Southern Europe, but the difference has little to do with religion and everything to do with the nature of broader cultural and genetic differences between these regions which happen to map onto the sectarian split.
In any case, there's a lot to chew on. I appreciate that they ran some regressions, but I think there are some omitted variables lurking in there that they haven't accounted for....
- Log in to post comments
In Guatemala I knew people who were attracted from Catholicism to Evangelical faiths because Evangelicals strictly reject alcohol, a serious problem among the poor there. I suspect that there, being Evangelical will lead to better health.
(On the other hand, Catholics accepted vaccinations but some Evangelicals rejected them , so maybe it ends up a wash.)
My own church, Presbyterian, was once very strictly anti-alcohol but now doesn't much have a stance on it, other than to warn against drunkenness. I would guess the same basic roots, alcohol was a scourge in old Scotland, so any reformer worth his salt would inveigh against it, biblically based or not. As the church matured, memory of former ills faded.
In Guatemala I knew people who were attracted from Catholicism to Evangelical faiths because Evangelicals strictly reject alcohol, a serious problem among the poor there. I suspect that there, being Evangelical will lead to better health.
i didn't emphasize it in this post (which was over long), but
1) selection bias
2) parameters changing over time
are important. when a church is small and growing it often has a very self-selected membership. as it expands to include a greater swath of society the differences start to diminish. if selection bias is one (though not only) reason that group X exhibits many differences over time as it grows in size, or evolves in character, then you will see the nature of the differences change or disappear. in the 1960s white catholics differed on many social metrics from white protestants, but today the differences are more catholic-mainline vs. evangelical protestant. the point is that *ostensible theology* often remains invariant.
p.s. and obviously re: #1, small sects which have high turnover tend to attract particular types. fundamentalists and pentecostals are generally socially marginal, so their relative ill-health and lack of investment in public goods which imply low time preference are no surprise....
Agreed that theology doesn't affect the behavior of believers much in a causal way. For example, American Lutherans today are remarkably different than the immigrant Lutherans of only a century ago from whom they are descended, but without any theological change.
At the same time, church practices and church organization do affect behavior -- things like communitarian organization, attitude toward education, practices relating to exclusion and inclusion. Whether or not these practices can be coordinated with anything specifically theological, if there's a difference in practice that maintains itself over time it can be significant.
Just an additional point: any missionary church that tries to save sinners will probably show the effects of the prior sinfulness without being a cause of these effects. Some sects are especially tempting to people who already have problems.
At the same time, church practices and church organization do affect behavior -- things like communitarian organization, attitude toward education, practices relating to exclusion and inclusion.
i agree. social expectations and norms can shape development in many direct and indirect ways. the problem here and elsewhere is the tendency see a set of tendencies, 1-n, and abduce back to a set of theological beliefs, 1-n. theological beliefs are not inconsequential, but direct causal inferences have just not shown to be valid predictors i the past, and modern psychological experiments do not suggest a very deep internalization of religious philosophy in the typical believer.
The history of the Quakers is a case in point. Early Quakers were wild-eyed fanatics. At a certain point some Quakers became important in business and trade (perhaps because the professions were closed to them.) Then some of them became social reformers, especially anti-slavery crusaders (even though other Quakers were slave traders). In early America Quakers were a rustic regional sect like Amish for awhile, and then gradually became a Unitarianish mostly-urban church for (often basically secular) intellectuals and pacifists.
There were constant threads within this: strong and semi-political moralism, a degree of deliberate separation from the mainstream.
Nixon was a church Quaker, which has converged to generic Protestantism. The meeting Quakers still remain very distinct.