A few readers sent me a link to this interview with Alister McGrath; most thought it was worth a laugh, but one actually seemed to think I'd be devastated. I'm afraid the majority were correct: everything I've read by McGrath suggests that here is a man whose thoughts have been arrested by a temporal lobe seizure that he has mistaken for a lightning bolt from god. He'd probably be flattered to be compared to C.S. Lewis, but I see some similarities in the shallowness of their thinking that they believe they've deepened by tapping into theological tradition, but I'm sorry — my bathroom tap could drip for millennia, but it's a nuisance, not Niagara.
It also doesn't help that his argument is basically one of dogma and contradiction.
I think Richard Dawkins approaches the question of whether God exists in much the same way as if he'd approach the question of whether there is water on Mars. In other words, it's something that's open to objective scientific experimentation. And of course there's no way you can bring those criteria to bear on God. I think Dawkins seems reluctant to allow that God may not be in the same category as scientific objects. That's an extremely important point to make in beginning to critique him.
He's actually right on one thing: we are approaching the question of god as a scientific problem, and the question of water on Mars is a pretty good analogy. We can't see it here, we aren't there, we have to build a case on inference from evidence and we have to design tests to evaluate the possibilities. That's been an eminently successful strategy for humanity. So why can't we bring them to bear on the god question? I've highlighted his answer: he says we just can't. He doesn't say why we can't, it's just a dogmatic assertion. Keep this in mind, though, because he's going to contradict himself in a moment.
Also, I'd like to know what he means by this category of "scientific objects". Everything is a scientific object, from distant stars to grains of dirt, from the first picoseconds of the Big Bang to pillow talk between lovers. If we can ask a question about it, it can be science. McGrath may think this is a useful strategy for a critique, but all it amounts to is setting up his premises as unquestionable. We simply do not have to accept that.
A second point, which clearly follows on from this, is that Dawkins clearly believes that those who believe in God must prove their case and atheists have nothing to prove because that's their default position. But I think that's simply incorrect and it's obviously incorrect.
Really, the only obvious position is to say: We don't know, we need to be persuaded one way or the other. The default position in other words is: not being sure.
For a guy who is about to claim to understand science, he sure is clueless about the fundamentals. This is not about proof. Science does not use proof. We favor evidence, and the work consists largely of the slow accumulation of evidence in support of ideas, not magically potent proofs that establish an idea as unassailable. What we have on the atheist side is a growing body of evidence that demonstrates the sufficiency of natural processes in generating phenomena that were once considered "obviously" the handiwork of a god — the steady decline of the relevance and support for the god hypothesis. At the same time, we see theologians like McGrath and pseudoscientists like those of the Discovery Institute trying to support their god/designer hypothesis with handwaving, sloppy logic, mangled evidence, and bald-faced assertions of unquestionable premises. Our side is growing in strength and has a solid foundation, theirs is a shambles. That's why scientific thinking will favor atheism.
Now of course, maybe they'll get their act together, throw out the charlatans, discard the historical relics cluttering up their beliefs, and actually assemble some evidence of their own; then we'll have some real competition. I don't think it will happen, but I could be surprised.
As for his claim that the default position is "not being sure" — he's being dishonest. His position and the religious position in general is one of certainty in their dogma in spite of the lack of evidence (this is called "faith," and is considered a virtue by the religious; it's called "gullibility" and is considered an error by the rational). The scientific position is that they've had a few thousand years to make their case and they've failed, while a few centuries of scientific progress has revolutionized human culture, and theirs is a dead argument.
As someone who has studied the history and philosophy of science extensively, I think I've noticed a number of things that Dawkins seems to have overlooked. One of them is this: One of the most commonly encountered patterns in scientific development is seeing a pattern of observations and then saying, in order to explain these observations, we propose that there exists something that is as yet unobserved but we believe that one day will be observed because if it's there, it can explain everything that can be observed.
Of course, if you're a Christian you'll see immediately that that same pattern is there in thinking about God. We can't prove there's a God but he makes an awful lot of sense of things and therefore there's a very good reason to suppose that this may, in fact, be right.
Whoa. What happened to "of course there's no way you can bring those criteria to bear on God"? What about "God may not be in the same category as scientific objects"? One moment he's claiming you can't study god like you would the possibility of water on Mars, and next he's claiming the validity of using observation and theory to justify the existence of the remote and directly unseen. How … inconsistent.
It's true, scientists do use chains of observation to make reasonable inferences about the cause of a pattern, make hypotheses about that cause, and then design experiments based on those hypotheses to assess their ideas about the cause. Theologians do the first part. They observe phenomena, and make assertions based on traditional mythology (i.e., not reasonable), but then they refuse to test their ideas — they enthrone them as dogma and insist that you cannot bring scientific (i.e., logical and empirical) criteria to bear on them. And then when someone like Dawkins dares to apply the next step in scientific reasoning to their claims, they cry "Unfair!" and stamp their feet and try to take their ball home.
We examine the pattern of evidence, and in biology for instance, we don't see evidence of any kind of god meddling in our history. Even those biologists who believe in a god will tell you that they don't see evidence, they see possibilities: maybe God flipped this nucleotide that way to generate that useful mutation. It's indistinguishable from a chance event, though, and they can't show any causal agent, but they find solace in the idea that maybe it happened. There is no good reason to insert a god into the pattern, other than that the scientist may have been brought up in a superstitious tradition that demands one.
So my question, therefore, is: How on earth can Dawkins base his atheism on science when science itself so to speak is in motion, in transit?
That's pretty funny.
Well, heck, how can anything be based on science, then? I'm listening to the stereo right now: if the physics and electronics and materials engineering behind that widget are scientific subjects in constant flux, how can it possibly be working?
That's actually the powerful secret of science. We embrace the change. We build on a foundation of good observation, but we are free to abandon old paradigms to find better ones that more accurately describe the universe and that are more productive in leading us deeper into understanding it. Gods are the old paradigm, the one that has failed, the useless idea that takes us nowhere.
Another thing of interest to you, seeing as we're talking to a Catholic audience, is that I've spoken in many lectures about Richard Dawkins and critiqued him. And very often atheists will stand up and say: "How dare you criticize Richard Dawkins!"
It's almost as if there's a new dogma of the infallibility of Richard Dawkins in certain circles and I find that bizarre.
Now I find that claim bizarre, especially since earlier in his screed McGrath claims that the "most serious, negative reviews" of Dawkins' work have come from his fellow atheists. Are we his claque or are we his most serious critics? And good grief, read the comments at RichardDawkins.net — this is not a coterie of fan boys and girls praising their leader, but an undisciplined mob, each with their own idea of what atheism means, agreeing with Dawkins in some points and nit-picking him on others (and this diversity, while a negative as far as getting a coordinated response from atheists, is also one of our strengths, since there is a kind of Darwinian savagery about the internal workings of the atheist movement.) And, by the way, I think one of the goals of the Out Campaign (which is a good example of Dawkins' ideas not being automatically accepted) should be to get more representatives of atheism up there so that the religious apologists have to quit pretending that atheism consists of Richard Dawkins and his army of clones.
I also don't see this kind of event McGrath describes happening often. More likely, someone would stand up and say, "How dare you criticize Richard Dawkins so stupidly!"
One last nugget of foolishness, and then I'll drop McGrath.
The second point I'd want to make is that certainly I believe in the Nicene Creed, but I don't believe it because someone has rammed it down my throat. I believe it because I've looked at it very closely and I believe it to be right. I am very happy to be challenged about that because I believe in being open and accountable.
Amazing. He's not dogmatic, but he accepts the Nicene creed.
I've read it. Actually, the Nicene creed was probably the major trigger for my own abandonment of religion. It's a statement of the major premises of Christian belief, and I was required to memorize it in my confirmation classes, and we also went through it and discussed each clause. I quickly realized that the first line, "We believe in one God," was not true for me. Further, the subsequent lines were further assertions that I found either false (that there was a "maker of heaven and earth") or self-contradictory (there's also a Jesus, who is a god, and a Holy Spirit, who is a god?) or gibberish (the Virgin Mary nonsense and the resurrection, which somehow redeems us). It doesn't hold up under the critical examination of a 14 year old, so I'm baffled about how an educated adult can find it at all persuasive. I've found my own preferred version of the creed on a t-shirt:
Christianity: The belief that some cosmic Jewish Zombie can make you live forever if you symbolically eat his flesh and telepathically tell him that you accept him as your master, so he can remove an evil force from your soul that is present in humanity because a rib-woman was convinced by a talking snake to eat from a magical tree.
That's patent humorous insanity, but the Nicene creed is worse: it's patent insanity that takes itself seriously. That anyone could look at it "very closely" with any objectivity at all and accept it, from triune god to virgin birth to 'dead' god to resurrection and ascent to final judgment, and argue that it is right is incredible. McGrath was adamant in insisting that atheists need to prove the nonexistence of god, but what I'd like to see is one scrap of evidence for any piece of the exceptionally silly Nicene creed — not proof, but just some rational reason for me to believe one single line of this dogma that McGrath accepts.
My confirmation teacher (a very nice and enthusiastic lady) and my pastor (also a decent fellow) couldn't do it. Neither could any of the books I'd read after and since. McGrath sure hasn't. McGrath claims that atheists misrepresent Christianity, but if the Nicene creed is the core of the belief, I don't see how we're misrepresenting it: it's a collection of absurdities. Maybe Mr McGrath should try spending more time actually defending that nonsense convincingly than simply whining about the atheists who are picking on his beliefs…but I don't think he can do that, either.
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Wonderful post, PZ. It's obvious McGrath is just playing to his audience (see: Fox News), distorting atheism and, as a figurehead, Dawkins. And, even better, claims their views are distorted.
No one is safe or, for lack of a better term, religiously followed in atheism. Sure, we have our more popular guys like Dawkins, et. al, but I don't know anyone who believes they are infallible. That's one of the best parts of atheism: there are many viewpoints and perspectives, united by a cause. It's much different than a theist perspective, which is wholly to indoctrinate a perspective and muffle original thought.
And very often atheists will stand up and say: "How dare you criticize Richard Dawkins!"
Is that all they say, or do they follow it up with a vicious rebuttal that McGrath just side-steps?
If we can ask a question about it, it can be science.
Not too sure about that. For example, what about the question: "are there fairies under your garden?". How can that be a scientific question, or a well-formed hypothesis?
Thanks for the ciritque PZ. Spot on.
There's a good bit in Avalos' The End of Biblical Studies (2007) critiquing McGrath. Apparently, McGrath claimed that none of the translation difficulties and troublesome variants of Biblical texts affect key questions of doctrine.
To which the rational response is, "Hello? Pericope Adulterae. Comma Johanneum. Hell, what about that snake-handling thing in Mark 16? Oxbridge theology may be secure from these — because it's based on the sanctification of vagueness — but the authenticity of these passages does actually matter to people out there beyond the ivy."
I bring this up partly to shill for The End of Biblical Studies, which I quite enjoyed reading, and partly to note that it seems odd for McGrath to say, "I've looked at [the Nicene creed] very closely" but not consider the scriptural foundations of Trinitarianism. If he had looked very closely at the Nicene creed, then surely he must have researched the arguments about the Trinity which pervade the history of Christian theology. I mean, you can't avoid them. Why, then, would he say that the disputed authenticity of Biblical passages doesn't matter?
On another note, does an assertion that a "dogma of infallibility of Richard Dawkins" exists count as a violation of Blake's Law?
It's funny he mentions the Nicene creed. It was the version of the Creed that they ask you about during Confirmation that got me OUT of Catholicism without getting confirmed.
I put this argument to my parents: Taking it as given that I was uncertain (to say the least) about the existence of ANY gods, let alone Triune ones, let's assume that Catholicism were correct even if I didn't believe it at the time.
That would mean the church in which confirmation was to take place, and the bishop who would be grilling me as to whether or not I believed in such things, were holy and also representative of an omniscient being. Were I, as an unbeliever, to lie to this holy man, in this holy place, that I believed in Catholic dogma, surely the omniscient being would KNOW and take my irreverance and deceit as in insult?
Would not affirming those core beliefs for the sake of pleasing my family or attaining "acceptance" within the church community, rather than because I actually believed them, ultimately prove worse for me if Catholicism were true? Wouldn't the BEST thing be NOT getting confirmed, just in case my unbelief were wrong and their Catholic beliefs were correct?
That sort of inverse Pascal's Wager formed the core of my logical argument against confirmation and against the ridiculous nature of the Creed, and I was only 14 at the time. Thankfully, because it played to my parents' religious superstitions, it worked...I never went through Confirmation and never will. I'm very much with you, PZ, when you snigger at how McGrath finds persuasive bits of dogma that many of us saw through as hormonally-challenged teens.
Why is it that religious types and fundamentalists always substitute the person for the idea? "Dawkins" for "atheism," "Darwin" for "natural selection," etc.
Maybe it's because their world is so based on obeying authority figures that they assume ours is, too?
Well, we do train graduate students in basic parsimony: you do a little background research to see if there haven't been studies already done that knock down your glorious hypothesis, and that there is some grounds for thinking your idea is actually a question of interest. So in that sense asking that question is quickly off the table.But in the purest sense, it is legitimate. We'd have to get some definition of the properties of fairies, some preliminary evidence to suggest that there is a problem worth pursuing, but sure, we could address the question scientifically. Put remote cameras in the garden. Sample species present. Install traps. We could pretty quickly get to the point (and we already have) where garden fairies are an untenable hypothesis.Just as we have for the god hypothesis.
McGrath obviously doesn't understand that if there is an observation that provides evidence for something, then the lack of such observations provides evidence against it, by induction. Saying something is non-scientific cuts both ways. You can neither provide any evidence for it or against it. This means there is effectively no difference between its existence and non-existence.
PZ wrote:
PZ, any ideas on how to make a god trap? We can use evil or suffering as bait, but I just don't know how we'll contain him. Questions, questions!
Sweet. That's one for Bartlett's, despite what jeff said at #3.
"On another note, does an assertion that a "dogma of infallibility of Richard Dawkins" exists count as a violation of Blake's Law?"
Oh yes. Pretty much any attempt to chastise one's opponent for the crime of thinking that they're right in their convictions and daring to speak out on it should be considered a losing argument.
Experiment: We look for fairies under said garden. If through several trials we fail to spot fairies, we can be fairly confident the answer is "no."
@3:
That depends. If the fairies are in any way detectable in the real world then it's possible to test whether they exist or not. The question itself can quite easily be scientific, the problem starts when you discover that magic fairies are invisible, intangible, and only come out when nothing is looking.
Daniel #7,
Yes. But there's a subtlety here. I do, often, defer to authority figures such as Dawkins and PZ when it comes to matters of science. I'm not a scientist, though I do have a passionate interest in science, so my arguments often have to come from authority figures. But the catch is, my authority figures aren't imaginary and/or deluded.
Still, you have a valid point. My reasons for accepted the arguments from authority figures doesn't follow from my dogmatic acceptance of everything they say; it's based upon my understanding of science and reason and how the world works. If one day PZ up and started spouting nonsense about the sky turning neon orange, and offered no evidence to this point, I'd blow him off just as quickly as I ignore the street corner preachers and the pope.
So, to a certain extent, non-scientist atheists like myself do, in fact, rely on authority figures in science. It just doesn't form the foundation of our beliefs (or non-belief).
McGrath, also known as Mister "Avoid the freakin' question."
I have seen Dawkins try and get MacGrath to answer a single question for like 45 minutes with McGrath saying over and over again, "You raise an interesting question" and then babbling on about an unrelated subject matters for 3-4 minutes, to which Dawkins responds, "You seem to have missed the point." and tries again...
The guy is a BS artist and has no evidence for his position outside of, "I desire it to be so."
Um, as someone who HAS temporal lobe epilepsy, I know what effect you're getting at here. But is he really epileptic? Or is this just usage for comic effect?
Ahhh -- so if fairies only come out when nothing is looking -- then can they also come out when *they* are looking?
Is a fairy a *thing* or a *no-thing*.
If the former, then your definition fails, because they cannot, self-referentially, ever come out (per your definition)
if the latter, then they do not exist since they are then by definition, nothing!
PZ says:
Also, it acknowledges a powerful dominate alpha male to be submissive to.
They've done studies on people who they manage to induce frontal lobe seizures on.
They're then interviewed the experience. They often say it felt "spiritual" or transcendant.
Some interpret that as a religious experience.
I would say that, absent a coherent definition of "fairies", it isn't -- it's a nonsensical sentence. But given some clear idea what fairies are, and what real-world effects they might have, the question certainly falls into the realm of science. Now, its possible that our answer will be: "Not answerable given currently available, or easily obtainable data". Empirical uncertainty about well-formed hypotheses is a perfectly respectable scientific position.
PZ:
He said that you aren't allowed to bring science to bear on God.
He never said that he wasn't.
"about" would of been hand in my last post.
Which then begs the question, "What made you think there were any there in the first place?"
Hey now PZ, temporal lobe seizures don't ALWAYS inhibit one's ability to think coherently and rationally! ;P
/epileptic
Beware of the common "begs the question" misuse. See here:
http://begthequestion.info
cm,
Thank you, I was about to point that out myself.
McGrath's assertion that he has looked at the Nicene Creed very closely and found it to be right is indeed amazing. What does he mean, though, by "looked at it closely"? Repeated careful reading the brief Creed can't in of itself provide any confidence in its accuracy--it's just a bunch of incredible assertions that could be true or false.
So he must mean he has researched the veracity of the propositions in the Creed. Since the events in the Creed are believed to have occurred two thousand years ago, this then amounts to doing history. However, many of the propositions in the creed are "extra-historical", in the sense that they are not events that humans observed, but metaphysical propositions (like the Trinity). Also, for the events that are historically assessable, there is the basic problems of lying, error, distortion through retelling, etc.
And so, that any modern can expect to read the Creed and commit to believing it is an incredible thing. I would love to temporarily be made to believe it just so I could remember what that would feel like.
"Dawkins clearly believes that those who believe in God must prove their case and atheists have nothing to prove because that's their default position. But I think that's simply incorrect and it's obviously incorrect."
Uh, why is this "incorrect?" Dawkins uses Russell's celestial teapot argument to back his statement. Why is that wrong again?
Oh, hang on, it isn't.
Mike P at #15:
I'll second Mike. I'm also not a scientist, feel passionate about science and thus rely on scientific authorities. (And I would guess a scientific authority relies on other scientific authorities in matters outside his or her own specialty.)
I'll add that I know when a scientific authority strays from the demonstrable truth--through error or intention--s/he'll be spanked by colleagues and/or (more importantly) further evidence.
Not true with religious authorities.
But, then again:
I'm sorry, was that intended as a humorous pot/kettle/black example? Even assuming you can make a case for your assertion about everything being a scientific question, how much more unquestionable could you make your premise? And why should McGrath and other theists simply have to accept your premise, any more that you have to accept theirs?
"At the same time, we see theologians like McGrath and pseudoscientists like those of the Discovery Institute trying to support their god/designer hypothesis with handwaving, sloppy logic, mangled evidence, and bald-faced assertions of unquestionable premises."
*Snort!*
You're too kind, PZ... they have no evidence to speak of, mangled or otherwise.
cm wrote:
Sorry for going OT, but my short-hand rule is that if you say "That begs the question..." and then you have to say what the question is, then you're not talking about begging the question, you're talking about raising the question.
Why isn't this a scientific question. I can think of several experiments to determine this. The fact that I can confidently predict that answer to be "No" or at least "Apparently not" in no way makes the question unscientific.
Now, if you define your fairies as "invisible, in audible and intangible" the I have to ask "In what way can these things be said to exist at all?"
Oops. Loks like a few people beat me to it.
The reason I can say that is because I can ask a question about those subjects. McGrath is simply asserting that we can't ask those questions, when it's rather clear that we are.
Obviously, I'm not denying that people can question the premise that we can ask questions.
Are you suggesting that that there are subjects which we are not allowed to inquire about, perhaps? Could you list some? Or are you just playing village sophist again?
As PZ makes so clear, McGrath's grasp of logic and critical thinking is minimal, at best. I wonder if it's possible for someone like him to learn to think more clearly, or is his brain just not structured for it?
I fear it may be the latter. Just as my brain is very poorly structured to understand many things, such as, for example, the mathematics of quantum mechanics. But I differ in that I am willing to admit my ignorance and defer to the expertise of others.
I'd also suggest that, if he wishes atheists to take him seriously, McGrath must demonstrate the he has fully read and understood all the material at The Internet Infidels. As has been pointed out several times, it's clear his knowledge of the philosophy of religion is severely deficient.
Easy answer:
http://www.toadking.com/6x9=42/ghostbusters.jpg
Ugh, this line of argument is quite possibly the stupidest of all theistic arguments. I should have gone into theology: no accountability, cushy gigs at Oxford, no evidence required to support your positions, le sigh. Oh what might have been.
PZ writes: "what I'd like to see is one scrap of evidence for any piece of the exceptionally silly Nicene creed -- not proof, but just some rational reason for me to believe one single line of this dogma."
That simply won't happen. The religious can't produce scientific evidence. But for many, the god hypothesis makes sense, it gives a sense of purpose and meaning to life and a reason for living. No proof, no evidence other than the non-scientific personal affirmation of a God working in one's life.
A choice then to believe, based on faith, nothing else. Call it a crutch, whatever but for a lot of people (rational or not), it works. And if it doesn't work for you, that's fine.
I've got to say, the best version of the Nicene creed I've ever encountered was that due to "Not the Nine O'Clock News" in the early 80's. I can't find a transcript or a recording of the original online, though. Can anybody help?
McGrath answering how laypeople should prepare for meeting a "Dawkins disciple": "The arguments are not good; they are not going to lose their faith as a result."
I wonder if Oxford's favourite comedian has perused http://richarddawkins.net/convertsCorner?
Alister reminds me of Chicken Little, although this time it really is a lump of his (faith-based) sky that's landed on his head, with a lot more to follow.
"As for his claim that the default position is "not being sure" -- he's being dishonest. His position and the religious position in general is one of certainty in their dogma in spite of the lack of evidence"
No, no, PZ -- obviously, you just don't *get* it. What he means is that the default position for *us* science-minded types is uncertainty. Whereas the default position for *them* faith-minded types is certainty. Thus, we lose, they win. See?
There are a lot of subjective human constructs that probably aren't amenable to this. "Is that artwork beautiful?", for example. That's not something that we generally believe can be decided by objective observation (unless one's notion of beauty involves consensus opinion).
PZ, any ideas on how to make a god trap? We can use evil or suffering as bait, but I just don't know how we'll contain him. Questions, questions!
If Star Trek V is any indication, all we'd need is a planet near the center of the galaxy.
And, for some reason, we'd also need to keep this hypothetical god from getting access to a starship, since it such a craft would enable it to escape its otherwise inescapable prison planet.
Actually, that never made a lot of sense to me. Get Shatner in here, I have some questions about this whole "god trap" business.
P.S. Just for a giggle, I wrote in to http://ncregister.com/ suggesting they publish this article to "address the balance".
Jared (#6) - great story! I love it when I hear about these loopholes that play to the superstitions of the religious.
I have a friend who lives some distance from her staunchly Catholic family. She never voluntarily goes to mass or confession, but goes with her family at Christmas to avoid upsetting them. If she were to tell the priest that it has been one year since her last confession, she would get a whole load of grief and penances to do (and she would probably do them - she's a lapsed Catholic, but had enough of a scary religious upbringing to never ignore a direct order from the family preist). Instead, she gives the much more acceptable answer that it has been 2 weeks since her last confession. Then, when asked to confess her sins, she replies "lying". She gets a couple of hail Marys and is out with little more than a slap on the wrist.
Genius.
#38, theology is the best scam job there is for an academic. Say whatever you want, write whatever you want, and you don't have to provide any evidence. If anyone should actually question you, just use the "it's all metaphor" response. In fact, you don't even have to personally believe in any of it.
BronzeDog (#13) made the sensible suggestion:
Er, how would I know when I found a fairy? Could I see one unaided? Or smell one? Do I need to wear any protective clothing? How far down should I dig? How much of my garden should I dig up (or randomly sample)? And so on...
Yes, this perhaps could be experimentally decided, but I, at least, am unclear on just how to do an experiment, much less a series of them, specifically intended to search for fairies.
If I was searching for carrots, I'd have a decent idea. Admittedly, I'd be starting from a position of knowing something about carrots, so perhaps that isn't too good of an analogy?
As least part of the point here is that if you are looking for something specific, you at least have some ideas (hypothesises) about what you are looking for. I myself don't know any hypothesis about either fairies or goddessies, and could use a few references to what, perhaps, I should be looking for should I wish to dig up my garden.
Great post! McGrath: Liar, Lunatic, or... no that's about it. (Loon?)
As for the fairies, they are always leaving their slimy trails in my garden. It's disgusting.
Steve said:
I know all about those studies; I live with that experience every day. I'm just sick of people treating it as the butt of a joke.
I think there should at least be a disease rotation. Maybe diabetic hallucinations could be next, so epilepsy gets a break?
I'm also a non-scientist who relies on the authority of scientists for information about the way the universe works. I would not, however, give any heed whatsoever to PZ Myers if he told me I would go to hell for masturbating, or to Phil Plait if he told me I mustn't use the same dishes for meat and dairy products. There is a limit.
So why can't we bring scientific scrutiny to bear on the God hypothesis? For the same reason it's hard to "properly test" dowsing. If the results are positive, then dowsing is open to scientific examination. If the results are negative, then ...uh...you can't test this with science. It's beyond science's ability to consider, because it wasn't confirmed. So just try it for yourself and see if it "works." That's common-sense science. Dowsing may be outside of mainstream science, but inside of the common-sense science the little guy can do, on his own.
This sort of dishonest tactic is often clear enough to intelligent, science-minded theists when it comes to dowsing, but when it comes to religious claims (particularly their religious claims) they shift their perspective to defense mode. "There exists a superhuman, supernatural intelligence who deliberately designed and created the universe and everything in it" is placed in the same non-scientific categories as "I love my mother" or "chocolate tastes better than vanilla."
Can you prove you love your mother? Huh? Can you? Can you open up your head and show people the little "love" light? No, you can't -- but you know it, because you feel it. God's like that. Try believing in Him and see if it "works." Are you better off? That's a good experiment in common-sense science. See if God is to your taste.
Apologetics is one category error after another, elevated to an art form and bathed in smugness.
All good questions. All of which need to be answered when designing the experiment.
The point, however, is that no question can be ruled out of the bounds of science. Maybe qusetions about subjective, abstract concepts like beauty, but just because you and I can't think of a way to test it doesn't mean it can't be tested.
To VWXYNot: (comment #46)
That's exactly what I did! I knew if I told the priest it had been a whole month since my last confession, I'd get yelled at.
So I said "Bless me father for I have sinned. It's been one week since my last confession." Then, when I got to the lies, I'd tack on an extra one.
It worked.
That's a pretty good definition of sophistry.
We'd have to get some definition of the properties of fairies, some preliminary evidence to suggest that there is a problem worth pursuing, but sure, we could address the question scientifically. Put remote cameras in the garden. Sample species present. Install traps. We could pretty quickly get to the point (and we already have) where garden fairies are an untenable hypothesis.
Just as we have for the god hypothesis.
What if fairies are said to be invisible? Or disappear when an attempt is made to observe them? Or have inconsistent or unknowable "properties"? At least two of the above questions also apply to common conceptions of "God". That's why I think it's not necessarily a scientific question, since science assumes at least 1) observation and 2) consistency ("repeatable observation").
I don't see why subjective questions are outside of science. Where do people think subjective assessments take place? There seems to be some latent dualism in the assumption that they're unquantifiable. Subjective assessments are things brains have. We can study brains. You could answer the question, "Is this painting beautiful?" with "'Yes' for people with properties A, B, and C but 'no' for people with properties X, Y, and Z."
Boy, for scientists, you guys sure are dumb.
The first step is to hire a grad student as an RA and get them to do a lit review.
Before responding to that I should point out this.
Now, you're right that a purely subjective question has no general scientific answer. But that does not put art, or beauty, purely outside of the realm of things science can ask about. For example, if I want to know if PZ thinks a painting is beautiful, I could just ask him. If I want to know what kind of paintings most people find beautiful, I could ask a whole bunch of people their opinions of a variety of paintings, and try to sift out the commonalities. If I want to find out what the neurology of "experiencing beauty" is, I could try something tricky with MRIs or wire probes. The point is that the question "is this work of art beautiful?" is only unanswerable because the attribute "beauty" does not adhere to the painting itself, but to how a human mind experiences that painting, and the experience of beauty is complex and subjective. This does not imply that beauty is some special metaphysical property having nothing to do with physical, scientifically-accessible phenomena.
jeff:
Observation does not mean direct observation.
If the fairies (and God) have no observable effect on the physical world, then there is no evidence of their existence. Until there is something more than unfounded assertation, science will not accept them.
And then to write a grant application detailing how the discovery of fairies is the first step to curing a disease, preferably cancer.
Lana,
What's the point of lying to the priest when you can just skip the beads and prayers anyway. None of it matters. If you're really worried about the crap your family will give you then don't go.
Do they really browbeat you that much?
Observation does not mean direct observation.
I didn't say it did.
If the fairies (and God) have no observable effect on the physical world, then there is no evidence of their existence.
Until there is something more than unfounded assertation, science will not accept them.
Exactly. Then it's not a scientific question.
The question is whether or not you take the next philosophical leap and assert non-existence from non-measurement. These are deep positivist philosophical waters that Bohr and Heisenberg first swam in, in the 1920's.
For those who find Dawkins' tone harsh, there's always Carl Sagan's The Varieties of Scientific Experience. It seems to have fallen out of the spotlight, perhaps because Cosmic carl hasn't been keeping up on the talk show circuit.
I thought this question from Edward Pentin was the hilarious highlight of the entire interview:
Read this in the knowledge that McGrath has now published two books with "Dawkins" in the title, and is making money off his opponent's name.
The only way something can be outside the bounds of science is if it's so incoherent that nothing further can be said about it. Things have to meet a minimum standard of linguistic meaning before science can analyze them.
If you put your God beyond the ability of science to examine, you are declaring that the concept you're so concerned about is nonsensical and your beliefs about it "aren't even wrong", to paraphrase a famous scientist, because they don't express enough meaning to rise to the level of wrongness.
A few of the theist scientists on ScienceBlogs have taken to embracing the idea that their Invisible Sky Daddy isn't in conflict with science. I wondered how long it would take PZ to correct them - I guess the issue wasn't "how long", but "what would it take".
In the unlikely event anyone is interested in an interview Prof Dawkins conducted with Prof. McGrath, a link is provided below.
http://www.richarddawkins.net/article,1212,Richard-Dawkins-and-Alister-…
Inquire scientifically I'm sure you mean, since you are claiming that everything is a scientific question. That, of course, would require you to at least give some indication as to what scientific means and methods you will use. So:
Do supernatural souls exist? Show your work.
Which is more beautiful, a Mozart or a Salieri sonata? What tests have you made?
Who is the better author, Shakespeare or Stephen King? Show your calculations.
Oohh! I like that! I may put it on my card. Of course, sophistry, while a poor philosophy to live by, is a good explanation of the problem of knowledge. And it's better, in my opinion, to be the village sophist than the village know-it-all.
Strange, I took it to mean that not everything is amenable to scientific investigation. To assert that everything is amenable to science sort of requires that you know what "everything" consists of. Do you really claim to know everything?
No, it requires that you know what the definition of 'real' is. Science doesn't concern itself with the parts of "everything" that aren't real.
It's interesting to note that Denyse O'Leary, William Dembski's sidekick over at Uncommon Descent, is quite the fan of McGrath and has blogged about him on her own Blogs:
http://mindfulhack.blogspot.com/2007/07/is-this-twilight-of-atheism-oxf…
and
http://mindfulhack.blogspot.com/2007/07/more-on-twilight-of-atheism.html
Of course this is no surprise, as O'Leary is the queen of mindless assertions on matters related to atheism and "materialism".
If you haven't discovered her Blog yet, it's worth a look, if nothing else just to be amazed that somebody who calls themself a journalist can write such pointless, meandering drivel. Most of her blog entries are anti-atheist, anti-evolution, anti-materialistic tirades, often with no point but it does have some entertainment value. She is also the queen of nasty, snarky comments and you at least have to admire her grasp of language.
I would say that the question of the existence of faeries (or of god) is a scientific question , just a poorly constructed one.
I thought the point of the book was not that Dawkins merely believes that atheism is the default position, but that he can demonstrate that god doesn't answer any questions, only raises more. Doesn't he spend most of the book trying to prove that god is unlikely at best? Ie, that he is trying to persuade people?
Y'all should really be more careful about pissing off the Fair Folk. Good thing they don't care if you believe they exist or not. There aren't any gods to worry about, but you do not want a fairy going all mischievous on you.
There are paranormal researchers who claim that they have discovered strong evidence for the existence of supernatural souls. Near Death Experiences; Communication with the Dead; Past-Life Regression. Add to this various experiments and research done on Out of Body Experiences, psychokenesis, extra-sensory perception, and various forms of "energy" medicine -- phenomena which would support theories such as substance dualism or vitalism, and which would undermine theories like naturalism and materialism. Now imagine that the actual results of these studies were strong, replicable, and rock-solid. It's conceivable. Didn't happen, but it might have.
Clearly, supernatural souls are "amenable to scientific investigation" in a way quite unlike the personal aesthetic preferences they were compared to. Categories again.
These two paragraphs seem totally contradictory to me. Given the "only obvious position" in the second paragraph, why does he think the atheist position is "obviously incorrect"? Dawkins has show that atheism is the position that there is no evidence for God's existence, so it is not reasonable to believe that God exists. Since Dawkins' stated position is exactly as described in the second paragraph, there's no persuasion necessary to reach the atheists' default position. It would require evidence to persuade someone to believe that God does exist, which is why "those who believe in God must prove their case" and the "atheists have nothing to prove".
VWXYNot? wrote (#60):
I'm out of the loop, but when I was in the loop the sure-fire way to get your grant was to relate it to SDI ("Star Wars" missile defense). Surely these days "homeland security" will get you more favorable consideration than mere cancer.
Dawkins has show that atheism is the position that there is no evidence for God's existence, so it is not reasonable to believe that God exists. Since Dawkins' stated position is exactly as described in the second paragraph, there's no persuasion necessary to reach the atheists' default position.
Not quite exactly as described. As described in the second paragraph is going out of your way to say that you don't know; it could go one way or the other. Of course, you really only have to be careful like this about God. Big foot, fairies, ghosts, psychics, and the like, in those cases it's totally understandable to not believe in them without evidence. It's really just God, magically, somehow, where you have to sit on the fence in order to be "reasonable."
McGrath says that earlier positions should be abandoned as we progress. Atheists have abandoned the position that God exists. There shouldn't be a problem here, except that, of course, McGrath feels that religion has got everything forced out and that's it.
Indeed, you don't want on the bad side of the Unseelie Court. On your way home one night you might find yourself being followed by a large black dog with eyes the color of fire... whatever you do don't turn around.
Wait, is this one of the bad myths I'm not supposed to believe or one of the good ones I am supposed to believe?
#75 kmarissa
I totally agree with you except that it isn't going out of anyone's way to say "I don't know". It takes going out of your way to make the leap of faith, or to induce someone to do that.
Like I said, your belief is irrelevant. Just be ready to put out some cream, whisky, or both to bribe your way back to their good side if your luck suddenly turns all bad.
It is going out of one's way (at least, it's out of MY way) to pedantically emphasize that there is no evidence, so we can't know one way or the other, when God is the only idea we're expected to do that about. Generally, if we're asked whether we believe in fairies, society wouldn't consider us unreasonable or even "fundamentalist" for saying, "no, not really." Most people would understand that this means that we have seen nothing to make us believe in fairies, and we won't begin to do so unless we see evidence that changes our mind. McGrath's argument, on the other hand, would require us to carefully state that without sufficient evidence of fairies, we can't know whether they occur or not, so we're not sure. But we sure as hell can't say that we don't believe in them, that would be unreasonable. Except, no one EVER seems to require this type of careful fence-sitting and ambivalent language with regard to fairies. They only require it with regard to God.
No one cares about drawing a line between a-fairiests and agno-fairiests the way they do atheists and agnostics.
I suppose it's possible, but I find it hard to believe someone said this even once, let alone 'very often'. And I would have thought that whole Brights thing laid to rest any notion of Dawkins-fundies following his pronouncements in lock-step fashion.
And very often atheists will stand up and say: "How dare you criticize Richard Dawkins!"
Oh okay, you criticize Richard Dawkins for not believing invisible unscientifical things, but you won't criticize Jesus for throwing people in hell. Oh thanks a lot.
Sastra:
Sorry, that's a whelter of words that adds up to "If naturalism and/or materialism are true and describe all of "reality" then the absence of naturalistic/materialistic evidence may be some evidence of the absence of a soul." Quite apart from whether that is a valid basis for an inference, it merely begs the question of how you are going to scientifically establish that naturalism and/or materialism describe all of reality.
So you think there are no objective distinctions to be made between the quality of the work of Shakespeare and Stephen King? Interesting!
kmarissa wrote:
Ha ha ha. Oh yeah? Think again. I actually know neo-pagans who do believe in fairies (or claim to.) And I know even more people who are even more in the mainstream who believe in angels (which seem to be the same sort of thing.) They tell their stories, their "encounters." And let me tell you, they get very very hurt and offended if you smile at their sacred beliefs, or try to explain why it is not reasonable to believe in fairies and angels, there are more rational explanations.
No, I have been told. People's spirituality must be respected, and I can't be so arrogant as to think I know everything. Skepticism is negative and close-minded. The proper position for me to take is a polite neutrality. Agnosticism, in fact. A humble and ladylike (or gentlemanly) "maybe." After all, you never really know, do you? What if there really ARE fairies, and I was so blind as to outright deny it?
God of God, Light of Light, Very God of Very God, begotten, not made, being of one substance with the Father by whom all things were made
Yeah I'm sure the supreme intelligence of the entire universe wants people to memorize that line. (That was an excerpt from the Nicene Creed in case there are any heathens out there who aren't people who do believe in birdie Jesus (or claim to.) Fly birdie, fly. Very God of Very God birdie, fly up high into the cloudies!!
Can you come up with a reasonable operational definition of "quality" that is objectively observable?
Yeah Sastra, probably just a difference in perspective from running with different crowds. But I still don't think that most people would consider it to be an "extreme" or "fundamentalist" position to not believe in fairies. As far as I know, there's not a specific and highly-demonized word for it (or, for that matter, a t-shirt ;) ). Angels are, I think, trickier, because they're wrapped up in that whole God thing--like the holy ghost. I think most Christians consider them a sort of matched set.
Wait, that's not the Nicene Creed as I learned it.
Heretic! You've been memorizing the line wrong!
Define God first. If God is defined as impersonal agency that underpins reality and explains why any reality exists, and why THIS reality exists, rather than another logically possible one, then science can't tel us anything, sice science be definition deals with the phsicl universe, from the beehive activity of the atom to the biggest supergalaxies.
Defining God that way, there is, can be, no "god hypothesis", since any being(s) beyond the physical universe would by definition be beyond human comprehension. Anything outide the universe is by definition non-physical, and therefore forever beyond hypothesising. But of course, religious people try to hav it both ways by claiming that God is knowable, and has human attibutes.
John Pieret wrote:
Huh? I don't see how you got that from what I wrote. From what I can tell, my "whelter of words" more or less add up to "IF Near Death Experiences, Communication with the Dead, Past-Life Regression, ESP, pk, OBE's, etc, etc were scientifically verified, THEN it is unlikely that naturalism and/or materialism describe all of reality." You had asked what "scientific evidence" for the existence of souls might look like. I gave examples. Think Ghostbusters.
As for objective distinctions between the quality of the works of Shakespeare and Stephen King, it depends on what is meant by "quality" -- and what is meant by "better," which was in your original question. If someone thinks that Stephen King is "better" because they gladly read his stuff and have to be required to read Shakespeare's, there is no *scientific* test that could or would establish that, as an empirical matter, they should NOT enjoy King more than Shakespeare, or should not consider enjoyment crucial to what it means to be "better." I can't imagine what such a test would even look like. It isn't an empirical matter. The likelihood is that an "objective" argument would instead focus on the consensus of what is generally preferred -- or semantic disputes -- which are different sorts of questions. "De gustibus non est disputandum" and all that.
"That sort of inverse Pascal's Wager formed the core of my logical argument against confirmation and against the ridiculous nature of the Creed, and I was only 14 at the time. Thankfully, because it played to my parents' religious superstitions, it worked...I never went through Confirmation and never will. "
It's rather telling about religion/Catholicism that you needed to come up with the elaborate Pascal's Wager argument to convince them that you, as an unbeliever, shouldn't swear faith in God. You'd think it would be rather obvious in itself. It reminds me of the Jewish belief/joke that it's better not to believe but to go through the ritual insincerely than it is to believe sincerely but fail to follow the ritual. Some people have such a petty conception of God, but then I suppose that's what you get from reading the old testament.
John (#52) observes:
I agree. My short critique (#47) of BronzeDog's very rational and sensible comment (#13) was not meant to imply otherwise. What I was driving at is you cannot just "do an experiment"; whilst ultimately, you do do (repeatable) experiments, those experiments do need some preparatory work and a relevant testable hypothesis.
It'd be pointless to dig up my garden looking for faries if I haven't a clew how I might be able to detect one. I might as well be searching for zigboqulas.
(Note to the confused: I just invented the word "zigboqula". I don't have any more idea what one is then you do. A search for zigboqulas is perhaps another example of Lunacrous' point (#69) about being a poorly formed question?)
blf - you only *thought* you invented the word "zigboqula". Our zigboqulan overlords have seen the depth of depravity that is Pharyngula and have decided to make themselves known to us.
All hail zigboqula! Free us frpom the tyranny that is rational thought!
and another thing....
You can never search for zigboqulans - they search for you!
"You can never search for zigboqulans - they search for you!"
...in Russia?
da.
LOL ;)
The latter wins on originality.
I'm on your side, but this:
If we can ask a question about it, it can be science.
is rhetoric, not careful talking. We can ask a question about the zeros of the Riemann zeta function, but it can't be science: scientific method is not applicable, mathematics is. And that fact, the applicability of mathematics, is a fact about language and the way we use it. We can agree: don't mess with my proofs and I won't mess with your experiments. Similarly, theologians can and do ask questions about things which cannot be science. The problems start when there is disagreement about what we're talking about - a largely linguistic problem.
Even assuming you can make a case for your assertion about everything being a scientific question, how much more unquestionable could you make your premise? And why should McGrath and other theists simply have to accept your premise, any more that you have to accept theirs?
The proof goes something like this: Assume that something exists (souls, bread pudding, God, etc.). If it exists it must exist in some specific manner. This means that it has attributes. Attributes can be measured. Anything that can be measured can be the object of scientific inquiry. Obviously this is a little sketchy and needs fleshing out to be convincing, but the short answer is that what we mean when we say something "exists" implies something measurable and thus science.
Theologians go to great lengths to get around this, starting with the proposition that there might be some kind of existence different from what we normally mean when we say that something exists. They may suggest, for example, that God having no attributes is itself an attribute. Or more cleverly, they attempt to qualify God as having negative attributes (unbounded in place, time, knowledge, power, etc.). These attempts are hopelessly lame, as we might expect.
Or they may avoid the question, as Pieret does above, and instead attempt to place the burden of proof back on materialists who would see the world scientifically. But we're not the ones proposing the existence of immaterial entities.
Ah, this cat seems to be a master of the "well, you don't KNOW-so you BELIEVE in science" argument. This is a line of thought I encounter alot with the fundies at work. Any arguments I make regarding the evidence for scientific reason in general are quickly dashed on the rocks (their heads) when they whip out that old chestnut. "Did YOU examine those fossils yourself? Did YOU see the apes become bipedal?" I usually give up by this point not because they've won the argument, but because the look of smug satisfaction in their "home grown common sense" tells me that there is no reaching them.
I myself am a layman when it comes to the intricacies of the various sciences. In school, I always aced all my science courses which I think gave me a broad understanding of some of the basic facts. My bachelor's degree is in Graphic Design, but I think I keep abreast of things a little more than your average bear. Anyway, how do I reconcile a non expert knowledge of these things with the whole "faith" in science schpiel? Trust.
I know some of you are probably wincing at that, but its trust based on empirical observation. Between the Scientist and the fundie, who is more aggressively trying to gain power? Who's trying to control every aspect of everone's lives? Who's actually ADVANCED humanity? Who seems like they have more to gain? No, I couldn't tell you the ins and outs of genetic proofs for evolution, nor could I give you a detailed explaination of how all the different radiometric dating methods work--but I seriously doubt scientist are in some clandestine kabal bent on taking dominion over the country. When I see a biologist on late night tv claiming that "We can cure you're childs down-syndrome, but the almighty chromosomes pairs are tellin' me that you GOT ta SEND that LOOOVE OFFERIN!" I might get a little worried. Until I can find the time to get a master's in biology, geology, astrophysics, quantum mechanics, and psychology, I'm going to trust the more objective party.
But unlike the zoologist Dawkins, he is an expert in historical theology, philosophy as well as molecular biophysics.
Ummmm... I know ALL of the biophysicists at Oxford, and Alister McGrath is definitely not one of them.
Kudos, PZ, that was a very eloquent and instructive analysis.
One way of judging a denialism (here of science results and criticism on faith) or fundamentalism is to observe the inconsistencies that appears from cognitive dissonance. I will of course only join the choir in noting such occurrences.
Kettle, pot, black.
Also, I had assumed that "apologetics" was what christians called theology that defends their faith against attacks. But it turns out that apologia is defending any position from attacks, perhaps going back to rhetorics.
As atheism seems to be the "attacker" as defining a positive world view based on observations, it is McGrath task to come up with support for defense. Instead he finds that "Richard Dawkins approaches the question of whether God exists in much the same way as if he'd approach the question of whether there is water on Mars". An inconsistency.
Kettle, pot, black.
In lieu of being an "expert" in molecular biophysics" and having "studied the history and philosophy of science extensively", McGrath has obviously no idea of what predictions and theories entail. Another inconsistency.
Predictions doesn't concern new entities but new data, and the purpose is to increase the number of observations and decrease the number of faulty theories by verification.
Verified theories may or may not introduce new entities which may or may not contribute directly in the extension of predicted data. It is however the theory as a whole that is important. McGrath should compare with theories, not entities. A category mistake, that can count as yet another inconsistency due to its cause.
Kettle, pot, black.
Besides the Kuhnian mistake that PZ points out, it is really funny to see the dissonance in the inconsistencies here. He also fails to notice that Dawkins discuss improbability, not impossibility. Two more inconsistencies for McGrath.
This was just the beginning of the article. It goes on, and on, and on, and screams "cognitive dissonance" and "faith-head" for those who listen.
Mathematics is a subset of science. We can ask meaningful questions about it, which means that there are aspects of reality which we can observe in order to learn about it. It's ultimately an empirical discipline.
Hmm. I really like this short and powerful description. It is correct that science could be any question, if it directly or indirectly connects with observations.
But I see that PZ, while noting that observations bear on this particular question, goes on to consider whether any question could be inquired on. John Pieret raises subjective questions (again :-P), which can get a subjective answer from individuals or objective answers from observations on populations.
Regardless of if all subjective questions can get a meaningful answer, in general I think that at some point questions themselves become meaningless because they stop to be well formed.
But on well formed questions we can't tell if they can be answered or not. (If we could we would have either all answers or at least a full description of all possible empirical methods.) We can but try.
Mathematician:
I'm pretty sure PZ meant empirical questions. And it so happens that math connects with (and are confirmed by) science through usage.
Btw, FWIW, IMVHO math can't be just a language game. Not only by essential parts of it being inspired and coincidentally tested by use, but because I subscribe to Chaitin's view of semi-empiricism in math proper.
Let me put it another way. All theories in science are provisional; if new evidence comes along then they will be discarded or revised. PZ's statement that everything is amenable to scientific inquiry should be understood as a scientific theory. Since everything encountered so far has been, by induction he hypothesizes that everything will continue to be.
This can be falsified by one counterexample. It's not sufficient to claim that there might be something - you actually have to provide it. To say that it's not proven is beside the point. Naturalism is a theory. If a scientist states any theory as truth that's only because the evidence for it is very strong.
I'll go farther and say that it will be impossible to find an exception to naturalism. Anything that might qualify would have to be objective and measurable, and that would make it simply a new part of nature and amenable to scientific inquiry.
Science isn't all inclusive. Are mathematics and logic science? Is the Philosophy of Science (e.g., why/how does science work), science?
However God fails also as a philosophical object according to many philosophers (though first you have to define God). Is 'God' a necessary being (think first cause)?
Creo's are an exception to naturalism --- they're just creepy wierd!
All theories in science are provisional; if new evidence comes along then they will be discarded or revised. PZ's statement that everything is amenable to scientific inquiry should be understood as a scientific theory.
That's very nice but I can't figure out how come they don't ask their "God" to stop throwing people in hell and torturing them forever. What's the big deal? Hell should be abolished, IMO. Oh well.
Yes.
Depends on who's practicing it. Usually not. It's usually not worth much, either.
I'd say all questions fall into one of four categories:
1) Analytic (deduction, mathematics)
2) Empirical (observation, experiment)
3) Subjective (taste, opinion)
4) Nonsensical (grammatical without semantic content)
Only #2 is science. Mystical questions tend to be of type #4 ("What is the meaning of life?" being the most well known).
Logic and reason come first, and are the bedrock by which we can ask and answer any questions at all.
jack* wrote:
This is actually the opposite of what I am arguing -- based, perhaps, on different definitions of "nature" and "naturalism." I maintain that if the existence of God, ghosts, disembodied souls, or immaterial teleological, mental, or moral forces in the universe were scientifically demonstrated, then science would support the theory that the supernatural exists. Materialism's wrong, and we found that out.
After all, there is no reason upfront that the "supernatural" must be subjective, immeasurable, and outside of scientific inquiry. That's a defense tactic developed to explain a failed research project. Demonstrate the magical Power of Prayer in a series of good studies regenerating amputated limbs and see how quickly the faithful drop the phony "you can't use science on religion" mantra. If they like the results, it seems we can.
By redefining anything which science could discover as part of "Nature" after all, you make Naturalism unfalsifiable. Which seems to either make it a religious belief, or a meaningless category.
PZ, this is another excellent example of your fine writing and debating style. Are you going to be publishing your own book soon? I also visit Dawkins' website regularly, and I notice that many of the best links there are to articles that your've written. You do a GREAT job! As an aside, Dawkins and others (including commenter #3)have mentioned the scientific question of fairies under your garden.... I'm having a particularly bad problem this summer with the fairies under my garden, and although I've actually enjoyed their being there other years, this year they've turned ANGRY. I can't seem to come up with any mention of them in the journals I've checked. And I don't want to make them any angrier, I just want them to recognize me as a fellow denizen of the garden. What to do?
"Which seems to either make it a religious belief, or a meaningless category."
Scratch the word "religious" and substitute the word "faith." Otherwise, since I'm arguing that religious beliefs are provisionally falsifiable, I just refuted myself. Doh.
Did Gertrude Stein write that?
Regarding the proper use of "begging the question", the earlier question of "are there faeries at the bottom of the garden" is a perfect example. It assumes the conclusion while asking the question. It preseumes that there are such things as faeries, that we can describe their attributes, and that we can test for their presence. It's a cart-before-the-horse situation. The same thing applies when people ask "is there a god". As others have pointed out, it's effectively a meaningless statement. It's not even wrong.
If the theist's position is that god is utterly beyond the scope of human knowledge--if it exists outside of the natural world and is impervious to rational, scientific inquiry--what reason could they possibly have for thinking it exists. What questions does it answer? How would you even think of such a thing in the first place, and what could it possibly mean to say it exists?
WRONG.
The category of 'material' would gain a lot of new entries. But none of those things would be supernatural.
The first two are necessarily science. The third can be, depending on precisely how the question is worded.
Caledonian:
How do you define "supernatural?" What would be some examples of something that would be "supernatural" -- and why?
Alistair McGrath is an intellectually dishonest flea and I am glad whenever anyone takes him down a peg. He seems to attack stupid atheist stereotypes and sometimes it as if he is just making shit up.
I am looking forward to PZ's book.
PZ - I just grabbed a comment from this article of yours that was linked to from Dawkins' website. I got a kick out of the praise you got from one of his bloggers...
Comment #60690 by v4ri4bl3 on August 2, 2007 at 5:33 pm
Excellent article. I caught myself thinking, "Wow. Dawkins' writing seems to be improving quite a bit," before I realized it was written by someone else.
No offense to Dawkins. I think he's brilliant. But I also think this guy is a better writer.
He doesn't seem to use too many words or, it would seem, any words that don't fit well or flow easily. A nearly perfect article.
I agree it is amazing to think how certain individuals are comfortable following this line of reasoning. It is so patently erroneous and yet they seem to fly by with it, no problem. But then again this is the whole problem with religious ideology in the first place. Convincing yourself that it is acceptable to believe nonsense.
And very often atheists will stand up and say: "How dare you criticize Richard Dawkins!"
No no no... it's
And very often atheists will stand up and say: "How dare you criticize Richard Dawkins!"
How do you define "supernatural?" What would be some examples of something that would be "supernatural" -- and why?
There is no thing outside of nature; anything subject to empirical observation, experiment, is part of the natural world. To discuss the supernatural is to define that which is outside and apart from nature, that which is indistinguishable from the non-existent.
Ken Cope wrote:
This seems to make the categories of Natural and Supernatural for all intents and purposes meaningless. If God exists and is knowable to us in any sense, it's now a part of Nature. Nature = Reality we can know. Using this definition, it's easy to dismiss the existence of the supernatural. Using this definition, fundamentalist Muslims, New Agers, and your devout Catholic Aunt Tillie don't believe in the supernatural either.
Seems rather pointless, then. Just shift everything over and make up new words to describe the difference between disembodied, immaterial ghosts and living people, or chemical reactions and magical forces. Or, perhaps, eliminate the descriptive terms and leave off distinctions altogether.
In this post, PZ has argued that one can approach the question of God (and, presumably, ghosts, disembodied souls, and immaterial teleological, mental, or moral forces) as scientific problems. Would you agree -- or is that only true as long as nobody has slapped them with the label "supernatural?"
Well, yeah. Aunt Tillie just believes something wrong. Simple as that. The natural/supernatural distinction came about from the political relationship between the Church and the universities (and more generally the relationship between Greek and Christian thought). The universities got to study Aristotle just so long as they didn't tread on Jesus' toes. A lot of back and forth led to the completely arbitrary modern ideas about the natural/supernatural and physics/metaphysics distinctions we have clouding our views of science today. Beyond neatly exhibiting entrenched power structures they're meaningless. The Scholastics even came up with an early version of "the problem of induction" to explain how God could intervene in their clockwork Aristotelian universe.
I don't think it is an example of begging the question, because in begging the question does not use an actual question. An example of begging the question with these ideas might be the statement (note: not a question): "There must be faeries at the bottom of the garden because they are making me believe they are there with their faerie powers." In other words, the conclusion is just asserted twice, with no outside evidence.
But the question, "Are there faeries at the bottom of the garden?" (by the way, what does "the bottom of the garden" mean? In the soil under the roots of the plants?) is a well-formed question that has a yes or no answer. Questions that refer to imaginary things are still structurally legitimate as questions.
CM,
You are correct. I overstepped. However, the question presumes as valid that which it is seeking to answer. To ask if there are faeries in the garden assumes that there are such things as faeries. Maybe there's another term for it.
Steven King's works were actually written by him, albeit possibly while he was under the influence of demonic possesion.
William Shakespeare's works, on the other hand, were not written by him at all but by another fellow of the same name.
"albeit possibly while he was under the influence of demonic possesion."
Actually, it was mostly cocaine.
Given. But the category of "things we can know" != "things that are addressable by, or suitable subjects of scientific query." For something to be addressable by science, it must posses certain properties. Yes, it must affect the natural world- but it must do so in very particularly ways. To be specific, either the cause or its effects must observable to any independent observer.
While this is true of things like natural phenomenon- because natural laws are universal and incapable of self direction- it fails in the face of phenomenon that are rare and capable of (1) deliberate obfuscation, and (2) selective action.
Let's look at the issue of the fairies. Let's even be more specific and look at the concept of fairies who have no wish to be observed, but happen to like building shoes. Let's say these faeries happen to find a particular shoe maker, and, for what ever reason, they decide they like the cut of his jib. So they decide that they'll help him by making shoes for him at night when he sleeps. Now, It's just this particular shoemaker, not all shoemakers- so, its not a universally observable truth. Thus, a whole range of observers are denied access to the data in question. Further, the faeries are sentient and object to being observed- so if they recognize any sort of third party attempting to record their actions, even the shoe maker, they will simply refuse to act.
Even further, let's propose that the shoemaker in question is historically rare- the faeries are only attracted to him because, unbeknownst to the shoe maker, he has a specific and ascetically singular method of creating aglets, except one guy who discovered the method 1,000 years prior. Thus, there is no meaningful historical record of another shoemaker who will receive the benefit of these fairies, except for some guy who at best is historically questionable, and at worst is historically absent- 'cause who the hell really wants to commit the adventures of shoe makers to writing?
Now lets apply Occam's razor:
Here's a shoemaker claiming his excess inventory is due to the nocturnal contribution of some sort of unproven entity he calls a "fairy." No other shoemaker can reproduce this effect, and, under observation, the shoemaker himself can't duplicate this miracle. Further, there exists no reliable historical evidence of shoemakers receiving this unexpected benefit from his magical and unobserved benefactors. Sure, some days he has a lot of shoes, but that's it.
Now, do we allow for a multiplication of entities to explain this particular phenomenon, or do we attribute it to a combination of amphetamine use and deliberate falsehood?
The answer is simple: the shoemaker is a crank-head.
Yet, we'd be wrong. And the entities we rejected would have actually had a demonstrable effect on reality, in the production of any number of stylish-yet-comfortable kicky low back pumps.
Of course, its a bad argument for shoe making fairies, given. But it does work.
Now, extrapolate this argument to other singular, intentional events on the part of a being who feels a need to muddy the waters- like, say, the the bodily resurrection of some Jew 2,000 years ago because he was "the son of god." Or ignoring some prayers while granting others.
Of course you have to ignore things that should be scientifically observable, like world wide floods that annihilate nearly every lifeform that existed at the time, and the creation of the world in 6 days. But some people seem to be able to do this. And on that level...
It's still a bad argument, but, again, it works.
Mothworm, I believe the most common terms for it are loaded question" or "complex question".
I'm not sure if this is really a loaded question or not. As I understand it, a loaded question is intended to produce an answer that "limits direct replies to those that serve the questioner's agenda." But in this case, replying "no" to the question about the faeries does not force the answerer to accede to the existence of faeries. A question like, "Have you stopped visiting the faeries at the bottom of the garden?" however, does attempt to force the answerer to accede to the existence of the faeries.
But I see your point: asking specifics about entities about which there is no evidence ("Does God enjoy music?") is essentially equivalent to a loaded question. In fact, perhaps it is more insidious?
There are fairies at the bottom of my garden, whether "the bottom" refers to the far southern edge or the soil beneath it, where the term "fairies" includes rats and mice. When the sun goes down they gyre and gimble in the wabe, mimsily outgrabing.
Sastra:
Right! If the evidence against naturalism and materialism meets the standards of naturalism and materialism for evidence, then (and only then?) is supernaturalism possibly true. A tad circular, isn't that? Again, how do you get to the point of saying "THEN" by empiric means?
Think of it this way, the scientific method, assumes "methodological naturalism," ruling supernatural explanations out of the box at the beginning. In effect, simply showing that possibly sufficient natural causes exist does not scientifically test for the existence or nonexistence of non-natural causes, because those have been excluded as scientific explanations a priori. The only way to "scientifically" disprove supernaturalism, as you are groping for but not quite reaching, is to "scientifically" disprove science. But you can't do that scientifically, because the scientific method doesn't allow you to use non-natural explanations of events. If you manage to disprove science, it is only because you have abandoned science to do so.
It's philosophy all the way down.
More likely, someone would stand up and say, "How dare you criticize Richard Dawkins so stupidly!"
Having actually been to see McGrath talk, I would imagine that this happens quite often. My one regret was that I had yet to read the God Delusion, so I couldn't legitimately call him on his obvious misrepresentations of the arguments therein. For a while I felt quite.... militant.
Something in the line of the t-shirt definition of christianity made me love snakes - at age 8, in the sixties.
The nuns at school seemed to explode - but they didn´t.
Honestly, saying it was not responsible for the shortage of catholic personel since!
jack*:
I take it that you are claiming that those attributes can be measured scientifically (otherwise you've already violated PZ's statement that everything is a scientific object). Just how do you go about scientifically establishing that all attributes can be measured by the means of science?
Ah, if you assume that everything that exists is amenable to science then everything is amenable to science. Even if such tight circles didn't put you in danger of disappearing up your own posterior, who is this "we" and how did you get to be their spokesperson?
How does one scientifically measure "lame"? Or is that not a "scientific object"?
What scientific, as opposed to philosophic, import does that have?
For a guy who is about to claim to understand science, he sure is clueless about the fundamentals. This is not about proof. Science does not use proof. We favor evidence, and the work consists largely of the slow accumulation of evidence in support of ideas, not magically potent proofs that establish an idea as unassailable.
"For a guy who is about to claim to understand science, you sure are clueless about the fundamentals."
No, this isn't how science works. It is how science worked 100 years ago. Thankfully, science is a lot further one since then. What you're writing is an ode to confirmation bias, which is anything BUT sound science. One fundamental hallmark of good science is self-skepticism. Which is why it's not enough to accumulate "evidence in support of ideas". To do so is to declare "I am infallible, and boy, am I going to prove it to you."
No, that's not what he said. Feel free to propose a better definition of 'exists' if you don't like his.
Torbjörn:
Damn things won't go away ... especially when people claim there ain't no such animals.
What "objective" answers do you get from observations on populations, other than the percentages of such subjective attitudes, beliefs, etc. within the population? Do such studies go to the truth or falsity of them or whether they arise from natural of non-natural causes?
Windy:
Why, "exists" is the state of something that "is," a "being," the opposite of "non-existence." It is an attribute that is not logically dependent on whether or not humans know, or can know, of that existence. It certainly is not logically related in any way to the possibility of being measurable under the philosophical assumption of "methodological naturalism."
Science as "the slow accumulation of evidence" is the 19th century philosophy of science, which really has been exploded for some time. Have you read any Popper or Kuhn? Dawkins seems philosophically inept compared to Mary Midgely or Michael Ruse. Ruse's "Can a Darwinian be a Christian?" is a model of how to approach the matter and it highlights one or two very real problems, but not those posed by Dawkins who seems to present religion almost on a Da Vinci Code level of history.
It seems the scientists haven't, either. Someone should tell them that they're doing it wrong, don't you think?
Why, "exists" is the state of something that "is," a "being," the opposite of "non-existence." It is an attribute that is not logically dependent on whether or not humans know, or can know, of that existence. It certainly is not logically related in any way to the possibility of being measurable under the philosophical assumption of "methodological naturalism."
Methodological naturalism (or philisophical materialism, either) is not dependent on a thing being measurable. There are plenty of things which demonstrably exist which are not real. "Real" in this case referes to those things which are measurable (concrete/qunatifiable). Methodological naturalism doesn't deny the existance of abstract concepts, it only denies the reality of them. ;-)
That is certainly a possibility, but how do you know? Show your work. (Of course, speaking in the broadest terms of possibly knowable, not about what humans currently know)
Furthermore, existence seems to be something more than a logical attribute.
If existence-nonexistence were merely a duality, with no further meaning, attaching one of the labels to a concept would mean nothing. I will note that no one seems to use those words in that manner - there is in fact a definition attached to the distinction.
How do you determine whether something exists, or does not exist?
If I talk about the previous post in this thread where you reject the coherence of the concept of God, what argument would you use against the assertion that it exists?
Sastra:
How do you propose to define "supernatural" in such a way that it would encompass gods but not, say, incredibly powerful aliens?
Uriel, your fairies are definitely still accessible to science -- for example, do the shoes produced show any trace of human contact (e.g., fingerprints, DNA)? Are they produced if we incapacitate the shoemaker in some fashion in the evening to ensure he is not making them?
Science deals with singular events all the time, and certainly forensics and history deal with entities with intentionality. Neither of these criteria prevent objective study.
You haven't really defined anything there. You've simply passed the content of the word over to 'something that is,' 'being,' and 'non-existence.' No one could possibly derive any meaning from your definition without the definition of at least one of those terms.
Add to that the possibility that a smarter species of observer might be able to defeat the faries' attempts to hide themselves. There's a distinction between what science can manage in principle, and what we can do with it in practice.
Unless Pieret offers us a definition for 'existence', being able to detect fairies or not gives us no clues as to whether they exist in his sense.
Just because the fairies can't be interacted with in any way doesn't necessarily mean they don't exist. Just like Santa Claus, the Easter Bunny, or alchemy - just because alchemy doesn't work doesn't mean it's not true.
Firstly, PZ - great post. I loved every moment of it.
If I may just point out something going all the way back to comment #3 that I don't think anyone's picked up on yet:
A question is not and won't ever be a hypothesis. A hypothesis is a testable potential answer to a question, not the question itself. For example, one possible hypothesis arising from the question 'do fairies exist?' is 'Fairies do exist'. Once we've argued about whether or not it's testable we'll know whether it's a hypothesis or not. ;-)
On the testability issue, look at comment #48:
I think this falls into the same error that theists make when 'God' is questioned or attacked. There is a tendency among theists, when challenged, to abandon or ignore the God they 'know' (ie the God with specific qualities/atributes) in favour of a vague, nebulous 'god-concept' that can be neither proven nor disproven and certainly never targetted in arguments because its even more nebulous that fine mist.
All we need to do to answer the god/fairy question is get specific. If the fairy believer posits a fairy that can be seen, then we can dispose of all so-called arguments that relate to 'unseen-ness' or 'unknowability' and start laying camera-traps.
The God described by believers has certain characteristics - the world would noticeably be a certain type of world if a God with those characteristics existed.
It isn't.
The 'god' described by philosophers and lying aplogists isn't even a question about which a hypothesis can be formed. It is utterly worthless and the theists' reliance on this piece of rhetorical legerdemain is appalling dishonesty.
On a lighter note, comment #52:
Beautiful - that's going straight into my Big Book Of Things To Say To Piss Of My Religious In-Laws.
Caledonian @ #148:
It's fairly late at night here in Australia right now and I'm not operating at full steam. Please confirm for me that you were being sarcastic.
Please.
Of course I'm serious! Just because none of the predictions of alchemy match our observations of the way the world works doesn't mean that it's not true. It can be true anyway, just as totally unobservable fairies can exist despite being "there" in any way.
Just ask Pieret! He'll explainn it.
Yep. They're not right either. Read any Sokal, Bricmont, Haack, Wilkins, Goodstein or Feynman?
A hypothesis is a testable potential answer to a question, not the question itself. For example, one possible hypothesis arising from the question 'do fairies exist?' is 'Fairies do exist'. Once we've argued about whether or not it's testable we'll know whether it's a hypothesis or not. ;-)
Exactly. If the question can be formulated in a way that can be tested, then it is scientific. However, testing presupposes the two assumptions I mentioned earlier, that are at the core of all science, and which can be summed up by the phrase "repeatable observation". To be scientific, something must be 1) observable, i.e. "real" (whatever that is), not a dream, and 2) repeatable, which assumes that the universe is consistent. If faeries are assumed to be fully or partially unobservable, or to have inconsistent properties, then any questions about them cannot be properly tested, and are not scientific.
Taking positivism to extremes, the question of "existence" would be ultimately subjective. Something "exists" only if it can be observed (directly or indirectly) by *your* consciousness, since all that is known (or ever can be known) about reality is filtered through it. In this philosophy, observer and observed cannot be separated.
I think Myers misunderstands McGrath's point wrt the "default position". Myers argues as if McGrath says that the default position is the religious position, but McGrath is describing the starting position, not his theistic position. He says that the default position is the "obvious" agnostic position.
As for his claim that the default position is "not being sure" -- he's being dishonest. His position and the religious position in general is one of certainty in their dogma... -Myers
No, Mcgrath didn't say (in the paragraphs under discussion) that his own opinion is "not being sure", he is saying that that is the default position.
I hope that even the excitable of us heathens can remain reasonable during a heated debate and try to evaluate the opposing arguments in the most favorable light, trying to filter out our interpretive biases to keep the argument as objective as possible. Otherwise, I'd have to agree with religious onlookers that the Atheist is "missing the point".
(I'm not opining whether the true starting position should be the Atheistic position or the Agnostic position. I'm just saying that this is the point which McGrath is arguing, and which point Myers apparently doesn't understand.)
Not just that, but we can't say anything about whether any measurable things exist! In your face, Descartes!
You've misunderstood my argument. I do not think non-natural causes should be excluded as scientific explanations a priori. PZ Myers and Dawkins are arguing against "methodological naturalism" as part of the definition of how science works and for ontological naturalism as a falsifiable working theory. There is nothing in the methods of science which requires anyone to make upfront distinctions between "natural" and "supernatural."
By distinguishing "Supernaturalism" as a top-down view of reality which has pure Mental beings, properties, and products preceding, grounding, influencing, and connecting material nature. "Naturalism," on the other hand, indicates a bottom-up view of reality where complex systems, such as minds and values, arise from lifeless material processes.
What is the god, and how does it do its work? If the "god" evolved from lower-level components and does not make use of magical forces or powers which are irreducible to the physical, I say it's just a big ol' alien.
Unluckily I was drinking some lemonade when I read #141 so my keyboard needed some attention. For those unfamiliar with Mary Midgley try looking at http://www.royalinstitutephilosophy.org/articles/article.php?id=14
especially if you have read "The Selfish Gene". She wrote this in 1979 and it should be trotted out every time anyone suggests that her views in this area are worthy of respect.
Funny, you accusing me of circular reasoning.
Existence is not an attribute like color or weight, which is the core fallacy of the ontological argument. Existence can be thought of loosely as a kind of mapping: one between a concept of a thing and observations of the thing. If I say that the girl I have been dreaming about every night really exists, then you would expect me to be able to determine her name and address. If you say that faeries exist, then I would expect to be able -- at least in principle -- to make some sort of observation of them. Observations might be indirect, through instruments, or impractical for other reasons, but must be possible in principle.
Most theists are quite comfortable with this definition of existence. For God they say that the observation is done introspectively by the believer; they know in their heart that God exists. The scientist rejects this as insufficiently objective, but not because we disagree about what "exists" means.
What really pisses me off about McGrath is that he keeps saying "and that's an important point" after every fricking point he makes, as if his say-so is all we need to judge whether his points are valid or important enough.
Also, he persists presenting straw-man versions of Dawkins's arguments, which is the zenith of ignorance. In regard to the existence of gods, Dawkins DOES say "we don't know", and he goes on to say that 1) we CAN'T know, because gods are designed by those who believe in them to be unfalsifiable, and 2) that there is insuffient evidence FOR gods for their existence to be a reasonable proposition, and we can therefore assume that there aren't any until someone sees one.
And that's an important point.
The idea of "god" has ALWAYS been nothing more than a hypothesis that has never been confirmed by any information whatsoever coming from outside of the human head.
BTW, PZ, this post is one of the greats. Superb.
I think it's really just a matter of applying Sagan's bologna detection kit principles to incoming knowledge claims.
One finds that knowledge claims from religious-type sources end up falling back on arguments from authority, or personal incredulity, etc., whereas knowledge claims from scientist-type sources fall back on observation, and confirmed predictions, etc.,...not authority.
Plus, if you pay attention over time, science knowledge claims undergo big selection pressures -- the weak or incorrect ideas don't survive in the long run (no matter who makes the claim), which allows the lay-person to be wary (if excited) about any initial claim, and eager to see the outcome as this new claim is tested and debated by other scientists.
Again, these criteria are met by anything that exists at all. If something cannot be observed in any way, even in principle, in what way can it be said to exist? The concept is simply incoherent. Likewise, if something has no consistent attributes at all, how can it be said to be a specific thing? No matter how random something may appear, there must be at least one consistent attribute that we can recognize to be able to give it a name.
PZ: on reading it over again, I noticed something that bugs me. You say, "Theologians do the first part [eg,. "use chains of observation to make reasonable inferences about the cause of a pattern"]. They observe phenomena, and make assertions based on traditional mythology."
I'm not exactly sure if that's precisely the case. There is little if any evidence that theologians pay attention to anything other than attempting to reinforce their mythologies. The vast bulk of their scholarship is confined to "observing" their mythological literature. On the rare occassions they are "observing" anything out in the natural world, it is with the express expectation to "uncover evidence" IN SUPPORT of their mythology. They do NOT expect to be shown wrong. They are therefore constitutionally incapable of making "reasonable inferences about the cause of a pattern", as scientists are. They will "make assertions based on their traditional mythology" on WHATEVER they putatively "observe".
jeff :
That's too narrow, as there are plenty of scientific endeavours that do not deal with repeatable phenomena, such as paleontology, evolutionary biology, geology, and most of astronomy (not astrophysics, but astronomy). The underlying principles used may be consistent, but what is studied are contingent and often unique events.
Sorry about that unclosed bold tag.
Again, these criteria are met by anything that exists at all.
Depends on your definition of existence. I can assert the existence of an earth-size planet orbiting a star 100 thousand light years away. No one can observe it (at least not yet) to verify, so are you willing to categorically state that it doesn't "exist"?
If something cannot be observed in any way, even in principle, in what way can it be said to exist?
That is the positivist philosophy behind modern science, especially brought into focus by the copenhagen interpretation of QM. It has some important consequences, though. Since something must be observed in order to "exist", it necessarily implies the existence of an "observer". If an observer is required, then scientific reality can never be purely objective.
Likewise, if something has no consistent attributes at all, how can it be said to be a specific thing?
I didn't say fairies couldn't have some consistent attributes. In any case, the fairies example was used to test whether or not all questions about reality are scientific.
That's too narrow, as there are plenty of scientific endeavours that do not deal with repeatable phenomena, such as paleontology, evolutionary biology, geology, and most of astronomy (not astrophysics, but astronomy). The underlying principles used may be consistent, but what is studied are contingent and often unique events.
Yes, I agree - "repeatable" came from the phrase "repeatable observation". "Consistency" is a better word for the 2nd assumption.
'Not yet' is one hell of a modifier. What is important is not what we can do, but rather what can be done.
Which is why it's much simpler to define existence in terms of interactions, rather than observations.
Which is why it's much simpler to define existence in terms of interactions, rather than observations.
How are going know what "interactions" occur, without observing them (directly or indirectly) somewhere down the line?
I mean "observation" in an idealized objective form. Ultimately our grounding in reality comes from our personal experience, but we can very quickly abstract away from that to understand that is something exists than it can be observed (more properly measured) the same way by anyone. This abstract observer -- be it man, beast, or machine -- can stand in for any specific observer for defining objective existence.
When a tree falls in a forest, even if no specific person heard it the sound it made existed because an abstract observer would have heard it had they been there. The observer could have been a person, squirrel, or tape recorder.
The Copenhagen interpretation is caca.
sastra #157 says: "There is nothing in the methods of science which requires anyone to make upfront distinctions between "natural" and "supernatural." "
While there may be nothing in the METHODOLOGY to make any such a priori distinctions, it is certainly significant that that very methodology has over quite some time now ammassed a score in the "game" of "natural vs. supernatural" of some humongous positive number x to zero.
WHY SHOULDN'T scientists and everyone else pay attention to that as a real SCIENTIFIC result, no matter how ontological its original underpinnings may be? Its just another hypothesis that bites the dust. It SHOULD be as easy to let it die as any other. Screw any allegiance to its metaphysical origins.
More than ample and quite legitimate room to come down in favor of concluding that, after all, the CONCEPT (hypothesis) of supernaturality has no counterpart in reality. SCIENTIFICALLY. That's a legitimate SCIENTIFIC conclusion. The rest of it goes something like this: its all either natural, or it just plain doesn't exist as anything other than a figment in a human head. (And, BTW, it impliese that metaphysical considerations seem to be a poor source of hypotheses).
we can very quickly abstract away from that to understand that is something exists than it can be observed (more properly measured) the same way by anyone. This abstract observer -- be it man, beast, or machine -- can stand in for any specific observer for defining objective existence.
This "abstract" observer exists only in the mind of the real observer.
The Copenhagen interpretation is caca.
Tell that to all the scientists who still follow it's rules, and who favor it (probably more than 50%). Bohr pretty much got it as right as it can be for now. Most of the other interpretations have serious problems with EPR.
John Pieret #133 says, "the scientific method, assumes "methodological naturalism," ruling supernatural explanations out of the box at the beginning."
That's simply not true. Where do you get the idea that science assumes anything? (Let alone "out of the box at the beginning", as if science has achieved what it has by the kind of outrageous application of self-deceit that religion commonly relies on to establish nothing but its total incapacity to inform us about nature?). WHERE? Where do you get that crap from? Be specific. What causes you to make such an astonishingly assinine statement?
We don't need to show that unfalsifiable things are untrue, because they're already meaningless. If a thing is meaningless, it makes no difference whether we call it true or false.
So theists are wrong no matter what they do.
jack*#172 says, "When a tree falls in a forest, even if no specific person heard it the sound it made existed because an abstract observer would have heard it had they been there. The observer could have been a person, squirrel, or tape recorder."
PLEASE. What the flying heck is an "abstract observer [who] would have heard it had they been there"? What is that??? An ABSTRACTION is NOT "a person, squirrel, or tape recorder". An ABSTRACTION isn't anything other than a figment in your head.
You say:
"I mean "observation" in an idealized objective form. Ultimately our grounding in reality comes from our personal experience, but we can very quickly abstract away from that to understand that is something exists than it can be observed (more properly measured) the same way by anyone. This abstract observer -- be it man, beast, or machine -- can stand in for any specific observer for defining objective existence."
First, your estimation of what constitutes "observation" is woefully restricted. It is NOT confined to your own (or anyone else's) experience, nor is it defined by your estimation of what constitutes an ideal or objectivity. An electron or even a neutrino, for example, are "observers". Anything which partakes in an interaction automatically - essentially - makes them so. Consciousness, human or otherwise, no matter how much they think themselves adept at "abstraction", not required.
The tree falling in the forest makes a sound whether humans or their conceits are present. There are plenty of "observers" around to detect the signal, and NONE of them have to be "abstract" in order to do so. They are there (along with the tree) whether we think so or not.
I know a guy just like you. He's pretty smart. He actually does understand many things, wants to know lots more, and although the subtlety of certain aspects elude him, he makes a constant effort to engage. Its his way of learning. He simply starts blabbing things out. His way of conversing. But he's also good at listening and can turn on a dime when faced with a correction. Actually, he's pretty good at counting on it.
So. PLEASE. Be PRECISE man!!! First, TRY TO UNDERSTAND THE WORDS you employ with which you attempt to make your mind known. And listen up whenever somebody responds. Some of them might actually understand a lot more than you do. That's how lots of us get smarter. You can too.
Why, from places like here, and here, and here, among many others. You know, from scientists and philosophers of science. There might be legitimate discussions over the exact nature and extent of methodoligical naturalism but someone who has never heard of it is the first place isn't qualified to discuss that.
Which is why methodological naturalism excludes supernatural explanations, at least since Darwin drove a stake through the heart of Natural Theology.
I just can't resist discussing things with people who are too ignorant to know what the word means.
You have it backwards. Science does not assert an a priori definition of 'natural', which is necessary for the concept of the supernatural to be meaningful. If we observe it, or it indirectly affects our observations, we include it in nature. If we see something new, we expand our understanding.
The idea of the supernatural isn't coherent.
The idea of the supernatural isn't coherent.
Much better than my comment in #123
Well, I have had a lot of practice - this is only about the 200-trillionth time I've pointed that out at ScienceBlogs.
They still haven't caught on.
Which is why methodological naturalism excludes supernatural explanations, at least since Darwin drove a stake through the heart of Natural Theology.
Sounds almost like some sort of empirical evaluation of supernatural claims happened at that point. Naah, that can't be possible.
Jack d*:
All definitions are tautologies.
I would? Why? It could be someone from your childhood who you would no longer recognize or someone you passed once in the street who is now dead. Does that person cease to have been real if you can't find her address? You're dangerously close to saying that anything that merely hasn't been observed doesn't exist.
What you "expect" is not the issue here. That is, at best, your philosophy, instead of science itself, unless you can empirically demonstrate that all entities that are "things" and exist necessarily can be observed by scientific means. I should say that I have no problem with your philosophy as long as you clearly label it and don't call it "science."
And what I'm asking you to do is demonstrate why such observations "must" be possible in principle, instead of just asserting it.
Are those theists all True Scotsmen too? Let's say I know a different class of theists who most definitely would not agree that supernatural things "must" be observable by human beings in order to exist.
Windy:
You're quite right ... that wasn't what happened. The empirical claims of people like Paley were as correct as any of his day. What Darwin did was show that the inference from apparent design (that Dawkins talks about) to a designer, was not warranted (though not disproved) because there was a natural explanation that was sufficient to explain the phenomena.
Yes, I'll agree with uou on that (hey, it surprised me too!). That is the temporal direction that the impermissibly "supernatural" is determined in science. Newton's universal gravitation was accused (on good grounds) of being a metaphysical concept of ghostly action-at-a-distance by the empiricists of his day. Science eventually accepted it based on its mathematical "elegance;" its ability to explain so much and, eventually, the consistency of the observations supporting it.
That still doesn't mean that science permits supernatural explanations and does not exclude them a priori, it just means that science is open to changing its mind on what is and is not "supernatural."
Science doesn't do anything a priori. Methodological naturalism isn't a part of science; it's a thesis in the philosophy of science. The thesis goes, roughly, that while science requires methodological naturalism it doesn't require metaphysical naturalism. The argument is simply that if methodological naturalism can do the job then metaphysical naturalism would require a further argument. Notice that this argument doesn't involve experiments, observations, or anything else related to the enormously successful enterprise of science. It's also wrong.
But before we can concern ourselves with 'naturalism', we have to establish that it's meaningful to talk about things other than nature.
Back in the Dark Ages, when people had a specific list of things that were in nature, and anything else was supernatural, there were all kinds of supernatural things about. Part of the Renaissance's redevelopment of science lay in the general recognition that arbitrary definitions of nature were neither useful nor coherent.
My thoughts exactly.
The again, "supernatural" is rather meaningless in a deeper sense, since modern physics seems to imply that only boundary conditions could be freely chosen.
But Last Thursdays restarts are unpredictive and meaningless. And where is the cosmic microwave background imprinted message declaring all over the sky "I am, therefore science is not"?
Tulse:
Russell's description of gods predicting 24 h of the future would do it. Or the CMB code above.
But really, why should we care about a perfect distinction? Empirical science knows and handles uncertainty, we only need to be pretty sure.
John Pieret:
Note that all theories explaining data are circular, describing what is already known. It is predictions that break circularity - in other words, empiricism and falsifiability. It is also why predictive science doesn't work like descriptive philosophy, as you claim.
There have been no such claims here. And they doesn't cut it in these matters as I explained, which is why it is boring to see the same powerless argument time and again.
This was an aside on your argument. My argument is that we can't know if any particular question can be answered or not, so that attempt to question PZ's claim is meaningless. It is falsifiable, but not in this way.
Tony Bellows:
There is very little work done on the workings of science, but it is to a first approximation a good historical description. The ebb and tides of todays mature science as theory and experiments will periodically dominate is observed by scientists, but little explored.
To let philosophers try to describe the workings and results of science seems meaningless on the face of it. Mathematicians are their own best philosophers. For science Sokal, Feynman or why not Wilkins here on ScienceBlogs are pretty good. [I see Blake Stacey concur and expound in comment #153.]
But what we would really need is some more methodical and observational work on this.
poke:
Good description of philosophical MN. I am constantly surprised about the number of people who doesn't get that science is an endeavor and simply contains a set of useful methods. (Which IMO philosophy makes a bad job of describing, even less explaining, see above.)
jeff:
But this is because you know by observation that other such bodies exist in such environments. Even Russell's teapot exist, it is just unlikely to exist in that environment.
This is all wrong. Theoretical entities are inferred indirectly (for example, the wave function) and may or may not be observed later, and science doesn't work by excluding unobserved objects. It tentatively excludes objects that can't exist by theory or consistently defies possible observation. (Which for mature theories can become definite instead of tentative.)
The modern variants of copenhagen can chose observers to be classical decohered objects instead of appeal to ignorance. And if an object observes another object, how isn't it "objective"? :-P
Really, repeatability of observations and characterization of measurement and model uncertainties makes science objective. The problem with contingency comes in with current data and theory - our progress depends on technique, history and views.
Consistency is observed, and nowadays also theorized (symmetries, Ramsey theory).
Though I can grant that it would be very difficult to work if physics changes considerably over space and time. Not a good environment to make equipment or reasonable theories in, even less to find large universes or biological life. :-P
Russell specifically said "I might perhaps be convinced at least of the existence of some superhuman intelligence", which is a long way from a admitting to a metaphysically different entity. And sufficiently powerful, but natural, beings could even alter the CMB (certainly science fiction has postulated completely natural beings of similar power).
An argument from incredulity is no argument, especially when, as Clarke's Third Law tells us, "Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic." If you showed someone from the Middle Ages television they would no doubt think it involved the supernatural. If you showed a lighter to a neolithic human they might believe you had some magical power. Just because we cannot currently think of a way that something would be accomplished within natural laws does not mean that it is not accomplished that way. In other words, extraordinary evidence doesn't, in and of itself, necessitate the supernatural.
sastra:
Oh, I'm fully aware that they want to change the definition of science that is presented to the world every bit as much as the IDers do and in the same way, in fact. In this regard, I find them every bit as dangerous to science education as the IDers are. Unlike the IDers, they offset this pernicious effect by doing so much other good for it.
The "method" of science is what scientists actually do when they are doing science. When PZ or some other scientist actually writes up a research grant and does an actual study of God (not some peripheral business about indeterminate effects of prayer or the like) where he proposes a supernatural cause for a material phenomena that will be, in fact, critically tested by the study (which the prayer study didn't do), come back to me. Otherwise, PZ and Dawkins are merely dressing their philosophy up in science's robes as a rhetorical ploy in the exact same manner as Dembski and Behe do.
poke:
Actually, it is supposed to be, like all philosophy of science, a description of what scientists do when they do science. If you have examples of scientists acting as if methodological naturalism isn't the case in their work (rather than in their philosophizing), by all means let's hear them. The last examples I know of were Sedgwick, Agassiz and the like.
Caledonian:
Excellent! Give us a rigorous description of "nature" to start us off!
Torbjörn:
Uh, oh! A Popperian? But, you'll have to be clearer in that part, I'm not following what you're trying to say about "predictive science" and all and how that's supposed to disprove supernaturalism.
There most certainly have been. PZ said everything is a "scientific object." Or am I supposed to ignore runaway rhetoric?
Ah! Well, if Torbjörn: has explained it, it must be true. Um, could you just point me to where you've explained all of science, life, the universe and everything so I can catch up?
But if the attempt to answer his claim is meaningless, isn't his claim meaningless? Hey! If you're bucking for my title of "Village Sophist," just be warned I'll not give it up without a fight!
On the contrary, PZ and Dawkins want to eliminate an ancient fallacy that has dogged the teaching of science for ages.
Can you provide a working explanation for how we could determine something is supernatural? Merely not being part of the natural world we understand doesn't cut it, because presumably there are lots of things about the natural world we don't understand yet.
What criteria, other than ignorance, define the category of 'supernatural'?
Torbjörn:
But this is because you know by observation that other such bodies exist in such environments.
That's not the point. I was giving an example that invalidates someone else's definition of "existence". If you go back and actually read what I was responding to: (Again, these criteria are met by anything that exists at all. Depends on your definition of existence.)
That is the positivist philosophy behind modern science,...
This is all wrong. Theoretical entities are inferred indirectly (for example, the wave function) and may or may not be observed later, and science doesn't work by excluding unobserved objects.
Oh please. Yes, of course. We don't need to observe every detail to make inferences. In fact, that was one point of the earth-like planet example I gave. Nevertheless, positivist philosophy was very much behind the formulation of QM in Bohr's day. Look it up.
The modern variants of copenhagen can chose observers to be classical decohered objects instead of appeal to ignorance. And if an object observes another object, how isn't it "objective"? :-P
It is not "objective" from that object's point of view, and not even from ours, since we observe that object. However, you're right that coherence/decoherence is an improvement.
Consistency is observed, and nowadays also theorized (symmetries, Ramsey theory).
Consistency is observed, but it is also required to do science. If it wasn't, no testing could be trusted. For example, if the speed of light was inconsistent, it would affect every other physical parameter related to it in any way, some of which would also affect any testing apparatus we could devise to test for the speed of light. Ditto for plancks constant, charge on an electron, etc.
The rules of the Copenhagen interpretation are exactly the same as those of every other interpretation of QM. Were they not, we'd have separate theories, not differing interpretations of the same theory.
We're not. So? Unless you're proposing that things don't exist unless we observe them, this isn't relevant.
And it was a dismal failure. A planet 10,000 light years away is not something which "cannot be observed in any way, even in principle."
Your scenario seems to assume that the speed of light is inconsistent, but that the rules relating it to other parameters remain consistent. Of course, if that's the case, then the effects of the change are predictable, thus amenable to science.
Although blatantly false, that would be more correct than saying that observation and measurement bear no relation to existence. Which is more likely to exist: a girl you meet and talk to daily, or a girl you dream about but don't remember seeing in the waking world?
Philosophy of science concerns the logical justification of science; it's not a description of what scientists do (that would be sociology). Maybe this is the source of your confusion. Methodological naturalism is (a) not about excluding supernatural entities and (b) not a description of what science does. It's a philosophical argument (a logical thesis) concerning whether or not we're justified in taking our metaphysics from science. The argument, as I said, is that scientists could do science even if they merely acted as if they were metaphysical naturalists without making any ontological claims. This makes your challenge quite amusing: according to methodological naturalism, practicing scientists never act as if methodological naturalism is true.
Methodological naturalism is a lot like the "zombie problem." It's easy to say "there could be entities exactly like us down to the last atom but without consciousness" but the details are sticky. Likewise it's easy to say "scientists could do their work without making any ontological claims" but it's difficult to reconcile that with practice. But that's why they call it philosophy.
Why do you expect to find your planet just outside the Milky Way? ;) I suppose it could be in the galactic halo, although stars are sparser there, so it is probably *unlikely* to exist.
(This is nit-picking, of course, but doesn't it provide a nice analogy to some religious claims? An unsupported claim pulled out of a hat is less likely to be true.)
I should note that our two most famous philosophers of science, Popper and Kuhn, both make the same mistake of moving from a logical thesis (inductive skepticism) to a historical thesis (falsifiability in Popper's case and the paradigm shift model in Kuhn's case). Both "solutions" have the problem that they neither address the logical thesis (the truth of inductive skepticism, as a logical thesis, has nothing to do with the history and practice of science; if science had a history of being purely cumulative and error free, or of being an endless string of unrelated theories each one overthrowing the last, it still wouldn't amount to evidence for or against inductive skepticism) nor are they accurate descriptions of scientific practice. So when it comes to be confused about what the philosophy of science is, you're in good company.
Which is why it's much simpler to define existence in terms of interactions, rather than observations.
How are going know what "interactions" occur,without observing them (directly or indirectly) somewhere down the line?
We're not. So? Unless you're proposing that things don't exist unless we observe them, this isn't relevant.
Unless you can verify via observation that such "interactions" (whatever that means) occur consistently, you may have good imagination, but not much else.
That's not the point. I was giving an example that invalidates someone else's definition of "existence".
And it was a dismal failure. A planet 10,000 light years away is not something which "cannot be observed in any way, even in principle."
The only dismal failure here is your reading comprehension. I said 100,000 light years, and an "earth-like" planet. If you can detect one of those, you should be working for Geoff Marcy.
Your scenario seems to assume that the speed of light is inconsistent, but that the rules relating it to other parameters remain consistent. Of course, if that's the case, then the effects of the change are predictable, thus amenable to science.
Good luck with trying to figure out what's consistent and what's not, and with building any testing apparatus. Especially if the inconsistency was always present, and didn't just happen overnight.
Why do you expect to find your planet just outside the Milky Way? ;) I suppose it could be in the galactic halo, although stars are sparser there, so it is probably *unlikely* to exist.
True, I should have said 50k or 75k light years, for the other side of the galaxy.
(This is nit-picking, of course, but doesn't it provide a nice analogy to some religious claims? An unsupported claim pulled out of a hat is less likely to be true.)
Good point. I could also have said 160k or 200k light years for the magellanic clouds. But alas, they're gas rich and metal poor ;)
You've misunderstood what I was saying quite spectacularly. Right after the part you quoted I said: Observations might be indirect, through instruments, or impractical for other reasons, but must be possible in principle. Your failing memory doesn't affect whether anyone exists.
The main point is that if a person exists they have observable attributes. It doesn't matter if anyone does observe them, only that they are observable in principle. A person that you imagine or hallucinate does not. This is the difference between real and fantasy, and is the common definition of "exists" that we all share.
If you don't agree then please provide an example of something that we all agree exists, or could exist, which cannot be observed under any possible circumstance.
Well, lets break this down.
1) do the shoes produced show any trace of human contact (e.g., fingerprints, DNA)
Let's assume that the answer is yes. Does that mean faeries weren't involved?
To answer that, you have to clearly define what the abilities of the faeries in question are. Remember, they aren't interested in being discovered- just in making shoes. Now, if they are aware that fingerprint technology exists, what exactly, prevents them from inserting false data into the mix? We know from modern forensics that finger prints can be spoofed. And what about unintentional contamination?
And as far as placing DNA evidence goes, thats even easier, so long as the shoemaker drools in his sleep.
On the other hand, let's assume the answer is no.
Well, if one considers the nature of shoe making, which involves not only highly porous materials, but the use of various oily substances for things like weatherproofing, coloration and preservation, than the existence of either meaningful DNA or fingerprint evidence on a pair of shoes would involve such an obviously unlikely transfer of evidence that it would render that evidnece extremely questionable, in terms of modern forensics. Much in the way that, in a question of a suicide, a clear finger print on a well maintained gun is questionable because the treatment of the item should preclude such evidence.
Which points out the fact that what what one might consider evidence for a conclusion is sometimes evidence against that same conclusion. In such a case, the lack of evidence is more consistent with a naturalistic explanation than the presence of evidence. It's weird, but its true.
So, either way, given sufficiently clever fairies, the answer to this question is inconclusive.
Moving to your second point:
2) Are they produced if we incapacitate the shoemaker in some fashion in the evening to ensure he is not making them?
An even easier issue to answer, and far more germane to the question-
No. Of course not. If fairies in question are intelligent, self directed, and desirous of non-detection, the first thing they would do in the event of the incapacitation of the shoe maker would be to remove their influence. Remember, they're not insensate.
Let's compare this to the several studies regarding prayer and healing. Admittedly, we have various studies indicating that, given a double blind setting, prayer is not only not beneficial to the ill, but is in fact harmful.
But what, in fact, are the constraints of a double-blind study regarding prayer? Well, the first and most obvious is that prayer, under a double-blind model, can not and could never fulfill one of the most basic and common requirements of 'real' prayer- in that it cannot be a _sincere_ appeal to a higher power. It's nearly impossible to clam that a prayer for some unknown person, somewhere, for the sake of a scientific study, is sincere in any meaningful sense. So, by definition, these prayers should fail, because they are dishonest, and are attempting to asume and
commoditize what,in fact, is meant to be a gift to the faithful.
Much in the same way that expecting the faeries to continue producing shoes, in the absence of the shoemaker is unrealistic.
Again, its a weak argument- but it does work. And given a timid and uninvolved god, there are parallels.
Since the discussion has obviously moved beyond my rather simplistic model, I just wanted to say that this gets to the heart of what I was trying to say by clumsy analogy:
While it may be true that, if a thing exists, it should have observable attributes, it does not in any way follow that:
1) Those attributes will be easily or universally observable. Just because something is observable in principle does not mean it can be or will be observable in fact.
2) It does matter very much, at least scientifically, whether or not "anyone does observe them." In fact, that happens to be the whole part and parcel of what science _is_- the explanation of not only that which has in fact been observed, but that which can be observed equally by all observers. To this end, it matters very much whether a event is actually observed or whether it is only "observable in principle..."
It's possible that some violation of the first law of thermodynamics occurred yesterday somewhere in the universe. By definition, until such an event is observed, and either occurs repeatedly or leaves evidence of it's occurrence that is accessible to all equally privileged observers- scientifically for all intents and purposes, that event never occurred. That isn't the same as saying it didn't happen.
Which is to say:
Neither, until some objective demonstration is provided to prove that (a) isn't a hallucination and (b) isn't simply a case of forgetfulness. Either way, the girl in question is a non-entity, as far as science goes, barring equally accessible evidence to the contrary. That has nothing to do with weather or not she exists.
With all due respect, that is nonsense - I asked which one is more *likely* to exist, based on past experience. You don't really walk around suspecting that people you meet daily are hallucinations, do you?
And as for science - let's say I have invited a volunteer to my lab in order to take genetic samples and compare it to some physical parameter, say, hair color. I don't need to obtain confirmation that I did not hallucinate a blond girl that just visited the lab; I can do the whole analysis start to finish by myself, and the girl thus becomes a scientific object. But there is a sort of independent confirmation - our past experience of dealing with people.
Were I standing on its surface, I suspect I'd be able to detect it quite well. Hence, observable in principle. You still aren't getting the distinction between what is possible, and what one particular species of ape on a backwater planet with limited technology can do.
We seem to be doing pretty well at that already. Some physical parameters are considered constants, others variables. Furthermore, constants are watched closely for signs of change, and new theories in which they vary are frequently proposed. Do you think physicists don't actually consider such things?
poke:
I'm sorry, though I was shorthanding my comment, the philosophy of science is critically involved in untangling what it is that scientists do (since we were really dealing with epistemology here). Stephen Jay Gould, among many others, has said that "science is what scientists do." Scientists, (in most cases) don't consult philosophers before they do what they do. You can't logically justify science without justifying what it is that scientists actually do. And "justifying" in that context means "coming along afterwards and trying to sort out just what it is that scientists do and why it seems to deliver 'truth'." But John Wilkins has a good series of articles on that, with the third article and its discussion of epistemology particularly relevant here.
No and that's not how it's understood. Methodological Naturalism (with capitals) was and is an attempt to distinguish science from the pseudoscience of creationism. Specifically, it's an attempt to distinguish what "creation scientists" and IDers do from what scientists do.
I think there is a distinction to be made between them (though there is plenty of room to argue how and where). If you are right, then there is no distinction and, therefore, there is no warrant to exclude creationism from public school education on the grounds that it is not science. Simply saying creationism is bad science won't do ... we certainly don't want the government deciding what good and bad science is. Even scientific consensus doesn't help because the educational value of science is not necessarily coextensive with the "safest," most accepted, science.
It's called "methodological" precisely because scientists don't bother to make ontological claims in their work. Name me a scientific paper that has "this study is valid only if naturalism is true," or words to that effect, in it. The ontological claims of so-called "philosophical materialism" or "philosophical naturalism" are irrelevant to science as it is actually done. No scientist when considering, for example, using Ken Miller's work in his/her own work, cares what Miller's beliefs about God are ... unless he appealed to God as the mechanism by which, say, the bacterial flagellum works. "God makes it wiggle" would pretty well insure that Miller's work wouldn't be used by other scientists, don't you think? And do you think any scientist who read that would bother to see what evidence he put forward for it? Wouldn't s/he just click on the next article in PLoS?
Good. Show me where scientists make ontological claims in their actual practice of science, as opposed to their philosophizing.
Your stuff about Popper and Kuhn is a muddle. If you are saying that they were wrong to ignore the practice of science, why? According to you, the philosophy of science has nothing to do with its practice, so why should that be a problem? And if the logic and history of science are separate and not mutually relevant, then you are basically claiming that there is no logic to scientific practice. I tend to doubt that. The failures of Popper and Kuhn were that they tried to describe the logic and practice actually used by scientists and failed.
jackd*:
No, I was quite aware that you included the phrase "impractical for other reasons," which was why I included the phrase "dangerously close." The question here is how you distinguish "impractical" from "impossible" without having it eat your premise. In order for science to say anything relevant about the supernatural, such observations must be "practical," wouldn't you agree? So, how do you distinguish between a lack of scientific observations resulting from their being "impractical" from those which are "impossible"?
Which is, itself, a practical observation of a particular entity that does not necessarily translate to other entities. Asserting that God must have observable attributes is just that, an assertion.
Unless you are trying to exclude God out of the box, then any observation of God on our terms, where we can bring science to bear on the observations (which, remember, must be repeatable), are, at the very least, "impractical." I personally think, based on the method of science, they are impossible but I wouldn't know how to distinguish the two.
Windy:
I never would say that observation bears no relation to existence. But what I would say is that the probability depends not only on the existence of an observation but on the likelihood of the observation's success -- its appropriateness to the thing to be observed. The lack of observation of an electron by use of an optical microscope tell us nothing about the existence of electrons.
Caledonian:
By agreeing with Phil Johnson that God is detectable by science? I disagree with their method.
I'm told that prayer and meditation are the standard methods. Just in case you were asking for a scientific method, demanding that would be begging the question, of course. In any case, what basis do you have to think that there must be a method to make such a determination?
Exactly. If you can't determine the full extent of what is "natural," then you can't exclude the possibility of the supernatural.
Why, the same criteria that defines the category of the "natural."
No, it isn't.
What is it?
I really oughtn't let this one pass:
If you can't offer a functional definition for what is 'natural', then the 'supernatural is not a coherent concept. We don't need to provide a comprehensive list of all the things that are natural in order to discuss the properties shared by all natural things, and we most certainly can exclude the supernatural if those properties are of a certain form.
About subjectivity - see Bunge's Finding Philosophy in Social Science, which has a whole section called "The objective study of subjectivity".
jack*: The "absence of attributes is itself an attribute" argument is yet another example of where philosophy has a role to play, as it happens, as a clear theory of the distinction between properties and predicates would cure this right up.
Later on you miss the rationalist side to science. Hypotheses are invented.
jeff: You have discovered why science is not empiricism! Congratulations!
Tulse: Actually, any scientific investigation is general in some respects, specific in others. If I mix up a solution of hydrogen sulfide in water, the ambient pressure, temperature, number of ants in the grass outside, etc. are all different today as opposed to tomorrow. Exact repeatability is not possible at any time. This is ANOTHER reason why science is as rationalist as empiricist: if it weren't, experiments themselves become incomprehensible.
Torbjörn Larsson, OM: Mathematicians are their own best philosophers? Then why are so many of them Platonists? :)
All: And the philosophy of science is both descriptive AND prescriptive. Paul Bartha (philosophy, UBC) once asked me what I took the role of the history of science in the philosophy of science to be. And I answered that it should be something like "a source of examples", good and bad, for how science is to function best. So good philosophy of science can involve detailed reconstruction of historical case studies (even recent ones, of course, not just the 17th century!) which is descriptive and attempts to draw lessons, which are prescriptive.
There are two problems with that:
1) Scientists don't actually care about what the philosophy of science has to say, so its claims aren't used prescriptively no matter what its intents.
2a) The standards by which the outcomes of past examples can be judged to be useful or not are the ones science is concerned with using. You cannot analyze a thing by taking it for granted, and analyzing the criteria for valid conclusions is impossible for that reason.
2b) What you can do is acknowledge that all we can do is accept the inherent standards we possess, and try to construct a model of those standards by observing what we recognize to be true and finding patterns, then testing those patterns against future observations. In others, by performing science.
The philosophy of science is useful neither in theory nor in practice.
Actually my argument is that if God exists, then He must have attributes observable in principle. This is true because this is what it means to say that something "exists," the core part of my argument which as far as I can tell you have not bothered to try and refute.
You seem to be having a lot of trouble making the leap from "observable in practice" to the more abstract "observable in principle." One way of thinking about this is to imagine you have the power to project yourself anywhere and any time in the universe, at any possible scale and make any measurement or observation that is logically possible. With that power, what type of entity could exist but remain unobservable?
The answer is none, because that is the definition of "exists." Not the scientific definition, but the everyday, common, linguistic definition. It's what the word means.
I would add that it is not enough to say that the deity has this power, but chooses to remain in hiding. If he is unobservable in principle, he must be incapable of making himself known to humans, even if he would desire it. (a strange sort of God, but there you have it.)
My six-year-old daughter has been trying out a number of different fairy-traps in the garden; sometimes she just goes ahead and constructs one, other times she draws a design and consults me for an opinion on whether it will work. So far I've always been able to find something about the trap - the glue will probably have dried by the time they come out, those holes are pretty big, what if they don't like that sort of bait? etc - that means it's an inconclusive test (if it doesn't catch any fairies). I've also been perfectly open about the fact that I don't believe in fairies, and though she respects my opinion as a zoologist, she is also aware that there are things I don't know.
I expect that one of these years she'll come to the same sort of conclusion as Jared #6 - and I - did about the Creed. But as long as she still believes (or plays the game of believing, which is the same thing), she's doing exactly what she should do as a protoscientist: trying her darndest to catch some of the little buggers.
Her record of keeping pets alive isn't too good (e.g. problems with food, water, or excess sunlight), so if she does get one, I'll show her how to euthanase it humanely and collect tissue samples while it's still fresh. That's the sort of attitude I would respect in a theologian.
Well, yes, I do. but I like to think of that as one of my many charming idiosyncrasies. Much in the same way my insistence on wearing at least on piece of ladies undergarments, regardless of the situation, enamors me to one and all. But, to the point-
Granted its not the clearest of arguments. And, yes, a) is far more _likely_ than b) to be real- under the assumption that you happen to be a reliable observer.
That is not at all the same thing as saying a) does exist and b) is a fiction. Putting aside my assumption that you are, in fact a reasonable observer, it is possible that a) & b) exist, a) and not b) exists, b) and not a) exists, and neither a) nor b) exists.
Unless I have clear, objective evidence that one of those cases are true, I can't take your assertion on face value in a scientific sense.
As a counter example, lets say that the entity a) you are claiming to have daily interactions with happens to be the ghost of your great-great grandfather, who visits you daily around 3 p.m., and the entity b), which you claim to only dream about, upon objective analysis, bears a striking similarity to someone you meet regularly two years ago in a bar you used to frequent, but have since forgotten about given your active social life.
Now which is more likely to exist?
John Pieret #178 says:
"I just can't resist discussing things with people who are too ignorant to know what the word means."
Well, that's just dandy of you. Spiffy even. You keep worrying about other people who you think "are too ignorant to know what THE WORD" means (ahem, cough) and I'll just continue to point out how conceited imbeciles like you don't even know what a fucking word IS. Perhaps we can arrive at some mutual agreement down the road, hmmm? Say, in about 30 years or so, sport? That should be ample time for a delusion-fever to break.
The word you don't know is "assinine." Despite all the evidence you keep presenting, you insist on applying it to people other than yourself.
[Sorry for the delay but I had problems posting before. These horses appear pretty moribund anyway. My last thoughts:]
Caledonian:
But then why would "natural" be any less "incoherent"? On the other hand, if you can make a "coherent" category of "natural," then you've made a coherent category of "supernatural," unless you can point to one or more other categories. Similarly, if you can come up with criteria for "natural," you've automatically come up with criteria for "supernatural."
jack*:
In other words, an unlimited being should be able to observe everything that exists. In short, God can observe God. Okay, if you say so. I don't see how that's relevant to what humans can know, particularly through science.
Back from the weekend and commenting again FWIW.
Tulse:
Sure. But why would we need to be perfectly able to distinguish between gods and some really improbable false positives?
Oh, perhaps you think this is about "truth", not facts?
Back from the weekend and commenting again FWIW.
John Pieret:
Why, because some are in Scottish?
The prayer study incorporated the possibility of observing effects of supernatural causation, which is what believers attribute to them.
Ask those philosophers that rigorously describe "methodological naturalism".
Back from the weekend and commenting again FWIW.
John Pieret:
Not especially. But "falsification" is a good model for testability.
Hm? I was answering your claim about circularity. Predictions break it.
Now you are circular. :-P In the bad way; I was discussing why nobody has claimed that subjective areas doesn't exist. AFAIK Myers recognizes relative morals.
Comment #106.
How did you go from "that attempt" to all "the attempt"'? You Village Sophist, you! :-P
Back from the weekend and commenting again FWIW.
jeff:
Oops. I missed the earlier comment. Turns out I actually agree with your real point.
Oh please. Yes, of course. :-P
First off, the minor use of philosophy, not necessarily positivist, by Bohr was an attempt to clarify the emerging theory.
Second, both the QM of Bohr vs that of today, and the philosophy of Bohr's day and the methods describing modern science would differ, wouldn't it? Science today as practiced is naturalist and reductionist.
Circularity isn't an indication of non-objectivity. And all complete theories would be circular anyway.
If you mean that we have no complete description of an observer, or progress of time, for a universal wavefunction in QM, that is correct.
I don't think that word means what you think it means. If speed of light varied slowly enough we would be able to keep up. Think "slight change of parameter value". The trouble would be that change every 5 minutes would be hairy. :-P
Thus God and anything "supernatural" are - in principle - scientific objects. QED.
Since "not being able to come up with a functional definition" IS what incoherent means, you're a total idiot.
Wrong.
Hmm, it looks like the "begging the question" discussion wrapped up a couple days ago, so I doubt I'll get an answer to this (I just got back from a week long vacation), but how common does misuse of a word/phrase have to be before it becomes an accepted usage? Does it ever? (Examples: spelling RADAR as radar, or using you instead of thou) It's just become a pet peeve of mine in recent years when people seem to think that dictionaries and grammatical rules define language, rather than merely being descriptions of language.
On another note, I'm glad I changed my handle from Jeff to Fatboy, so that people won't confuse me with that other jeff.
John Pieret:
poke has it right - philosophy is neither needed, nor a good description of what scientists do. What we would like to have are models, preferably testable, of what science does. This is not something that seems to interest philosophers, with a few exceptions. (Such as Popper on tests.)
Um, no, the logical justification for science is that it delivers useful (reliable) knowledge. Knowledge is "validated beliefs" and science provides the validation process.
That isn't "the" assertion. One common assertion is that most religions make supernatural claims on evidence. You can also see assertions that when they claim to know about supernatural agents, skeptics wants to see evidence.
And getting this evidence isn't "impractical" in most cases.
Keith Douglas:
Hmm. I don't understand how you go from that we select and observe experiments to be robust, to the conclusion that rationalism is needed.
For me, rationalism is an expression of the formalism that we need to describe methods and results.
They didn't get better advice. :-P
If you want to help, the "n-Category Café" has a house philosopher. I haven't a clue whether he is a Platonist or not. (But given the company, I suspect he is.)
Caledonian:
Exactly. We need a "science of science". I want to know, dammit! :-P
We already have it. The problem is that it can't be made into a complex field, which is what philosophers want for job security. All you have to do is apply the scientific method to its own implementation.
When philosophers want to understand why looking at a map justifies our claim to knowledge of the territory, they create a diagram illustrating the relationship of the map to the territory. Then they construct a diagram explaining the diagram. Then a diagram of diagramming the diagram. And so on, and so on.
When scientists want to understand how the map justifies the claim to knowledge, they walk out into the territory and compare the map to it. No infinite chain of explanations. No increasingly complex but empty knowledge base that requires years of study to be familiar with. Just a simple procedure that anyone can do.
What we now call 'science' used to be called 'natural philosophy'. The field was split in two for a very good reason.
Torbjörn: Generality - which has to be assumed in order to understand experimentation. Think of an experiment concerning falling bodies. The very statement of a principle to be investigated goes well beyond experience - it says (say) that ALL bodies fall with acceleration g, etc. (Whether this is correct or not - it isn't, of course, since it only applies close to the Eart -is not the point.)
What is the n-Category café?
Caledonian:
Oh, I agree! (And, I might add, beautiful analogy.)
[Though I would rather they called it "science of science", to get these people off their ontological and metaphysical asses.]
Keith Douglas:
Excuse me, did you say "assumptions", "testability" and "uncertainty"? No? Oh, problem of induction.
Well, I thought we didn't care much for that in science. And I think generality is an observation, amply verified on cosmological scales by now. (Though a sufficiently non-general nature would doom the project of science - we wouldn't be able to keep up and track all changes, or in worst case not even understand (construct) our equipment as you discuss. OTOH we would probably not live either. :-o)
Googling points you here.
Look for David Corfield's posts, such as this:
(But AFAIK he is open to all math philosophies and "foundations". He lament the lack of philosophers on math IIRC.)
Kudos, PZ, that was a very eloquent and instructive analysis.
One way of judging a denialism (here of science results and criticism on faith) or fundamentalism is to observe the inconsistencies that appears from cognitive dissonance. I will of course only join the choir in noting such occurrences.
Kettle, pot, black.
Also, I had assumed that "apologetics" was what christians called theology that defends their faith against attacks. But it turns out that apologia is defending any position from attacks, perhaps going back to rhetorics.
As atheism seems to be the "attacker" as defining a positive world view based on observations, it is McGrath task to come up with support for defense. Instead he finds that "Richard Dawkins approaches the question of whether God exists in much the same way as if he'd approach the question of whether there is water on Mars". An inconsistency.
Kettle, pot, black.
In lieu of being an "expert" in molecular biophysics" and having "studied the history and philosophy of science extensively", McGrath has obviously no idea of what predictions and theories entail. Another inconsistency.
Predictions doesn't concern new entities but new data, and the purpose is to increase the number of observations and decrease the number of faulty theories by verification.
Verified theories may or may not introduce new entities which may or may not contribute directly in the extension of predicted data. It is however the theory as a whole that is important. McGrath should compare with theories, not entities. A category mistake, that can count as yet another inconsistency due to its cause.
Kettle, pot, black.
Besides the Kuhnian mistake that PZ points out, it is really funny to see the dissonance in the inconsistencies here. He also fails to notice that Dawkins discuss improbability, not impossibility. Two more inconsistencies for McGrath.
This was just the beginning of the article. It goes on, and on, and on, and screams "cognitive dissonance" and "faith-head" for those who listen.
Hmm. I really like this short and powerful description. It is correct that science could be any question, if it directly or indirectly connects with observations.
But I see that PZ, while noting that observations bear on this particular question, goes on to consider whether any question could be inquired on. John Pieret raises subjective questions (again :-P), which can get a subjective answer from individuals or objective answers from observations on populations.
Regardless of if all subjective questions can get a meaningful answer, in general I think that at some point questions themselves become meaningless because they stop to be well formed.
But on well formed questions we can't tell if they can be answered or not. (If we could we would have either all answers or at least a full description of all possible empirical methods.) We can but try.
Mathematician:
I'm pretty sure PZ meant empirical questions. And it so happens that math connects with (and are confirmed by) science through usage.
Btw, FWIW, IMVHO math can't be just a language game. Not only by essential parts of it being inspired and coincidentally tested by use, but because I subscribe to Chaitin's view of semi-empiricism in math proper.
My thoughts exactly.
The again, "supernatural" is rather meaningless in a deeper sense, since modern physics seems to imply that only boundary conditions could be freely chosen.
But Last Thursdays restarts are unpredictive and meaningless. And where is the cosmic microwave background imprinted message declaring all over the sky "I am, therefore science is not"?
Tulse:
Russell's description of gods predicting 24 h of the future would do it. Or the CMB code above.
But really, why should we care about a perfect distinction? Empirical science knows and handles uncertainty, we only need to be pretty sure.
John Pieret:
Note that all theories explaining data are circular, describing what is already known. It is predictions that break circularity - in other words, empiricism and falsifiability. It is also why predictive science doesn't work like descriptive philosophy, as you claim.
There have been no such claims here. And they doesn't cut it in these matters as I explained, which is why it is boring to see the same powerless argument time and again.
This was an aside on your argument. My argument is that we can't know if any particular question can be answered or not, so that attempt to question PZ's claim is meaningless. It is falsifiable, but not in this way.
Tony Bellows:
There is very little work done on the workings of science, but it is to a first approximation a good historical description. The ebb and tides of todays mature science as theory and experiments will periodically dominate is observed by scientists, but little explored.
To let philosophers try to describe the workings and results of science seems meaningless on the face of it. Mathematicians are their own best philosophers. For science Sokal, Feynman or why not Wilkins here on ScienceBlogs are pretty good. [I see Blake Stacey concur and expound in comment #153.]
But what we would really need is some more methodical and observational work on this.
poke:
Good description of philosophical MN. I am constantly surprised about the number of people who doesn't get that science is an endeavor and simply contains a set of useful methods. (Which IMO philosophy makes a bad job of describing, even less explaining, see above.)
jeff:
But this is because you know by observation that other such bodies exist in such environments. Even Russell's teapot exist, it is just unlikely to exist in that environment.
This is all wrong. Theoretical entities are inferred indirectly (for example, the wave function) and may or may not be observed later, and science doesn't work by excluding unobserved objects. It tentatively excludes objects that can't exist by theory or consistently defies possible observation. (Which for mature theories can become definite instead of tentative.)
The modern variants of copenhagen can chose observers to be classical decohered objects instead of appeal to ignorance. And if an object observes another object, how isn't it "objective"? :-P
Really, repeatability of observations and characterization of measurement and model uncertainties makes science objective. The problem with contingency comes in with current data and theory - our progress depends on technique, history and views.
Consistency is observed, and nowadays also theorized (symmetries, Ramsey theory).
Though I can grant that it would be very difficult to work if physics changes considerably over space and time. Not a good environment to make equipment or reasonable theories in, even less to find large universes or biological life. :-P
Back from the weekend and commenting again FWIW.
Tulse:
Sure. But why would we need to be perfectly able to distinguish between gods and some really improbable false positives?
Oh, perhaps you think this is about "truth", not facts?
Back from the weekend and commenting again FWIW.
John Pieret:
Why, because some are in Scottish?
The prayer study incorporated the possibility of observing effects of supernatural causation, which is what believers attribute to them.
Ask those philosophers that rigorously describe "methodological naturalism".
Back from the weekend and commenting again FWIW.
John Pieret:
Not especially. But "falsification" is a good model for testability.
Hm? I was answering your claim about circularity. Predictions break it.
Now you are circular. :-P In the bad way; I was discussing why nobody has claimed that subjective areas doesn't exist. AFAIK Myers recognizes relative morals.
Comment #106.
How did you go from "that attempt" to all "the attempt"'? You Village Sophist, you! :-P
Back from the weekend and commenting again FWIW.
jeff:
Oops. I missed the earlier comment. Turns out I actually agree with your real point.
Oh please. Yes, of course. :-P
First off, the minor use of philosophy, not necessarily positivist, by Bohr was an attempt to clarify the emerging theory.
Second, both the QM of Bohr vs that of today, and the philosophy of Bohr's day and the methods describing modern science would differ, wouldn't it? Science today as practiced is naturalist and reductionist.
Circularity isn't an indication of non-objectivity. And all complete theories would be circular anyway.
If you mean that we have no complete description of an observer, or progress of time, for a universal wavefunction in QM, that is correct.
I don't think that word means what you think it means. If speed of light varied slowly enough we would be able to keep up. Think "slight change of parameter value". The trouble would be that change every 5 minutes would be hairy. :-P
John Pieret:
poke has it right - philosophy is neither needed, nor a good description of what scientists do. What we would like to have are models, preferably testable, of what science does. This is not something that seems to interest philosophers, with a few exceptions. (Such as Popper on tests.)
Um, no, the logical justification for science is that it delivers useful (reliable) knowledge. Knowledge is "validated beliefs" and science provides the validation process.
That isn't "the" assertion. One common assertion is that most religions make supernatural claims on evidence. You can also see assertions that when they claim to know about supernatural agents, skeptics wants to see evidence.
And getting this evidence isn't "impractical" in most cases.
Keith Douglas:
Hmm. I don't understand how you go from that we select and observe experiments to be robust, to the conclusion that rationalism is needed.
For me, rationalism is an expression of the formalism that we need to describe methods and results.
They didn't get better advice. :-P
If you want to help, the "n-Category Café" has a house philosopher. I haven't a clue whether he is a Platonist or not. (But given the company, I suspect he is.)
Caledonian:
Exactly. We need a "science of science". I want to know, dammit! :-P
Caledonian:
Oh, I agree! (And, I might add, beautiful analogy.)
[Though I would rather they called it "science of science", to get these people off their ontological and metaphysical asses.]
Keith Douglas:
Excuse me, did you say "assumptions", "testability" and "uncertainty"? No? Oh, problem of induction.
Well, I thought we didn't care much for that in science. And I think generality is an observation, amply verified on cosmological scales by now. (Though a sufficiently non-general nature would doom the project of science - we wouldn't be able to keep up and track all changes, or in worst case not even understand (construct) our equipment as you discuss. OTOH we would probably not live either. :-o)
Googling points you here.
Look for David Corfield's posts, such as this:
(But AFAIK he is open to all math philosophies and "foundations". He lament the lack of philosophers on math IIRC.)