Rawls

Somehow, this passage from John Rawls Political Liberalism seems relevant to Egypt, to anti-creationism, to the disputes over gnu atheism, and even to a forthcoming reply to Martin Cothran on the nature of human rights:

Now the serious problem is this. A modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. No one of these doctrines is affirmed by citizens generally. Nor should one expect that in the foreseeable future one of them, or some other reasonable doctrine, will ever be affirmed by all, or nearly all, citizens. Political liberalism assumes that, for political purposes, a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a constitutional democratic regime. Political liberalism also supposes that a reasonable comprehensive doctrine does not reject the essentials of a democratic regime. Of course, a society may also contain unreasonable and irrational, and even mad, comprehensive doctrines. In their case the problem is to contain them so that they do not undermine the unity and justice of society.

The point being that pluralism is good, necessary, and inevitable, and our political processes should not assume some single doctrine or worldview, but should work to find ideas and policies agreeable across this diversity. Doctrines which are, or which seem to be harmful or irrational are to be contained, not eradicated.

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The problematic presupposition is clearly stated:

... yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines.

Fortunately for himself, John Rawls apparently never encountered our contemporary teabaggers and hyperchristians.

By Pierce R. Butler (not verified) on 10 Feb 2011 #permalink

The catch being that there are different degrees of incompatibility. Some doctrines may be incompatible in the sense that for a human to hold both in their head at the same time requires a serious degree of psychosis (say, that the world is spherical and that it is tetrahedral). Many such, however, can in some degree be separately held by differing members of society, such that on most questions of social governance the adherents do not conflict to a level that is socially destructive.

However, the doctrines are often part of doctrinal complexes that indicate what level of deviation from normal (or prescribed) sorts of belief should be met with varying levels of social disincentives (shunning, disdainful language, damage to property and/or person, death to the individual and/or kith and kin, et cetera). This in turn leads to social questions about what sorts of disincentives ought be met with secondary disincentives, potentially including various disincentives formally sanctioned by the rest of society.

Some doctrinal complex pairs may be simply too incompatible to be contained together within the same society without resulting in conflict potentially leading to (near-)extinction of at least one of them. Of course, such inter-meme conflicts seldom are as rapid as (say) a mere decade-long civil war; the initial trend may not indicate the end result.

Political liberalism presumes that in most cases, the parts of the complex associated with mutual tolerance can keep the believer-group A and believer-group B working together to allow negotiating agreement about resolving (or at least conducting) conflicts. However, this will tend to break down if the conflict is over how agreement is to be negotiated (or if the negotiated agreement itself results in extinction of the population; humans usually aren't that directly stupid, however).

Rawls died in 2002, and wrote the quoted passage in 1995. While that's pre-teabagger, it's in the midst of the Gingrich revolution, and well after the rise of the radical religious right.

If Rawls considered J. Falwell, P. Robertson, et al, "reasonable", what else need we ask about J. Rawls?

By Pierce R. Butler (not verified) on 10 Feb 2011 #permalink

Why assume Rawls did any such thing? Hence the last two sentences quoted above.

How could he expect to "contain" that which he won't even name?

Can't you just imagine a wingnut headline about this post?


"Accommodationist" seeks to imprison Christian Patriots!!!

By Pierce R. Butler (not verified) on 10 Feb 2011 #permalink

Is there a substantive difference in this context between "containment" and "marginalization?"

How many Gnu Atheists are actively seeking eradication instead of marginalization?

Is hoping that someday everyone will think that religion is nuts a symptom of a desire to eradicate religion, or a symptom of ignorance of human nature?

Is nothing more than loud and open disrespect of religious ideas (up to and including purposefully offending those who hold such ideas) an act more consistent with the goal of eradication or with the goal of marginalization?

Dave W.: The term "eradicate" is borrowed here from Jerry Coyne, who has used it repeatedly, and has defended it repeatedly as his goal. Sam Harris certainly seems to suggest that he wants to completely end faith when he calls his book "the end of faith," and when he maintains as wide a criticism of belief as possible. PZ has stated that his desire is more to marginalize than to eradicate, though I doubt he'd mind if religion got eradicated. Dawkins probably falls into that camp, too, though I don't recall a specific statement.

Pierce: "How could he expect to "contain" that which he won't even name?"

Presumably by stating clearly the characteristics of that which must be contained. Listing particular instances would make a philosophical work seem arbitrary and post hoc, while listing properties makes it clear his goal is a priori principles.

Rosenau wrote:

"PZ has stated that his desire is more to marginalize than to eradicate, though I doubt he'd mind if religion got eradicated."

And I doubt that the people you mention who seek eradication wouldn't find more productive things to do if religion were to reach the levels of marginalization that PZ seeks.

Once it reaches that sort of triviality, how would one go about eradicating the remainder, anyway, without resorting to thought police prying into the personal lives of the last few closeted theists? I mean, I think anyone who calls for the eradication of religion either isn't thinking things through, or is instead in reality just trying to help the competition among "memes" do the job. After all, a title like "The End of Faith" doesn't imply an active eradication. There may simply come a day when the last person who finds a need for faith dies a natural death.

And Coyne is pretty clear that by "eradicate" he means to argue it to death, which can really only marginalize it since a certain percentage of people will never accept some arguments.

Dave W.: I don't dispute that actually eradicating religion would be nigh-impossible, and hardly necessary. But that's Coyne's stated goal, and he seems committed to that language, so I'll use it in discussing his aims. Furthermore, I don't think it would be unfair, when other gnus endorse Coyne's anti-accommodationism and don't draw a distinction between his "eradication" talk and their own views, to assume that while they may not advocate eradication, they also don't object to that language. All of which is to say that I feel justified in addressing the topic of "eradicating" ideas, and the illiberal nature of that language, in the context of the headbutters.

Poor dumb me, I still don't have any idea what Rawls meant by "contain".

Does it entail barbed wire?

By Pierce R. Butler (not verified) on 11 Feb 2011 #permalink

Well, I don't see anyone advocating for the re-writing of history books or encyclopedias to eradicate these ideas. The notion that slavery benefits both master and slave has been about as eradicated as any idea can be in the U.S. Is our society worse off for its utter elimination from serious political discourse?

Or are you just arguing that "eradicate" is the wrong word for Coyne to be using?

Pierce: Yes, because barbed wire is the best way to contain a doctrine. Works every time.

And I still don't know what Rawls had in mind - but I'm coming to suspect it involves a physically meaningless abstraction of no use whatsoever against impending theocratic totalitarianism.

Ftr: my computer went on strike last night, so I'm hitchhiking on a neighbor's system which won't be available most of the weekend. Failure to respond doesn't mean I'm _choosing_ to drop out of this dialog...

PS: I live near several "detention facilities", and they've mostly upgraded to razor wire. USA: always at the cutting edge!

By Pierce R. Butler (not verified) on 12 Feb 2011 #permalink