A Paper on the Problems with Perceptual Symbol Systems

If you found yesterday's post on perceptual symbol systems and related theories interesting, you might like this paper by Edouard Machery that is in press at Cognition. The paper is titled "Concept Empiricism: A Methodological Critique." The critique is aimed at "neo-empiricism" in concept research, and uses Barsalou's perceptual symbol systems theory as its primary example. Here's the abstract:

Thanks to Barsalou's, Damasio's, Glenberg's, Prinz' and others' work, neo-empiricism is gaining a deserved recognition in the psychology and philosophy of concepts. I argue, however, that neo-empiricists have underestimated the difficulty of providing evidence against the amodal approach to concepts and higher cognition. I highlight three key problems: the difficulty of sorting out amodal predictions from neo-empiricist predictions, the difficulty of finding experimental tasks that are not best solved by imagery and the difficulty of generalizing findings concerning a given cognitive process in a given context to other cognitive processes or other contexts. Finally, solutions to these three problems are considered.

More like this

In his comment to my post on conceptual metaphor theory (CMT), reposted here, Dr. Gibbs writes: The topic of why conceptual metaphor theory arouses such vehemence is one that greatly interests me and is again the subject of my in progress book. My own opinion is that conceptual metaphor theory, and…
One of the more sophisticated theories in embodied cognition is Lawrence Barsalou's perceptual symbol systems theory. It is, in essence, an updated version of the "ideas as images" position of the British empiricists, and the mental imagery theories of the seventies1. The basics of the theory are…
Throughout the brief history of cognitive science, debates over the nature of knowledge representation have raged. In the 1970s, the debate was between those who thought that knowledge was represented as images -- modal, or sensory representations -- and those who thought that knowledge was…
One of the more sophisticated theories in embodied cognition is Lawrence Barsalou's perceptual symbol systems theory (which I've talked about before, here). Starting from the premise that cognition is for action, it argues that concepts are represented in the same brain systems that directly serve…

Is it possible to design satisfactory experiments to "solve" the PSS versus propopsitional problem? You'll never get people to agree that your manipulations are adequate. For example,

Reviewer A: There are some interesting ideas in this proposal. Experiment 1 in particular should provide interesting and informative results.

Reviewer B: However, it is not entirely clear what Experiment 1 will contribute to our understanding of interaction of verbal and nonverbal processing...

Fred, the solution Machery gives is to test individual models, rather than modal vs. amodal theories in general. I think that's the best way to go about it. If you can show that the best modal theory handles the data better than the best current amodal theory, then you have a reason to adopt a modal perspective until a better amodal theories come out.